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Abstract
Behavioral research has long documented that the choices an individual
makes do not always follow the maximization of expected values. To describe the
utility an individual maximizes through his or her choices, one class of models —
static models — has been previously developed. These models are reviewed in Chap-
ter 1. To assess the static models, a non-parametric method to reveal the utility of
alternatives is developed in Chapter 2. The results show that the utility predicted
from the static models deviates from the estimated utility.
Utility, however, is relatively unstable across contexts determined by infor-
mation presentation formats, choice set-sizes, the structures of alternatives, and the
relationships between alternatives. This instability is a topic for Chapters 3, 4, and
5. Following Chapter 3, which examines effects of information presentation formats
and choice set-sizes on risk-taking, Chapter 4 further investigates how the contexts
impact on choice evaluation. Then, Chapter 5 examines process of choice evaluation
by analyzing eye-movements during choices. The results from these three chapters
indicate that choices are systematically altered with contexts, supporting instability
of utility.
The instability of utility conflicts with the principle of utility maximization,
and Chapters 5 and 6 consider another class of models — dynamic models — which
can accommodate utility instability. A dynamic model assumes that an individ-
ual iteratively and stochastically develops preferences for each alternative, until
preference for one alternative reaches a choice criterion. The exact processes of
preference development is investigated in Chapter 5, which suggests that a dynamic
model should be based on single-attribute pair-wise comparisons. Following this
suggestion, a new model — multi-alternative decision by sampling — is proposed in
Chapter 6.
Chapter 7 discusses overall implications of the results for the principle of
utility maximization and model evaluation. I conclude that models should be as-
sessed not only on their ability to predict choices but also on their ability to predict
concurrent process measures, including eye-movements.
xiii
Chapter 1
Introduction
Choice making lies at the heart of human behavior. When an individual walks across
a busy street, the individual is assessing a risk of being run over a car and choosing
when to cross the street. When an individual looks through a menu at a restaurant,
the individual is evaluating each dish on the menu and choosing which dish he or she
prefers the most. Some of choices, such as choosing who to marry with, have life-
changing consequences, while others may have more trivial consequences. Studies on
how an individual makes those choices has been of great interest for psychologists,
economists and researchers in many other field. Psychology of choice has been
studied since the 18th century and has attracted increasing attention especially
over the last three decades.
This thesis investigates how an individual evaluates an alternative and how
he or she makes a choice, and this investigation extensively uses mathematical mod-
els to understand choices. There exist numerous mathematical models to explain
a number of phenomena observed with various experimental paradigms, ranging
from perceptual choice (e.g., choosing a brighter patch) to consumer choice (e.g.,
choosing a car to purchase). These mathematical models have been practically and
theoretically proved useful, as they can be readily tested with various alternatives
and compared against actual choice behavior.
Many of the existing models can be classified into the class of static models
or the class of dynamic models. Static models are often developed in behavioral eco-
nomics to explain choice between probabilistic pay-offs. In contrast, dynamic mod-
els typically stem from psychophysics to explain speed and accuracy of perceptual
judgments and have been extended to explain choice between consumer products.
Although other classes of models exist in the literature (e.g., heuristic models), this
introductory chapter focuses on the classes of static and dynamic models, especially
1
the models I use throughout the rest of thesis. Thus, this chapter does not aim
to provide comprehensive review of the field, but rather, it aims to introduce the
models relevant to the chapters to follow.
1.1 Static Models
Choice models, especially those in economics, often assume utility maximization.
Here, an individual is assumed to choose an alternative which maximizes utility.
Since studies in 18th century, it has been empirically shown that an individual’s
choice is not well explained by maximization of expected pay-off. To understand
an individual’s choice, various models have been proposed to describe utility of an
alternative. I start the review with one of the earliest models: expected utility
theory.
1.1.1 Expected utility theory
Expected utility theory was first proposed by Bernoulli (1738/1954) to explain be-
havioral phenomena associated with a price an individual should pay to play a
gamble. The individual can be assumed to pay any price up to the expected pay-off
from the gamble, but violation of this assumption is observed with St. Petersburg
game. In this game, a coin is flipped repeatedly until a head is produced. If an
individual enters this game, the individual earns pay-off of £2n, where n is the
number of coin flips before landing a first head. An expected pay-off from this game
is calculated as follows:
∞∑
n=1
1
2n
2n =
∞∑
n=1
1 =∞.
If an individual is willing to pay any price up to the expected pay-off, this individual
should be willing to pay any price at all: for example, hundreds of pounds.
An individual is, however, typically willing to pay only a few pounds, violat-
ing the assumption that his or her choice is explained well with maximization of the
expected pay-off. This violation led Bernoulli (1738/1954) to formulate expected
utility theory. According to this theory, an individual maximizes expected utility
— subjective value of pay-offs —, rather than the actual expected pay-offs. Thus,
Bernoulli introduced an utility function, which converts monetary amount into sub-
jective value. In order to explain behavior in the St. Petersburg game, this utility
function has to be concave. The utility function suggested by Bernoulli (1738/1954)
himself is the logarithmic function, but for the sake of brevity and consistency with
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Figure 1.1: Example utility function: u(x) = x0.88. Dotted line represents an
identity function. Parameter value, 0.88, is taken from Tversky and Kahneman
(1992).
the other models, I assume a power function, u(x) = xα, where 0 < α < 1. As
an illustration, an utility function with α = 0.88 is displayed in Figure 1.1. Then,
expected utility in the St. Petersburg game is calculated as below:
∞∑
n=1
1
2n
u(2)n =
∞∑
n=1
1
2n
(2α)n =
∞∑
n=1
1
2n
2αn =
∞∑
n=1
2αn−n
<
∞∑
n=1
2n−n =
∞∑
n=1
1 =∞. (∵ α < 1)
With a concave utility function, an expected utility in the St. Petersburg game is
less than infinity, which predicts that an individual should be willing to pay only
up to a finite amount of price to enter this game. Please note however, that utility
function is not a general solution, since other pay-off structures could still lead to
infinite value in a variant of St. Petersburg game.
1.1.2 Prospect theory
While expected utility theory successfully describes an individual’s behavior in the
St. Petersburg game, empirical studies from 1950s reported a variety of choice be-
havior inconsistent with expected utility theory. These violation of expected util-
ity theory has been throughly reviewed by Birnbaum (2008), Loomes (2010), and
Schoemaker (1982). Here, I will only review one of the most well-known violations:
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Allais’s paradox (Allais, 1953).
This paradox is empirically tested by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), where
an individual is asked to make a choice between the following two alternatives.
A: 2,500 with probability .33,
2,400 with probability .66,
0 with probability .01;
B: 2,400 with certainty.
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) report that 82% of individuals chose Alternative B
over A. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) also tested the following two alternatives:
C: 2,500 with probability .33,
0 with probability .67;
D: 2,400 with probability .34,
0 with probability .66.
These alternatives are obtained by eliminating a .66 probability of 2,400 pay-off
from Alternatives A and B, and hence, ordering of expected utility should not be
affected: if Alternative B is chosen over A, Alternative D should be chosen over C.
However, 82% of individuals chose Alternative C over D. This pattern of behavior
indicates violation of expected utility theory.
According to expected utility theory, the choice of Alternative B over A
implies the following:
.33 u(2, 500) + .66 u(2, 400) < u(2, 400),
which is equivalent to
.33 u(2, 500) < .34 u(2, 400).
The left term of this inequality corresponds to Alternatives C, and the right term
corresponds to D. Thus, expected utility theory predicts that if Alternative B is
chosen over A, Alternative D should be chosen over C. This prediction is violated
in the observation by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), where Alternative C is more
frequently chosen than D.
Prospect theory resolves this paradox and several other violations of expected
utility theory with editing rules and a weighting function. The editing rules pre-
process probabilities and pay-offs of an alternative before applying the utility and
the weighting functions. To resolve Allais’s paradox however, only the weighting
function is required. With the weighting function, w, choice of Alternative B over
A implies:
w(.33) u(2, 500) + w(.66) u(2, 400) < u(2, 400),
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Figure 1.2: Example weighting function for prospect theory: w(p) =
exp(−1.30 (− log(p))0.55). Dotted line represents an identity function. Functional
form is taken from Prelec (1998), and parameter values are arbitrarily specified to
reproduce the weighting function illustrated in Kahneman and Tversky (1979).
which is equivalent to
w(.33) u(2, 500) < (1− w(.66)) u(2, 400).
Also, choice of Alternative C over D implies
w(.34) u(2, 400) < w(.33) u(2, 500).
Thus if an individual chooses Alternative B over A and Alternative C over D, these
choices implies
w(.34) u(2, 400) < (1− w(.66)) u(2, 400),
or
w(.34) < 1− w(.66).
More generally, prospect theory is able to resolve Allais’s paradox, as long as the
following condition holds:
w(1− p) < 1− w(p). (1.1)
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This condition is satisfied by having a non-linear weighting function. Kahneman and
Tversky (1979) do not provide a functional form for a weighting function, but Prelec
(1998) examined several forms of a weighting function. An example is illustrated
in Figure 1.2. Mathematical proof that this particular weighting function satisfies
Equation 1.1 is provided by Prelec (1998).
Thus with the editing rules and a non-linear weighting function, prospect
theory is able to explain Allais’s paradox and various other behavior (see Kahneman
& Tversky, 1979, for details), which expected utility theory is not able to explain.
Also as prospect theory has an utility function u as expected utility theory does,
prospect theory predicts that subjective value of the St. Petersburg game is finite.
1.1.3 Cumulative prospect theory
One major limitation of prospect theory, however, is that it potentially permits
violation of stochastic dominance. Suppose an individual is making a choice between
Alternatives E and F:
E: x1 with probability p1,
x2 with probability p2,
0 with probability 1− p1 − p2;
F: x1 with probability p
′
1,
x2 with probability p
′
2,
0 with probability 1− p′1 − p′2.
Further assume that
0 < x1 < x2,
p′2 < p2, and
p1 + p2 = p
′
1 + p
′
2 < 1.
(1.2)
Then, Alternative E dominates F: Alternative E has a higher probability of obtaining
a larger pay-off, x2, than Alternative F, and also E has the same probability of
obtaining the worse pay-off, 0, as F. Thus, Alternative E should be chosen over F,
which implies
w(p′1) u(x1) + w(p
′
2) u(x2) < w(p1) u(x1) + w(p2) u(x2),
or
u(x1)
u(x2)
<
w(p2)− w(p′2)
w(p′1)− w(p1).
(1.3)
Also, suppose the same individual is faced with a choice between Alternatives
E’ and F’:
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E’: x1 with probability p
′
2,
x2 with probability p
′
1,
0 with probability 1− p′2 − p′1;
F’: x1 with probability p2,
x2 with probability p1,
0 with probability 1− p2 − p1.
Alternative E’ dominates F’, because Equation 1.2 indicates p1 < p
′
1: Alternative
E’ has a higher probability of obtaining a larger pay-off than Alternative F’. Also,
Alternative E’ has the same probability of obtaining the worst pay-off as Alternative
F’. Then, choice of Alternative E’ implies the following:
w(p2) u(x1) + w(p1) u(x2) < w(p
′
2) u(x1) + w(p
′
1) u(x2),
or
u(x1)
u(x2)
<
w(p′1)− w(p1)
w(p2)− w(p′2).
(1.4)
As x1 becomes similar to x2, the left term in Equations 1.3 and 1.4 approaches to
1. Thus, satisfaction of Equations 1.3 and 1.4 implies:
1 ≤ w(p2)− w(p
′
2)
w(p′1)− w(p1)
and 1 ≤ w(p
′
1)− w(p1)
w(p2)− w(p′2)
⇔ 1 ≤ w(p2)− w(p
′
2)
w(p′1)− w(p1)
and 1 ≥ w(p2)− w(p
′
2)
w(p′1)− w(p1)
⇔ 1 = w(p2)− w(p
′
2)
w(p′1)− w(p1)
⇔ w(p1) + w(p2) = w(p′1) + w(p′2)
However, w(p1) + w(p2) cannot be the same as w(p
′
1) + w(p
′
2), as w is a non-linear
function and p1 + p2 = p
′
1 + p
′
2 is assumed (Equation 1.2). Thus when x1 is very
close to x2, prospect theory eventually violates Equation 1.3 or 1.4, predicting a
choice of the dominated alternative.
This limitation is overcome with cumulative prospect theory (Tversky &
Kahneman, 1992), which employs a cumulative weighting function. Suppose an
alternative is associated with a pi probability of xi pay-off, where i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
When xi < xj for all i and j which satisfy 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n, then a weight is computed
as follows:
w(pi) = pi(
n∑
j=i
pj)− pi(
n∑
j=i+1
pj), if 1 ≤ i < n,
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Figure 1.3: Example weighting function for cumulative prospect theory: pi(p) =
p0.61
(p0.61+(1−p)0.61) 10.61
. Dotted line represents an identity function. Parameter value,
0.61, is taken from Tversky and Kahneman (1992).
and
w(pn) = pi(pn).
With this cumulative weighting function, the right term in Equation 1.3
becomes the following:
w(p2)− w(p′2)
w(p′1)− w(p1)
=
pi(p2)− pi(p′2)
pi(p′2 + p′1)− pi(p′2)− pi(p2 + p1) + pi(p2)
=
pi(p2)− pi(p′2)
−pi(p′2) + pi(p2)
(∵ p2 + p1 = p′2 + p′1)
= 1
>
u(x1)
u(x2)
(∵ x2 > x1).
Thus, cumulative prospect theory satisfies both Equations 1.3 and 1.4, and hence
stochastic dominance, independent of exact expression of pi.
To explain choice better, however, Tversky and Kahneman (1992) proposes
the following functional expression for pi:
pi(p) =
pγ
(pγ + (1− p)γ) 1γ
.
An example function with γ = 0.61 is displayed in Figure 1.3. This S-shape signifies
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typical risk-seeking for a small probability. An individual tends to overweight small
probabilities and underweight high probabilities, so that this individual often chooses
an alternative with a small probability of large pay-off over an alternative with a high
probability of small pay-off. Also when this weighting function is linear, cumulative
prospect theory becomes identical to expected utility theory. Thus, cumulative
prospect theory can be seen as a general case of expected utility theory. Performance
of cumulative prospect theory is compared against performance of expected utility
theory in Chapter 2, and also an extension of cumulative prospect theory is used in
simulations in Chapter 3.
1.1.4 Transfer of attention exchange model
More recent empirical studies, however, report notable violation of cumulative prospect
theory (see Birnbaum, 2008, for review). Here, I review only one of such violations:
violation of coalescing. In one of the experiments reported by Birnbaum (2008), an
individual made a choice between the following two alternatives:
G: 100 with probability .85,
50 with probability .15;
H: 100 with probability .95,
7 with probability .05.
The majority of individuals choose Alternative G over H. However, when confronted
with the following two alternatives, the majority of individuals choose Alternative
H’ over G’.
G’: 100 with probability .85,
50 with probability .10,
50 with probability .05;
H’: 100 with probability .85,
100 with probability .10,
7 with probability .05.
Alternative G is a coalesced form of Alternative G’. The pay-off of 50 with a proba-
bility of .15 in Alternative G is split into the two possible pay-off of 50 in Alternative
G’. Similarly, the pay-off of 100 with a probability of .95 is split into the two pos-
sible pay-offs in Alternative H’. In cumulative prospect theory, split pay-offs are
automatically coalesced because of cumulativity of a weighting function, and thus,
cumulative prospect theory predicts that if an individual chooses Alternative G
over H, this individual should choose G’ over H’. The violation is also reported by
Birnbaum (1999).
To explain violation of coalescing, Birnbaum and Chavez (1997) propose
transfer of attention exchange model. Suppose an alternative is associated with a pi
probability of xi pay-off, where i = 1, 2, . . . , n. When xi < xj for all i and j which
satisfy 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n, then according to transfer of attention exchange model,
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subjective value of this alternative is computed as follows:∑n
i=1 t(pi) u(xi) +
∑n
i=1
∑n
k=i (u(xi)− u(xk)) ω(pi, pk, n)∑n
i=1 t(pi),
where t is a weighting function, t(p) = pγ , and
ω(pi, pk, n) =

δ t(pk)
n+ 1
δ > 0,
δ t(pi)
n+ 1
δ ≤ 0.
The weight transfer function, ω, determines how much attention transfers from a
better possible pay-off to a worse pay-off, where attention transfer is specified by
parameter δ.
This transfer of attention exchange model does not coalesce pay-offs, and
as a result, the model predicts different subjective values for Alternatives G than
G’. As Alternative G has only one worse pay-off of 50 and Alternative G’ has two,
less attention transfers to 50 pay-off for Alternative G than G’. Thus, the coalescing
makes Alternative G better than G’. Similarly, coalescing makes Alternative H worse
than H’, because more attention transfers from a better pay-off of 100 for Alternative
H than for H’.
The transfer of attention exchange model explains Allais’s paradox with
transfer of attention. When evaluating the following alternatives,
A: 2,500 with probability .33,
2,400 with probability .66,
0 with probability .01;
B: 2,400 with certainty,
attention transfers from pay-offs of 2,500 and 2,400 to pay-off of 0 in Alternative
A. As a result, subjective value for Alternative A is less than subjective value for
Alternative B. When 2,400 with probability .33 is subtracted from each Alternative,
however, attention transfers to pay-off of 0 in both alternatives:
C: 2,500 with probability .33,
0 with probability .67;
D: 2,400 with probability .34,
0 with probability .66.
As a result, the difference in the pay-offs of 2,500 and 2,400 carries over to the dif-
ference in subjective values of alternatives: Alternative C is predicted to be chosen
by the transfer of attention exchange model.
In addition, the transfer of attention provides a different explanation for risk
aversion than the other models reviewed above. Risk aversion refers to the empirical
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finding that an individual prefers a pay-off with probability 1.0 over a probabilistic
pay-off with the same or even higher expected pay-off. An example is the following
two alternatives:
K: 2,500 with probability 1.00; L: 5,000 with probability .50,
0 with probability .50.
Majority of individuals prefers Alternative K over L. This risk aversion is ex-
plained with a concave utility function in expected utility theory, which predicts
that u(2, 500) × 1.0 > u(5, 000) × 0.5. Similar explanation is provided by the con-
cave utility function together with the weighting function in prospect theory and
cumulative prospect theory.
The transfer of attention exchange model, however, explains risk aversion
with attention transfer: in Alternative L, attention transfers from 5,000 pay-off to
0 pay-off, resulting in less weight on 5,000 than .50. Thus with the identity utility
function, the transfer of attention exchange model predicts that the subjective value
of Alternative L is less than 5, 000 × 0.5 = 2, 500, which is the subjective value
of Alternative K. The same mechanism predicts finite subjective value for the St.
Petersburg game. As the transfer of attention exchange model can explain more
choice phenomena, this model can be more flexible than other models.
Performance of the transfer of attention exchange model is assessed and
compared against performance of expected utility theory and cumulative prospect
theory in Chapter 2.
1.2 Dynamic Models
In contrast to static models, which have been developed in a domain of economic
choice, dynamic models were initially developed with perceptual identification tasks.
An example perceptual task presents two sequences of alphabetical characters and
ask an individual to respond “yes” if the two sequences are both words or both non-
words and “no” otherwise (Meyer & Irwin, 1981). To explain speed and accuracy
of such judgment, models have been developed with an idea that after presentation
of stimuli, an individual sequentially evaluates and accumulates information from
the stimuli. When the accumulated information reaches a response criterion, the
individual is assumed to make a judgment (e.g., respond with “yes” or “no”).
Unlike static models which aim to explain choice behavior alone, dynamic
models intend to explain both speed and accuracy of judgment, especially trade-
offs an individual has to make between speed and accuracy. It is often possible to
make a correct judgment in a perceptual task, if an individual is willing to spend
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Figure 1.4: Example preference development. Two lines represent preference for
two alternatives, and dotted line is a response threshold.
infinite amount of time in making a judgment. However, it typically takes much
less than a second to identify a perceptual stimulus (e.g., Ratcliff, 1978), indicating
a trade-off between speed and accuracy of judgment. As a result, dynamic models
often provide an account for process of judgment, while static models typically do
not provide such an account.
Over the last five decades, various dynamic models have been proposed and
successfully explained speed-accuracy trade-offs in various perceptual judgments
(e.g., Stone, 1960; Ratcliff, 1978; see Bogacz, Usher, Zhang, & McClelland, 2007 for
review). Following these success, dynamic models have been extended to provide a
unifying framework to explain economic choices. When applied to economic choice,
a dynamic model is considered to be a model of preference development. The mo-
ment an individual faces alternatives, the individual may not have preference for an
alternative over another. Rather, the individual is expected to sequentially evaluate
alternatives and develop preference for each alternative.
An example of preference development is displayed in Figure 1.4. At the
beginning of preference development, two alternatives have the same preference,
and over time, preference is accumulated. When a preference for one alternative,
represented as the solid line, reaches a threshold, the dotted line, an individual
makes a choice. The nature of preference development forms a key component of
dynamic models, and various models have been proposed to reflect psychologically
feasible processes of preference development.
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Figure 1.5: Illustration of alternatives in multi-alternative choice. Choice between
Cars A and B can be affected by the presence of Car D, C, or S.
1.2.1 Decision field theory
One of the most well-known dynamic models is decision field theory (Busemeyer &
Townsend, 1993). The process implemented in decision field theory is as follows.
When confronted with several alternatives to choose from, an individual tries to
evaluate all of the attributes associated with each alternative. Values across mul-
tiple attribute dimensions cannot be evaluated at the same time, and hence, the
individual undergoes a slow and time-consuming process of evaluating, comparing,
and integrating the comparisons on single attribute dimension at one time. No
choice is made until the preference for one alternative becomes strong enough to
guide the individual into choice. Decision field theory successfully explains various
phenomena in choice between two alternatives, including those reviewed under static
models (see Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993, for details).
To explain choice between three alternatives, decision field theory has been
extended to multi-alternative decision field theory (MDFT; Roe, Busemeyer, &
Townsend, 2001). In particular, MDFT is developed to provide an unifying ex-
planation for the attraction, compromise, and similarity effects. These three effects
document that choice can depend on the context determined by the available al-
ternatives. An example choice between cars is illustrated in Figure 1.5. Here, each
car is described in terms of two attributes, economy and quality. In this example,
whether an individual chooses Car A or B can depend on the presence of Car D, C,
or S in a choice set. These context effects are discussed in more detail in Chapters
5 and 6.
Importantly, the context effects suggest that preference for an alternative
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Figure 1.6: Example inhibition function: −0.10 exp(−0.01D2). Parameter values
are taken from Hotaling, Busemeyer, and Li (2010).
depends on its relationships with other alternatives. Thus for a dynamic model to
explain the context effects, a model needs to allow preference for an alternative to
impact on preference for another alternative. In this vein, MDFT lets the devel-
oping preferences inhibit each other: increasing preference for an alternative causes
preference for another alternative to decrease over time. Strength of such inhibition
depends on the distance between alternatives, with more similar alternatives more
strongly inhibiting each other (Tsetsos, Usher, & Chater, 2010).
To describe computational details of MDFT, I label three alternatives as A,
B, and T , and denote the economy dimension as E and the quality dimension as Q.
The value of Alternative A on the economy dimension is denoted as AE and that
on the quality dimension is AQ. Preference for the three alternatives is organized in
a column vector, P . The first element in this vector corresponds to preference for
Alternative A, the second corresponds to preference for B, and the third corresponds
to preference for T. This preference is iteratively updated as follows:
P (t+ 1) = S P (t) + V (t+ 1),
where S is a 3× 3 feedback matrix and V is a 3× 1 momentary valence vector.
In the feedback matrix, the influence of Alternative A on B is computed as:
−φ2 exp(−φ1D2AB).
Here, DAB is a distance between Alternatives A and B, which is defined as a
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weighted sum of distance along two orthogonal vectors:
DAB =
(AE −AQ −BE +BQ)2
2
+ ξ
(AE +AQ −BE −BQ)2
2
.
Also, the self feedback is computed as 1 − φ2. An example inhibition function is
plotted in Figure 1.6. As a distance between alternative, D, increases, inhibition
strength moves closer to 0, indicating that preference for one alternative affects the
other to a less extent. This distance function is a crucial component for MDFT to
explain the attraction, compromise and similarity effects (Tsetsos et al., 2010).
The momentary valence vector is computed with four matrices:
V (t) = CM W (t) + C (t), (1.5)
where
C =
 1 −1/2 −1/2−1/2 1 −1/2
−1/2 −1/2 1
 ,
M =
AE AQBE BQ
TE TQ
 ,
and
(t) ∼ N

00
0
 ,
σ
2 0 0
0 σ2 0
0 0 σ2

.
Here, the matrix C indicates that an attribute value of a car is evaluated in relation
to the mean average values of the other cars, and  indicates that the evaluation is
rather noisy. As parameter value for σ increases, the evaluation becomes noisier.
The attention weight W is a 2× 1 vector. There is a .50 probability that
W (t) =
[
1
0
]
, (1.6)
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and also a .50 probability that
W (t) =
[
0
1
]
. (1.7)
Equations 1.6 and 1.7 indicate which dimension is attended at given moment. When
W is specified as Equation 1.6, the first dimension, the economy of cars, is attended
and the three cars are evaluated according to Equation 1.5. Thus, these equations
specify the process where each car is evaluated, for example, on the economy di-
mension at one moment, then on the quality dimension at next moment, again on
the quality dimension at next moment, and so on.
At first, preference for each car is 0, and each car is iteratively evaluated,
and when the highest preference reaches the threshold, the alternative is chosen.
MDFT has been reported to provide a better fit to empirical choice data than probit
regressions which use attribute values to predict choice (Berkowitsch, Scheibehenne,
& Rieskamp, in press).
1.2.2 Comparison-grouping model
While multi-alternative decision field theory successfully explains the attraction,
compromise, and similarity effects, various other dynamic models have been pro-
posed to explain the same effects without clear indication on which model provides
better explanations for actual choice behavior.
Here, I review comparison grouping model (Tsuzuki & Guo, 2004). In con-
trast to multi-alternative decision field theory, which assumes stochastically fluc-
tuating attention over attribute dimensions, comparison grouping model assumes
stochastically fluctuating attention over alternatives. At one moment, an individual
attends two or three alternatives in a choice set and develops preference for the
alternatives.
As an illustration, I again label three alternatives as A, B, and T , which are
described with two attributes, E (economy) and Q (quality). The value of Alterna-
tive A on the economy dimension is denoted as AE and that on the quality dimension
is AQ. In the comparison grouping model, each alternative and each attribute di-
mension iteratively develops preference. I denote preference for Alternative A as
PA. Then,
PA(t+ 1) = PA(t) + ∆A(t+ 1). (1.8)
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If Alternative A is not attended at time t+ 1, ∆A(t+ 1) is 0, otherwise
∆A(t+ 1) =
{
ζA (1− PA(t))− λ PA(t) if ζA > 0
ζA PA(t)− λ PA(t) if ζA ≤ 0,
(1.9)
where parameter λ reflects how much preference decays over time, and
ζA = WAE PE(t) +WQA PQ(t)− τ (PB(t) + PT (t)), (1.10)
and
WAE =
(ln(AE + µ)− ν)
ψ.
Here, WAE determines a weight given to the economy dimension for Alternative A,
which is multiplied by preference for the economy dimension, PE . Also, parameter τ
controls strength of inhibition. As with multi-alternative decision field theory, com-
parison grouping model allows preference for an alternative to impact on preference
for another alternative. Preference for the other alternatives is updated in the same
manner.
In addition, preference for attribute dimensions is updated at each iteration:
PE is updated using Equations 1.8 and 1.9, but instead of Equation 1.10, we have
δE = WAE PA(t) +WBE PB(t) +WTE PT (t).
Thus, preference for the economy dimension is updated to be an average of prefer-
ences for the alternatives, weighted by each alternative’s weight given to the economy
dimension. Preference for the quality dimension is updated in the similar manner.
The iteration is initiated with preference for attribute dimensions and for alterna-
tives starts with a random sample from the uniform distribution between 0.25 and
0.75. After 100 iterations, the alternative with the highest preference is chosen.
Given the process above, preference development crucially depends on prob-
ability that each alternatives is attended. If one alternative is more frequently
attended, this alternative is more likely to develop preference and hence is more
likely to be chosen. The probability of attention, however, is manually specified in
Tsuzuki and Guo (2004), and its mathematical specification is not available in a
way to apply the model to arbitrary sets of alternatives.
This lack of mathematical specification makes it difficult to test prediction
from comparison grouping model, and it is not clear whether comparison grouping
model provides a better explanation of the context effects than multi-alternative
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decision field theory. These models are tested in Chapter 5.
1.2.3 Decision by sampling
The last model to be reviewed in this chapter is decision by sampling (Stewart,
Chater, & Brown, 2006). Unlike the other dynamic models reviewed above, decision
by sampling is developed primarily to explain choice between two alternatives with
probabilistic pay-offs and has not been extended to explain the context effects. The
extension is proposed in Chapter 6.
In decision by sampling (Stewart et al., 2006), the evaluation of an alter-
native on a particular attribute dimension follows the rank position in a sample of
attributes, and the rank position is stochastically, iteratively constructed through a
series of comparisons. As an illustration, suppose an individual is making a choice
between cars. The individual may attend to economy of cars at one moment and
compares a car against another car in his or her memory. If the comparison fa-
vors the car in a choice set, the individual develops preference for the car. After
this comparison, the decision maker may attend another attribute dimension (e.g.,
quality) at the next moment and makes a comparison. This iterative comparison is
repeated until the preferences for the available alternatives are sufficiently different.
Here, an alternative is compared against a sample from memory on single
attribute dimension at one time. Also, the preference development in decision by
sampling is insensitive to the magnitude of the difference. Rather, the preference is
proportional to the frequency count of the number of favorable comparisons. The
ranks derived in this way replicate a number of empirical findings: for instance,
the concave utility function and loss aversion (Stewart et al., 2006). The decision
by sampling also provides a reasonable explanation of choice with two alternatives,
especially compared against various static models (Stewart & Simpson, 2008).
Empirical support for decision by sampling is provided by several studies
investigating effects of samples in memory. Ungemach, Stewart, and Reimers (2011),
for example, offered customers leaving a supermarket the opportunity to choose one
of two lotteries: a safe lottery with a 55% chance of winning £0.50 or a risky lottery
with a 15% chance of winning £1.50. Ungemach et al. (2011)’s results show that
the customers who shopped more items priced between £0.50 and £1.50 are more
likely to choose the risky lottery. The prices of purchased items are likely to be
available in the customers memory, and therefore, when the customers are making
choice between the lotteries, the lotteries pay-offs are likely to be compared against
monetary values of purchased items. When compared against values between £0.50
and £1.50, the comparison favors the risky lottery but not the safe lottery, leading
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to the relative preference for the risky lottery. Similar results are reported on riskless
choices: for example, a choice between job applicants (Mellers & Cooke, 1994) and
apartments (Cooke & Mellers, 1998). These studies show that, for example, the
individuals who frequently saw monthly rents between $350 and $400 find the rent
of $350 much more attractive than $400.
1.3 Plan of thesis
The static models, reviewed above, are examined in Chapter 2. Chapter 2 develops
a non-parametric method for estimating utility over the wide range of alternatives.
The estimates are compared against expected utility theory, cumulative prospect
theory, and the transfer of attention exchange model. Extensions of expected util-
ity theory and cumulative prospect theory are examined in Chapter 3, which in-
vestigates impacts of choice set-size and also of information presentation formats.
These impacts are further examined in Chapter 4. Then, Chapter 5 critically evalu-
ates dynamic models of multi-alternative choice with process-tracing data, and the
process-tracing data are further leveraged to propose an extension of decision by
sampling in Chapter 6. Then Chapter 7 summarizes results from Chapters 2 to 6
and concludes this thesis.
19
Chapter 2
Non-parametric estimation of
the individual’s utility map
2.1 Background
Understanding how people trade off risk and reward is a fundamental goal of be-
havioral economics. The most common approach to modeling how people make
decisions between risky alternatives is based on the idea of utility: individuals inte-
grate their subjective probability of reward with their subjective value of the reward
to produce a single value, their utility that describes how well the alternative is pre-
ferred. The utilities of the alternatives are then compared and the alternative with
the highest utility is most often chosen.
The normative calculation of utility that maximizes long-term gain is to mul-
tiply the probability with the subjective value of the associated outcome. For an
illustration, suppose an individual is considering a choice alternative with three
possible outcomes: £20, £10, and £0. This particular alternative has a 20%
probability for £20, 40% for £10, and 40% for £0. Then, the expected utility
is 20%× v(£20) + 40%× v(£10) + 40%× v(£0), where v is the function to map the
monetary value to the subjective value.
However, previous research has demonstrated that an individual’s choice fre-
quently deviates from the predictions of expected utility theory (for review, Schoe-
maker, 1982). To explain the deviations, descriptive models of how risk and reward
are integrated have been developed (for review, Starmer, 2000). A common and
useful way to visualize the predictions of these models is to look at the indifference
lines, which connect choice alternatives of equal utility, over a probability triangle
(Camerer, 1989). The probability triangle is a two-dimensional space which maps
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Figure 2.1: Predicted utility map over a probability triangle. A point in this triangle
represent an alternative, whose potential outcomes are £20, £10, and £0. Proba-
bility of £20 is shown on the vertical axis, and probability of £0 is shown on the
horizontal axis.
alternatives with varying probabilities for the same set of three potential outcomes.
Throughout this chapter, we use £20, £10, and £0 as the potential outcomes from
a choice alternative.
Figure 2.1 displays the predicted utility maps from three of the most well-
known models of risky choice: expected utility theory, cumulative prospect theory
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1992) and transfer of attention exchange (TAX) model
(Birnbaum, 2008). The differences between the models can be seen in the shapes
of the indifference lines. Expected utility theory predicts indifference lines that are
parallel and straight. Cumulative prospect theory predicts lines that are concave
where the probability of the best outcome is larger than that of the worst outcome,
but convex lines where the probability of the best outcome is less than that of the
worst. The TAX model predicts indifference lines that are convex throughout the
triangle.
The usual experimental practice is to investigate choices in regions of the
triangle where models most differ from each other (e.g., Wu & Gonzalez, 1998).
When the models are tested in this way, the best model may not predict choices
away from the diagnostic regions well. For instance, Harless (1992) reports that the
cumulative prospect utility explains choice better than the expected utility theory
only in the boundary region of the triangle.
To assess models using the entire region of the triangle, we develop a non-
parametric method to estimate entire utility maps, an extension of Markov chain
Monte Carlo (MCMC) with People (Sanborn, Griffiths, & Shiffrin, 2010). We have
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modified MCMC with People to investigate regions of the probability triangle where
the choice alternatives are less preferred. The new method is tested in a simulation
to show that it can deliver useful results within a reasonable number of trials. We
then estimate utility maps from human data and determine which model fits best.
Finally, we discuss the results and future applications for this approach.
2.1.1 Markov chain Monte Carlo with People
Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) is a common method for drawing samples
from a distribution. It has been widely used to draw probabilistic inference espe-
cially when solving the exact function of interest is computationally difficult (Neal,
1993). Samples drawn with MCMC are typically used to make an inference on the
distribution, and here, we use samples to infer the shape of utility map over the
triangle.
MCMC begins in a start state z. Then a sample z′ is first drawn from the
proposal distribution q, then z′ is evaluated with the function of interest, pi to de-
termine whether to accept z′ as a new state or discard it and retain the current
state z. The sequence of accepted samples forms a Markov chain, and after this
Markov chain converges, accepted samples can be regarded as samples from pi dis-
tribution. To ensure that the Markov chain converges to pi, detailed balance needs
to be satisfied
pi(z) q(z′|z)A(z′, z) = pi(z′) q(z|z′)A(z, z′), (2.1)
where q(z′|z) is the probability of drawing z′ when the current state is z and A(z′, z)
is the probability of accepting proposal z′ over the current state z.
Throughout the chapter, we assume a symmetric distribution for q, q(z′|z) =
q(z|z′), so Equation 2.1 becomes
pi(z)A(z′, z) = pi(z′)A(z, z′). (2.2)
Detailed balance can be satisfied by carefully designing the acceptance func-
tion A. The most commonly used function is the Metropolis acceptance function
(Metropolis, Rosenbluth, Rosenbluth, Teller, & Teller, 1953), but the Boltzmann
acceptance function (Flinn & McManus, 1961) is of interest here:
A(z′, z) =
pi(z′)
pi(z) + pi(z′).
If an individual is asked to make a choice between alternatives z′ and z,
then the Boltzmann acceptance function can model that individual’s choice. This
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is because the Boltzmann function is equivalent to Luce’s choice rule (Luce, 1959),
which has been frequently used to model risky choice (e.g., Loomes & Sugden,
1998; Blavatskyy & Pogrebna, 2010). As a result, by sequentially presenting pairs
of choice alternatives to an individual (where the new alternative z′ is selected by
the computer), the collection of choice alternatives chosen by the individual can be
treated as samples from the probability distribution whose density is proportional
to the individual’s utility.
2.1.2 Extending MCMC with People
However, samples from the individual’s utility distribution does not necessarily serve
to estimate the shape of the utility map: pilot work confirms that all of the samples
will be concentrated around the most favorable alternative (100% probability of
£20 in the triangle), leaving the rest of the utility map unexplored. To enable the
reasonable estimation of the utility map, the Markov chain has to travel better
around the triangular space.
For this purpose, we implement a latent agent in the experimental program.
This latent agent makes an independent choice between the same alternatives as
participant, and only when the agent and participant both select the new choice al-
ternative, the new alternative becomes the new state. Otherwise, the current state
remains the same and another alternative is generated from the proposal distribu-
tion.
When the agent is implemented in this way, the acceptance function be-
comes a joint function of the participant’s and the agent’s choices. Specifically, the
acceptance function is defined as
A∗(z′, z) =
f(z′)
f(z) + f(z′)
g(z′)
g(z) + g(z′),
where f is the utility function for participant and g is the agent’s utility function.
Here, both participant and the agent follow the Boltzmann acceptance function.
Then Equation 2.2 becomes
f(z) g(z)A∗(z′, z) = f(z′) g(z′)A∗(z, z′).
With the implementation of the agent, the trajectory of the Markov states
depends on both participant’s and the latent agent’s choices. If the agent’s utility
follows an inverse of optimal choices (i.e., the utility is the lowest at the top corner of
the triangle), the Markov chain would be pushed away from that region. Thus with
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this extended method, the stationary distribution of the Markov chain is the joint
utility function of the participant and the agent, f g. Participant’s utility map can
subsequently be recovered by dividing the joint utility by the latent agent’s known
utility.
2.2 Simulation
To demonstrate that the developed method can estimate a participant’s utility map
within a reasonable number of trials, a simulation was run. The simulation used
the two of the utility functions in Figure 2.1: g was set to the inverse of expected
utility theory, and f was cumulative prospect theory. The proposal distribution, q,
was uniform over the triangular space. The possible outcomes were fixed to be £20,
£10 and £0.
With these functions, a choice trial was simulated as follows. First, the agent
used the g function to evaluate each alternative and uses the Boltzmann acceptance
function to select between the current state and the proposed alternative. If the
agent preferred the current state over the proposed alternative, another alternative
was sampled from the proposal distribution. If the latent agent chose the new
alternative over the current state, the virtual participant with f function then made
a choice between the same two alternatives.
Although the agent and the virtual participant could have made a choice
at the same time over the same two alternatives, we had the agent decide first: if
the agent does not select the new alternative, the previous state remains the state
regardless of the choice the participant makes. This reduces the number of choices
the participant must make.
Each simulation consisted of three chains: one chain started with the Markov
state of 60% of £20, 20% of £10 and 20% of £0. Another chain started with the
state of 20% of £20, 60% of £10 and 20% of £0 as the starting state. The final
chain started with 20% of £20, 20% of £10 and 60% of £0.
The first 100 trials were considered to be trials before convergence of the
Markov chain (burn-in period) and were discarded from each chain. The remaining
samples from the three chains were pooled and smoothed by kernel density estima-
tion. Because of the triangular boundary of the estimation space, it is actually quite
difficult to produce unbiased indifference curves. We chose to use a Dirichlet kernel,
an extension of the Beta kernel (Chen, 1999) to the triangular space, because it
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Figure 2.2: The KL divergences between f and fˆ for various numbers of trials.
The solid line represents the mean measurement of the 10 simulation runs, and the
dotted lines are maximum and minimum values archived in the simulations.
produced less bias than other alternatives. The Dirichlet kernel is defined as
fˆ(x) g(x) =
∑
i
Dir(zi|α1, α2, α3),
where zi is the ith state in the Markov chain, x is a vector of probabilities for three
outcomes, and αj is xj/min(h, xj , 1−xj). The kernel width h was set to 0.09. This
smoothed joint distribution is then divided by g to derive the estimation fˆ .
To assess the similarity between f and fˆ , we computed Kullback–Leibler
(KL; denoted as KL(f ||fˆ)) divergence (Kullback & Leibler, 1951), which measures
how much information is lost in the estimation process. The KL divergences for
different sample sizes are plotted in Figure 2.2. This figure illustrates that the
estimation shows the increasingly smaller divergence within the first few hundred
trials. The estimation becomes reasonably accurate on average after 700–800 trials.
The two panels of Figure 2.3 display the estimations after 1,000 trials. The
estimation with the smallest KL divergence among the 10 simulation runs is in the
left panel, and the right panel show the estimation with the largest KL divergence.
Both panels show the key properties of the cumulative prospect theory: the es-
timated maps display the concave indifference lines where the probability of £20
is greater than the probability of £0, and the indifference lines are convex in the
other area. Also, the indifference lines show fanning-out property from the lower
left corner toward the diagonal boundary.
Thus, the simulation demonstrated that the proposed method with the Dirich-
let kernel density estimation can recover the key characteristic of the utility map
using a reasonable number of samples.
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(a) The estimation with
the smallest KL divergence
(KL(f ||fˆ) = 0.002)
(b) The estimation with
the largest KL divergence
(KL(f ||fˆ) = 0.007)
Figure 2.3: Estimation of the cumulative prospect theory with 1,000 trials
2.3 Experiment
2.3.1 Method
Participant
Ten participants were recruited through the subject panel at the University of War-
wick. One participant did not complete the experiment, leaving nine (five male and
four female) participants. Their age ranged from 19 to 30 with a mean of 22.9.
Procedure
The experimental procedure closely followed that of the simulation. Three chains
with the same start states were run interleaved until participants had made 1,000
choices per chain. In each trial, the latent agent made a decision first, and a new
alternative was drawn from the uniform distribution over the entire triangle until
the agent chose the new alternative. The latent agent’s utility function was set to
be the prediction from the expected utility theory raised to the power of −8, which
was enough to ensure coverage of the map in pilot work.
In addition, 50 catch trials were inserted to the experiment, so that we could
assess whether participants were engaged in the task. In each catch trial, one al-
ternative had larger probabilities for both £20 and £10. If a participant was not
engaged with the task and randomly making choices, it is expected that he or she
would occasionally not select the non-dominant alternative.
The experiment presented a choice alternative as a pie chart with three slices.
Each slice represented one possible outcome, and the size of the slice was propor-
tional to the probability of the outcome. Participants were forced to log out from
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the online experiment and take a break after spending one hour on it. After the
minimum break of three hours, participants were allowed to log in again and resume
the experiment.
The choices participant made were incentivized: we invited participants to
the lab when participants completed the experiment. At the lab, we randomly
selected one trial from the experiment and played the selected alternative for real.
Participants were paid what they earned from the play.
2.3.2 Result and Discussion
All the participants selected the dominant alternative in all of the catch trials, which
was evidence that all participants understood and were engaged in the task.
Utility maps were estimated as in the simulation study. All participants
show a sharp peak at the top corner of the triangle in the estimated maps. The
sharp peak makes it difficult to see the shape of the map, and thus for illustration
purposes, we spaced out the indifference lines by taking the natural logarithm of
the estimation. As a result, small differences in utility are exaggerated, but the
shapes of the indifference lines are not affected. The resulting maps are displayed
in Figure 2.4. Each panel in the figure corresponds to one participant’s map.
The estimated maps show the steep indifference lines, especially where the
probability of £0 is small. The steep lines indicate aversion to the worst outcome
(c.f., Brandstatter, Gigerenzer, & Hertwig, 2006), where the increment in proba-
bility for the worst outcome needs to be compensated with a larger increment in
probability for the most desirable outcome. The steepness tends to be lessened near
the lower right corner of the triangle. As a result, for Participants A, D and H in
particular, the indifference lines show the fanning-out property. The fanning-out
suggests that participants more willingly accept an increment in probability for the
worst outcome when the probability is already large. The fanning-out is consistent
with the prediction from the cumulative prospect theory.
The estimated maps also shows the convex indifference lines, rather than the
concave, throughout the triangle. The convexity makes the estimated maps appear
similar to the predicted utility map from the transfer of attention exchange (TAX)
model (Figure 2.1). To assess the similarity between the estimated maps and the
model predictions, we computed the KL divergence between the estimated maps and
the models. As fˆ is a non-parametric map, the divergence is analytically intractable.
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Figure 2.4: ln(fˆ): logged estimation of utility map. Each panel represents utility
map for one participant. Solid line represents indifference line.
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Thus we approximate the divergence with a Monte Carlo calculation:
KL(fˆ ||model) =
∫
p(u|fˆ){ln(p(u|fˆ))− ln(p(u|model))} du
≈ 1
n
n∑
i=1
{ln(p(uˆi|fˆ))− ln(p(uˆi|model))}
≈ 1
n
{ln(p(Uˆ |fˆ))− ln(p(Uˆ |model))},
where uˆi is the ith element in a vector Uˆ of n independent samples from fˆ . We used
104 as n. The marginal likelihood is computed as follows:
p(Uˆ |model) =
∫
p(Uˆ |θ, model) p(θ|model) dθ.
Here θ is the model parameters, and p(θ|model) is the prior probability of θ. The
prior was the uniform distribution between 0 and 2 for all the parameters. This
marginal likelihood penalizes unnecessary model complexity (Myung & Pitt, 1997),
and thus the KL divergence computed with the marginal likelihood also penalizes
unnecessary model complexity.
To allow the predicted maps to adjust the spacing between the indifference
lines, the parameter vector θ includes one additional parameter used as an exponent
for the predicted utility. If this parameter value is greater than 1, the predicted map
produce the sharper peak. The prior for this exponent parameter is the uniform
between 0 and 10. Also, for the expected utility theory, we used the power law
value function: v(s) = sα.
The approximated KL divergence is mean-averaged over participants: the
means are 0.80 (SE = 0.10) for the expected utility theory, 0.85 (SE = 0.08) for the
cumulative prospect theory, and 1.09 (SE = 0.11) for the TAX model. These mean
divergences are below KL divergence of 2.06 (SE = 0.22) between the estimated
map and the uniform map. Thus, all three theories provide better predictions than
the uniform map, assigning the same utility to all alternatives. The divergence from
the expected utility theory is smallest for seven out of nine maps (Panels A, C, D,
E, G, H, and I in Figure 2.4), and for the remaining maps, the divergence from
the cumulative prospect theory is smallest. The divergence from the TAX model is
largest for all the maps.
However, the TAX model achieves largest maximum likelihood for the four
maps (Panels C, G, H, and I). Thus, it is possible that with larger n, the TAX
model archives larger marginal likelihood for these four maps, resulting in smaller
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divergence. Nonetheless, for the remaining five maps, the maximum likelihood is
largest for the cumulative prospect theory.
2.4 General Discussion
We have estimated non-parametric utility maps over the probability triangle. The
estimated maps indicates that the sensitivity to probability depends on the asso-
ciated outcome and also the magnitude of the probability. The probability of the
worst outcome is more heavily weighted than that of the better outcome. Also,
the sensitivity to the increment of the probability diminishes as the probability in-
creases, but this diminishing sensitivity is applied more readily for the probability
of the worst outcome.
The curvature of the indifference lines in the estimated maps appears similar
to the prediction from the attention exchange (TAX) model. However, the steep-
ness of the indifference lines is more in line with the cumulative prospect theory.
The model comparison indicates that five out of the nine maps are closer to the
cumulative prospect theory and the remaining four maps are closer to the TAX
model.
While the TAX model in Figure 2.1 predicts the convex indifference lines
throughout the triangle, the estimated indifference lines tend to flatten out and form
straight parallel lines toward the lower right corner of the triangle. In contrast, the
indifference lines do not appear flattening out toward the upper left corner. This
varying curvature implies that the performance of the model can differ in the corner
of the triangle, and further indicates that the choice preferences need to be examined
over the broader region of the triangle.
Then, it is of theoretical interest to identify choice alternatives where the
model prediction differ from the individuals’ choice behavior. To this end, the
estimation method that we have developed can be further extended. For instance,
by setting the latent agent’s utility to the inverse of the TAX model, the MCMC
chain converges to the distribution whose density is proportional to the individual’s
utility divided by the TAX model prediction. The condensed area in this joint utility
distribution is where the TAX model underpredicts the utility, and the thin area is
where the TAX model overpredicts the utility.
Also, the estimated maps could be further leveraged for data-driven analysis.
For instance, similarity between the maps could be quantified with Kullback-Leibler
divergence, and the maps could be classified into several categories. Such classifica-
tion might help identifying cluster of individuals with distinctively different pattern
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of utility map.
To conclude, we have developed the method for estimating the utility map
and comparing models, and shown that model comparison can benefit from con-
sidering the broader range of alternatives. The developed method can be further
leveraged in future study. Utility, however, may be unstable and sensitive to the
choice context, as the results from the following chapters indicate.
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Chapter 3
Set-size induced
risk-amplification:
Experience-based decisions in
large set-sizes favor riskier
alternatives
3.1 Background
Over the past decade, research with two-alternative environments has led to the
claim that in the sampling paradigm, where a choice is made after sampling a series
of sample pay-offs (such as $0, $0, $0, $9, and $0 from one alternative), individuals
make a choice as if they under-weight small probabilities (Hertwig, Barron, Weber,
& Erev, 2004). This under-weighting has been juxtaposed against over-weighting of
small probabilities in decisions from description (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tver-
sky & Kahneman, 1992), where pay-offs and their probabilities are described (e.g.,
$9 with a 10% probability, otherwise nothing). This difference in the weighting of
small probabilities — termed the description-experience gap (Hertwig & Erev, 2009)
— has been rigorously examined and consistently confirmed in two-alternative en-
vironments (e.g., Ungemach, Chater, & Stewart, 2009; Lajarraga, Hertwig, & Gon-
zalez, 2012; Gonzalez & Dutt, 2011; Newell & Rakow, 2007; Erev et al., 2010; Got-
tlieb, Weiss, & Chapman, 2007; Abdellaoui, L’Haridon, & Paraschiv, 2011; Hilbig
& Gloeckner, 2011).
The description-experience gap has been used to explain a variety of phe-
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nomena related to decision making outside the laboratory, including those involving
the financial crisis (Hertwig & Erev, 2009) and perceived terrorist threats (Yechiam,
Barron, & Erev, 2005). As an illustration, suppose an individual is assessing how
likely he is to lose weight from a specific diet. One method of assessment is to recall
other individuals who have tried the diet (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973; Galesic, Ols-
son, & Rieskamp, 2012). If the diet rarely leads to weight loss, then the probability
of weight loss may be under-weighted and the individual may infer that the diet is
a waste of time.
However, because the number of alternatives is often more than two outside
the laboratory, generalization of the description-experience gap requires that the
under-weighting and subsequent choice be independent of the number of alternatives.
Continuing the above example and generalizing from the description-experience gap,
the individual should under-weight the probability of weight loss and choose not to
try dieting regardless of the number of diets he considers.
Choices are, however, often influenced by the context provided by choice
sets (e.g., Huber, Payne, & Puto, 1982; Simonson, 1989; Tversky, 1972), and prior
empirical evidence suggests that a choice can change systematically with a growth
in set-sizes. Hills, Noguchi, and Gibbert (2013), for example, found that a larger
and more diverse set leads individuals to take more samples overall but to sample
fewer times per alternative and to subsequently choose alternatives which delivered
a larger pay-off.
Further, when individuals can observe foregone pay-offs from the alterna-
tives they did not choose, a larger set tends to lead the individuals to choose the
alternative that, most recently, delivered the largest pay-off (Ert & Erev, 2007).
Ert and Erev (2007) also show that choices are sensitive to the difference between
a large pay-off observed prior to a choice and the subsequent pay-off they earned
from the choice. If the difference is large, individuals eventually stop choosing the
alternative that most recently delivered a large pay-off. Thus through feedback indi-
viduals learn that the small number of pay-offs they observed are not representative.
In most studies with the sampling paradigm, however, participants do not receive
feedback immediately after making a choice (e.g., Hertwig et al., 2004), and thus
individuals are likely to keep choosing an alternative which delivered a large sample
pay-off.
Based on the above work, we hypothesized that in the sampling paradigm, a
safer alternative would be more often chosen in a small set, but a riskier alternative
with a rare but large pay-off would be more likely to be chosen in a large set in the
gains domain, where a pay-off is either zero or positive. This amplified risk-taking
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in the sampling paradigm should eventually diminish the description-experience
gap, as we do not expect risk-taking to be amplified in the description paradigm.
Unlike in the sampling paradigm, alternatives’ risk is apparent in the description
paradigm, and therefore, individuals could treat a choice in large sets as a choice
between categories of riskier ans safer alternatives, making their choices invariant
to set-sizes with respect to risk.
For the loss domain, where a pay-off is either zero or negative, the largest
possible pay-off is often zero, and both riskier and safer alternatives can deliver
zero pay-offs. Here, riskier alternatives deliver zero pay-offs more often, but riskier
alternatives also occasionally deliver large negative pay-offs. If a growth in set-
sizes facilitates choice for alternatives with larger pay-offs, risk-taking should not be
influenced in the loss domain.
In addition to the investigation into the influence of set-sizes on a choice,
the present study aims to extend previous studies by examining whether amplified
risk-taking is explained by sampling error. Although the description-experience gap
can be potentially attributed to a variety of factors (e.g., Hertwig & Erev, 2009;
Hills & Hertwig, 2010), previous studies with two-alternative environments have
demonstrated that risk-taking in the sampling paradigm is largely due to sampling
error (e.g., Fox & Hadar, 2006; Ungemach et al., 2009; Hertwig & Pleskac, 2010). Fox
and Hadar (2006), for example, show that individuals tend not to sample enough
to observe large non-zero pay-offs from a riskier alternative. As a result, these
individuals make a choice as if a pay-off from the riskier alternative can only be
zero. Also, Ungemach et al. (2009) show that when sampling error is minimized
by forcing individuals to sample a certain number of times from each alternative, a
riskier alternative is chosen more often in the gain domain.
Thus, previous studies show that sampling error in a small set tends to
promote a choice for a safer alternative in the gain domain. With a growth in
set-sizes, sampling error may promote a choice for a riskier alternative in the gains
domain, as at least one riskier alternative is more likely to deliver a large pay-off in
a large set than in a small set.
In what follows, we first describe two experiments which examined the in-
fluence of set-sizes on risk-taking and sampling error. We then examine how the
number of samples and set-sizes relate to sampling error.
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3.2 Method
In Experiments 1 and 2, we manipulated set-sizes in both description and sampling
paradigms, for both gain and loss domains, and for conditions in which the expected
pay-off of an alternative was positively or negatively associated with the probability
of pay-off. Both experiments employed a 2 (between-participant, set-size: small or
large) × 2 (between-participant, paradigm: description or sampling) × 2 (within-
participant, domain: gain or loss) design.
Experiment 1 was conducted on-line and the pay-off was in American dollars.
Experiment 2 was carried out in a laboratory and the pay-off was in British pounds.
The two experiments differed in the relationship between risk and expected pay-off
to ensure that the results do not depend on the particular structure of the pay-offs.
Additionally, the experiments differed in how the participation fee was calculated
(explained below).
3.2.1 Participants
In Experiment 1, 131 participants (73 males, 56 females and 2 unspecified) were
recruited through Mechanical Turk (http://www.mturk.com). Their age ranged
from 18 to 69 with a mean of 30.63. In Experiment 2, 101 students (57 males
and 44 females) were recruited through the participant panel at the University of
Warwick. Their age ranged from 18 to 52 with a mean of 22.7. We decided in
advance of collecting the data to test exactly 100 participants for both experiments,
but over-recruited due to technical reasons.
3.2.2 Apparatus
The alternatives were independently and randomly generated for each trial for each
participant. Half of the alternatives within a trial (1 alternative in a small set, and
16 alternatives in a large set) were safer alternatives, and the other half were riskier.
Each alternative delivers a non-zero pay-off with a certain probability and otherwise
nothing. Safer and riskier alternatives are characterized by different probabilities of
non-zero pay-off.
Within a trial, all the safer alternatives had the same expected pay-off — a
random draw from a uniform distribution between 0.50 and 1.00 for the gain domain
and between −0.50 and −1.00 for the loss domain. Thus in a particular trial in the
gain domain, for example, all the safer alternatives may have the expected pay-off
of 0.83.
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Then, the expected pay-off for the safer alternatives was multiplied by 0.9
in Experiment 1 and 1.1 in Experiment 2, to derive the expected pay-off for the
riskier alternatives. If the safer alternatives in one trial had the expected pay-off of
0.83, for instance, all the riskier alternatives within the same trial had the expected
pay-off of 0.83× 0.9 = 0.747 in Experiment 1 and 0.83× 1.1 = 0.913 in Experiment
2.
Then, each alternative was independently assigned with a probability of non-
zero pay-off. For a safer alternative, a probability of non-zero pay-off was a random
number drawn from a uniform distribution between 0.800 and 0.995. Then, the
expected pay-off for an alternative was divided by the probability of non-zero pay-off
to derive the non-zero pay-off amount. Thus, if a safer alternative had an expected
pay-off of 0.83 and a .943 probability of non-zero pay-off, the amount of the non-
zero pay-off is 0.83/.943 = 0.880. Then the probability and the amount of pay-off
were rounded to the nearest two decimal points. Continuing the above example, the
alternative has a .94 probability of 0.88 pay-off and a 1 − .94 = .06 probability of
0.00 pay-off.
Similarly for each of the riskier alternatives, a probability of non-zero pay-
off was a random number drawn from a uniform distribution between 0.005 and
0.200. This range of probability follows Hertwig et al. (2004)’s definition of rare
events. The amount of non-zero pay-off was then derived with the same procedure
as described above. Please note that pay-offs from a riskier alternative tends to have
a higher variance than a pay-off from a safer alternative. By eliminating extremely
rare or certain pay-offs (with probability less than .005 or greater than .995), we
aimed to reduce the possibility that participants would infer that non-zero pay-offs
were impossible or certain.
Each alternative was presented as a box on a screen, and a set of alternatives
was presented to participants as an array of boxes. An example screen-shot is
given in Figure 3.1. The left panel in this figure illustrates a small set with 2
alternatives, and the right panel illustrates a large set with 32 alternatives. Locations
of alternatives were randomized independently for each trial for each participant.
Thus, the top far-left box may be a riskier alternative on one trial and a safer
alternative on another trial.
3.2.3 Procedure
Participants were instructed that their payment would depend on their choices dur-
ing the experiment. The two experiments asked each participant to make six choices,
three involving gains and three involving losses. The gain and loss trials were in-
36
Click a box to sample till you feel ready.
Make a choice
(a) Small Set
Click a box to sample till you feel ready.
Make a choice
(b) Large Set
Figure 3.1: Example screen-shots.
terleaved and presented in a random order. At each trial, participants saw either 2
or 32 alternatives and were allowed to draw samples from the alternatives as many
times as they wanted before choosing one of the alternatives. Every time a sam-
ple was drawn, information about the alternative was presented for 500ms. In the
description paradigm, the information displayed the probability and the amount
of non-zero pay-off (e.g., 94%, $0.88). In the sampling paradigm, the information
presented was a sample, randomly drawn with replacement from the pay-off distri-
bution associated with that alternative. For example, about 94 out of 100 samples
from an alternative with a 94% probability of $0.88 were $0.88 and the other 6 were
$0.00. Participants did not learn about the pay-offs from their choices until the end
of the experiment. In Experiment 1, the pay-offs from the six choices were summed
and added to the base fee of $1.00. After adding the base fee, the fee ranged from
$0.00 to $14.57, with a mean of $1.80. In Experiment 2, the pay-off from one choice
was randomly selected and added to the base fee of £4.00. After adding the base
fee, the fee ranged from £0.00 to £8.00, with a mean of £4.08.
3.3 Results
Analyses were confined to trials where participants sampled at least two alternatives
and chose an alternative they had sampled at least once. This represented 686 out
of 786 choices (= 131 participants× 6 choices) in Experiment 1, and 555 out of 606
choices (= 101 participants× 6 trials) in Experiment 2.
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Figure 3.2: Proportion of choices for riskier alternatives in Experiment 1. Error
bars are 95% confidence interval.
3.3.1 Risk-taking
For each participant, we calculated the proportion of choices for riskier alternatives,
as in Figures 3.2 and 3.3. These figures show that both experiments replicated the
description-experience gap in the small set size for both gain and loss domains. In
the gain domain, a riskier alternative was more frequently chosen in the description
paradigm than in the sampling paradigm. Alternatively in the loss domain, a riskier
alternative was more frequently chosen in the sampling paradigm than in the de-
scription paradigm. These patterns are consistent with the description-experience
gap. However when a set-size is large, the description-experience gap disappears in
the gains domain, but not in the loss domain.
Choices for riskier alternatives were examined with mixed-effect logistic re-
gressions, which include by-participant intercepts and slopes as random factors.
Model fits indicate a significant three-way interaction between the domain, the
paradigm, and the set-size (Experiment 1: χ2(1) = 6.71, β = −3.79, p < .01;
Experiment 2: χ2(1) = 11.70, β = −4.11, p < .001). For the gain domain, the effect
of paradigm differs between the set-sizes (Experiment 1: χ2(1) = 13.22, β = 3.08,
p < .001; Experiment 2: χ2(1) = 11.84, β = 2.43, p < .001). Specifically, with
a growth in set-sizes, a riskier alternative is more frequently chosen in the sam-
pling paradigm (Experiment 1: χ2(1) = 19.24, β = 2.21, p < .001; Experiment 2:
χ2(1) = 18.90, β = 1.69, p < .001) but not in the description paradigm (ps > .39).
This amplified risk-taking eliminates the description-experience gap in the large set.
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Figure 3.3: Proportion of choices for riskier alternatives in Experiment 2. Error
bars are 95% confidence interval.
For the loss domain, a growth in set-sizes does not significantly influence
choices for riskier alternatives (ps > .07). Here, the description-experience gap per-
sists, providing reassuring support for prior generalizations from the two-alternative
environments in the loss domain (e.g., Yechiam et al., 2005; Hertwig & Erev, 2009).
To show that the elimination of the description-experience gap in the gain
domain is not due to a greater tendency for random choice in the large set-size,
we computed the mean sample pay-offs participants observed for each alternative.
Using this mean pay-off, the sampled alternatives were ranked in a descending order
within each trial. Ranks were then normalized as follows:
relative rank =
rank− 1
n− 1,
where n is the number of unique alternatives sampled. Random choice is indicated
by a mean relative rank of the chosen alternative close to .50. The mean relative
rank of the chosen alternative in the sampling paradigm for the large set-size was
.85 (SE = 0.02) in Experiment 1 and .90 (SE = 0.02) in Experiment 2. These were
both significantly higher than .50 (using a mixed-effect linear regression with max-
imal random effects on the logit-transformed ranks, Experiment 1: t(325) = 10.40,
p < .001; Experiment 2: t(260) = 14.79, p < .001), indicating that participants
consistently chose higher ranked alternatives among those they sampled and thus
were not choosing randomly.
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Figure 3.4: Sampling error in Experiment 1. For illustration purposes, sampling
error is mean-averaged across trials for each participant. Marker indicates grand
mean and error bars are 95% confidence interval.
As Experiments 1 and 2 yielded nearly identical results on risk-taking, in
what follows we partially pooled the data in the two experiments, allowing effect
sizes to differ between the experiments. Only overall effects are reported. To this
end, we included by-experiment intercepts and slopes, as well as by-participant
intercepts and slopes in all the mixed-effect models reported below.
3.3.2 Sampling error
Sampling error and set-sizes
As discussed above, risk-taking in the sampling paradigm is often attributed to
sampling error. Here we examine how sampling error explains the amplified risk-
taking. Formally, sampling error can be defined as the difference between a mean
sample and an expected pay-off. For example, if an alternative with a .16 probability
of a $5.19 pay-off delivers a series of samples, 0.00, 0.00, and 5.19, the mean sample
is (0.00 + 0.00 + 5.19)/3 = 1.73. Since this alternative has the expected pay-off of
.16 × 5.19 = 0.8304, the sampling error would be 1.73 − 0.8304 = 0.8996. Positive
error indicates that an alternative has produced samples with a higher mean than
its expected pay-off; a negative error indicates the opposite.
Sampling error was calculated for each alternative, and we identified the
largest sampling error separately for riskier and safer alternatives in each trial and
for each participant. Distribution of sampling errors is positively skewed in the
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Figure 3.5: Sampling error in Experiment 2. For illustration purposes, sampling
error is mean-averaged across trials for each participant. Marker indicates grand
mean and error bars are 95% confidence interval.
gain domain and negative skewed in the loss domain. Therefore in fitting statis-
tical models, we rescaled the sampling error by log-transforming their values after
correcting for the different lower and upper bounds for the gain and loss domains,
respectively.1.
Sampling error is displayed in Figures 3.4 and 3.5. These figures illustrate
that sampling error increases with a growth in set-sizes, and the increment is largest
for riskier alternatives in the gain domain. Mixed-effect linear regressions reveal
a significant interaction effect, indicating that the difference between riskier and
safer alternatives depends on the interaction between the set-size and the domain:
χ2(1) = 51.09, β = 1.37, p < .001. For the gain domain, the set-size has different
effects on riskier and safer alternatives: χ2(1) = 39.10, β = −1.21, p < .001. While
sampling error increases for both riskier and safer alternatives, the increment is
larger for a riskier alternative (χ2(1) = 7.85, β = 1.35, p < .01) than for a safer
alternative (χ2(1) = 4.22, β = 0.13, p = .04).
For the loss domain, the set-size does not have significantly different effects
on riskier and safer alternatives χ2(1) = 2.13, β = 0.16, p = .14. Here, sampling
error for riskier alternatives does not differ significantly from sampling error for safer
1For the gain domain, we subtracted the smallest possible sampling error, -1.1, and log-
transformed the resulting value. For the loss domain where the largest possible sampling error
is 1.1, we subtracted 1.1 from the sampling error, and negated to make the distribution positively
skewed, log-transformed and negated again. Figures show the data in relation to their untrans-
formed scaling.
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alternatives (χ2(1) = 3.48, β = −0.81, p = .06), but sampling error is significantly
larger in a large set than in a small set for both riskier and safer alternatives (χ2(1) =
6.12, β = 0.47, p = .01).
These results mirror the above results on risk-taking. With a growth in
set-sizes in the gain domain, sampling error most drastically increases for a riskier
alternative, whose choice is favored by a growth in set-sizes. Indeed, sampling error
for a riskier alternative explains choice for riskier alternatives. Specifically, sampling
error explains choice differently between the gain and loss domains (χ2(1) = 11.34,
β = −0.83, p < .001) but not between the set-sizes (χ2(1) = 0.47, β = −0.01,
p = .49). Larger sampling error predicts a choice for a riskier alternative in the gain
domain (χ2(1) = 21.05, β = 5.13, p < .001) but not in the loss domain (χ2(1) = 0.11,
β = 0.34, p = .11).
Thus, sampling error significantly increases with a growth in set-sizes in
both the gain and loss domains. In the gain domain, however, the increment is
more drastic for a riskier alternative. This increment in sampling error for riskier
alternatives is linked with more frequent choices for riskier alternatives in a large
set.
Sampling error and the number of samples
Sampling error of a riskier alternative is typically associated with the number of
samples when set sizes are small (e.g., Hertwig & Pleskac, 2010; Fox & Hadar, 2006;
Ungemach et al., 2009). When a riskier alternative is sampled only a few times, the
alternative may deliver only a series of 0.00 samples. As a result, the mean sample
from a riskier alternative is often lower than its expected pay-off. To investigate
relationships between the number of samples and amplified risk-taking, we first test
whether the number of samples explains sampling error. As our focus here is on
understanding increased sampling error for a riskier alternative and amplified risk-
taking in the gain domain, only a riskier alternative in the gain domain is examined
below.
Participants sampled 2.16 times from each alternative on average (95% CI
[1.24, 3.69])2, and we entered the number of samples into a mixed-effect linear
regression to predict sampling error. Model fit indicates that the effect does not
significantly differ between the set-sizes (χ2(1) = 1.84, β = −0.00, p = .17), and that
the number of samples is a non-significant predictor of sampling error (χ2(1) = 3.69,
2This estimate is derived with a mixed-effect Poisson regression, which allows each participant
and each experiment to have differing intercepts. As a Poisson regression uses the natural logarithm
as a link function, the estimated average is a geometric mean, rather than an arithmetic mean.
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Figure 3.6: Sampling error for a riskier alternative against the number of alternatives
sampled. Each marker represents a trial, and each participant has up to three entries
into the figure. Solid line is predicted sampling error from a mixed-effect linear
regression.
β = 0.09, p = .05).
Sampling error and the number of alternatives sampled
As a growth in set-sizes is linked with an increment in sampling error, the number
of alternatives sampled may also be linked with sampling error in a large set. If
individuals sample only two alternatives in a large set, for example, these individuals
are functionally restricting themselves to a small set of two alternatives. Thus, the
sampling error these individuals encounter should be smaller than the sampling error
which other individuals encounter while sampling all 32 alternatives.
Sampling error for a riskier alternative is plotted against the number of alter-
natives sampled in Figure 3.6. As expected, mixed-effect linear regressions suggest
that the number of alternatives sampled explains sampling error for riskier alter-
natives: χ2(1) = 7.38, β = 0.03, p < .01. Thus as more alternatives are sampled,
sampling error for a riskier alternative increases.
3.4 Discussion of experimental results
As hypothesized, a growth in set-sizes amplifies risk-taking in the sampling paradigm
in the gain domain, which in turn eliminates the description-experience gap. Further
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investigation revealed that this amplification is due to increased sampling error for
riskier alternatives.
Sampling error for riskier alternatives is explained by the number of alter-
natives sampled. As individuals sample more alternatives, at least one alternative
tends to deliver a large sample at higher frequency than its underlying probability,
resulting in increased sampling error. In the gain domain in particular, sampling
error for a riskier alternative increases to a greater extent with a growth in set-sizes
than sampling error for safer alternatives, which explains the amplified risk-taking.
Previously, sampling error has been attributed to the number of samples
(e.g., Hertwig & Pleskac, 2010; Fox & Hadar, 2006; Ungemach et al., 2009). When
a riskier alternative in a small set is sampled only few times, the alternative tends
to deliver only 0.00 samples. When a riskier alternative is sampled multiple times,
however, the alternative should deliver non-zero samples, increasing the sampling
error. This claim is not supported in our results, perhaps because participants in
our experiments sampled too few times to observe non-zero samples. Participants
in Hertwig et al. (2004)’s study, for example, sampled a median of 7.5 times from
each alternative, while participants in our experiments sampled a median of only
2.5 times in Experiment 1 and 1.0 time in Experiment 2.
Thus, our results do not clarify whether sampling error can be alleviated
as individuals sample more per alternative. Further, sampling error may also be
impacted by the interaction between the number of alternatives sampled and the
number of samples. To further explore these effects of sampling on sampling error,
the following section describes a simulation using a broader range of samples over a
finer range of set-sizes.
3.5 Simulation
To further understand how sampling error impacts on choice probability for a riskier
alternative, we examined the influence of set size using three of the best performing
models for explaining choices in the sampling paradigm reported in Hau, Pleskac,
Kiefer, and Hertwig (2008).
3.5.1 Method
We simulated choices in the environments which reflect those in Experiments 1 and
2, with the following exception: the expected pay-offs for the riskier and safer alter-
natives were made equal within each trial. This eliminates any confound associated
with the relationship between the expected pay-off and the alternative categories
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(i.e., riskier and safer). Simulated participants followed one of the three models in
making a decision: the maximax model, the two-stage model of cumulative prospect
theory (the two-stage model henceforth), or the natural mean model. Participants
with the maximax model chose the alternative with the largest experienced pay-off.
Participants who followed the two-stage model first weighted the frequency
of pay-offs and transformed pay-off amounts into a subjective value to derive the
perceived expectation of utility, E:
E = w(experienced frequency of pay-off)× v(amount of pay-off),
where
w(f) =
fγ
(fγ + (1− f)γ)1/γ
and
v(x) = sign(x) |x|α.
The participants then chose the alternative with the largest perceived expectation
of utility. We used parameter values reported in Hau et al. (2008): α = 0.94 and
γ = 0.99 for the gain domain; α = 0.86 and γ = 0.93 for the loss domain.
Lastly, participants using the natural mean chose the alternative with the
highest mean of sample pay-offs. This natural mean model is a special case of the
two-stage model, where α = 1 and γ = 1.
For each of the choice models and for a variety of set-sizes (from 2 to 32) we
simulated 104 participant choices with a fixed number of samples per alternative.
3.5.2 Results and Discussion
The simulation results are summarized in Figures 3.7 and 3.8 for the gain and loss
domains, respectively. In both domains the three models make similar predictions
over a large area of the simulation space. The most striking result is that, in the
gain domain, the simulated participants chose a safer alternative only when the set
size and the number of samples are relatively small. When the set-size is larger
than two, risky alternatives were chosen almost exclusively. The only exception is
when the number of samples is near one per alternative and only when the number
of alternatives is equal to or smaller than 12. When more than 12 alternatives
are available, all three models predict that a riskier alternative is more frequently
chosen, even when the number of samples is as large as 20 samples per alternative.
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Figure 3.7: Simulation results for the gain domain.
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Figure 3.8: Simulation results for the loss domain.
These results are consistent with the results from Experiments 1 and 2. As
sampling error for a riskier alternative increases to a greater extent with a growth in
set-sizes than sampling error for a safer alternative, predicted probability of choosing
a riskier alternative increases with a growth in set-sizes.
3.6 General Discussion
Psychological experiments often simplify the complexity of the environments in
which we live. This simplification is necessary for researchers to isolate and ma-
nipulate variables of interest while holding other variables constant. However, this
simplification can lead to the neglect of variables most likely to influence behavior
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outside the laboratory. In the present study, we demonstrate that one such vari-
able — set-size — has a substantial and potentially unavoidable impact on decision
making.
Specifically, our experimental results show that a growth in set-sizes facili-
tates choices for riskier alternatives in the gain domain. This amplified risk-taking
eliminates the description-experience gap. Given the number of articles devoted
to studying the gap in two-alternative environments, and given the number of real-
world environments that are likely to involve more than two-alternatives, the present
findings suggest a profound caveat on inferences made from two-alternative environ-
ments.
Our results further suggest that the impact of set-sizes on risk-taking is
largely due to a change in sampling error. Our findings confirm that sampling error
favors safer alternatives when set-sizes are small, but also show that sampling error
favors riskier alternatives when set-sizes are large. With a growth in set-sizes, riskier
alternatives start appearing better than their expected pay-offs.
Importantly, the simulation indicate that the choice models derived from two-
alternative environments predict the amplification of risk-taking associated with a
growth in set-sizes. These model predictions are consistent with the observation
that subtle differences between choice models may be largely irrelevant in the sam-
pling paradigm, where the statistical structure of information acquisition can have
extremely large effects (e.g., Hau et al., 2008). More positively, however, our results
demonstrate that the choice models are capable of predicting the observed impact
of set-sizes.
The impact of set-size and sampling error is likely to extend beyond choice
between monetary pay-offs. The world outside the laboratory is replete with op-
portunities to make a choice in environments with more than two alternatives. The
world wide web now provides consumer ratings and personal experiences for count-
less potential alternatives, ranging from treatments for depression to suggestions
about how to get your partner back. Each of these, in effect, represents a sample,
which can provide information about the utility of that choice. Unfortunately, as
the number of alternatives increases, the possibility that some alternatives will de-
liver rare ‘lucky’ successes increases, appearing as if the utility is unstable across
set-sizes.
In the introduction we discussed a specific example with dieting: an individ-
ual may assess benefits of diets by recalling other individuals who have tried that
diet. Here, recalled individuals are analogous to sampled pay-offs, and the number
of diets is analogous to set-sizes. Thus, our findings suggest that the inference on a
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diet can depend on the number of alternative diets being assessed.
If benefits of diets are rare, assessment on only a few diets may lead to the
inference that dieting is a waste of time. Assessment on a larger number of diets,
however, is likely to lead to the inference that at least one of the diets is beneficial.
Importantly, with more diets considered, it becomes more likely that one of the
diets appears much more beneficial than it actually is. Our findings suggest that
this effect of sampling error cannot easily be reduced by recalling more individuals.
However, the effect of sampling error can be attenuated by providing feed-
back to individuals Ert and Erev (2007). If individuals learn the benefit of diet
immediately after deciding to try the diet, these individuals may realize a difference
between what they expected and the benefits they actually enjoy. If sampling error
is large, this difference is also likely to be large, and individuals may eventually learn
that the samples they considered were not representative.
Unfortunately, in many environments feedback is not always immediately
available. In these cases, the impact of observing rare success can be large and po-
tentially dangerous. Thus, the effects of set-size are extremely important in under-
standing how individuals make choices in complex many-alternative environments
and thus further explored in the next chapter.
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Chapter 4
Encouraging myopic choices
with information
4.1 Background
When making a choice, people often face a large set of alternatives to choose from.
For example, an on-line retailer, amazon.com, now offers more than 3,000 jams.
While it may be more likely for people to find a preferred jam in a large set than
in a small set, some previous studies report that with more alternatives people are
more likely to defer a choice. Broadly, this effect is known as the too-much-choice
effect. Unfortunately, the prevalence of the too-much-choice effect is disputed as
are the factors influencing its occurrence (e.g., Scheibehenne, Greifeneder, & Todd,
2010).
In this study, we investigate how factors which possibly explain choice defer-
ral impact on information search and choice strategies. Previous studies show that
information search and choice strategies are often sensitive to choice environments
(see Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1993, for review). In particular, we examine
effects of set size and task complexity, employing risky choice environments. The
benefit of employing these environments is that they provides objective measures for
determining what information people use to make choices, as well as providing well-
defined paradigms for information presentation. Before we describe our approach in
more detail, we briefly review the literature on too-much-choice and choice behavior
in risky choice environments.
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4.1.1 Too much choice effect
The too-much-choice effect is typically associated with three types of behaviors:
the first of these is reduced choice quality. When faced with a large set, people
often show a reduced capacity to choose the most preferred alternative (Malhotra,
1982; Scammon, 1977). For example, Malhotra (1982) reported that people are
less likely to choose the product best aligned with their individual preferences when
making a choice between 25 products than when making a choice between 5 products.
Second, perhaps as a consequence of this reduced quality choice, people tend to show
decreased satisfaction with their choices with a growth in set size (Iyengar & Lepper,
2000). Third, and most relevant to the present study, people are more likely to defer
a choice when confronted with a large set (Iyengar, Huberman, & Jiang, 2004).
These behaviors have been attributed to cognitive limitations. Specifically,
the information overload hypothesis states that abundant information overloads
cognition, and subsequently people become unable to make an informed choice (see
Eppler & Mengis, 2004, for review). Previous studies have argued that information
overload is induced by large set size, explaining reduced choice quality (Jacoby,
Speller, & Kohn, 1974).
A number of studies, however, have shown that large set size alone does not
induce information overload. Wilkie (1974), for example, criticizes Jacoby et al.
(1974) for not considering choice quality in relation to quality achieved via random
choice. When choice quality is compared with quality of random choices, choice
quality actually improves with a growth in set size (see also Summers, 1974; Russo,
1974).
Perhaps less controversially, a recent meta-analysis of more than 60 exper-
iments on the too-much-choice effect found that set size have a “virtually zero”
effect size on decreased satisfaction and choice deferral (Scheibehenne et al., 2010).
Scheibehenne et al. (2010) suggest that in some cases too-much-choice was poten-
tially reliable, but that “to understand the effect that assortment size can have on
choice, it will be essential to consider the interaction between the broader context
of the structure of assortments — beyond the mere number of options available —
and the decision processes that people adopt” (p. 421). Thus, the previously ob-
served influences on choice deferral may be a result of numerous factors and may
not necessarily be caused by a growth in set size.
One factor that has since been investigated is the number of attributes (or
features) associated with each alternative. Greifeneder, Scheibehenne, and Kleber
(2010) demonstrate that a growth in set size alone does not decrease satisfaction,
but that increasing the number of attributes along which an alternative is described
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does. The number of attributes is also indicated to affect choice quality (Helgeson &
Ursic, 1993) and choice deferral (Dhar, 1997). (Dhar, 1997), for example, presented
participants with two consumer products (e.g., jams) at one time and asked them
to make a choice. The results suggest that people are more likely to defer a choice
when two products differ in four attributes rather than two attributes.
4.1.2 Risky choice
Studies with risky choice environments ask participants to make choices between
alternatives that deliver monetary pay-offs with a fixed probability. For instance,
an alternative can be associated with a 90% probability of £3 and a 10% probability
of £0. This risky choice has been studied with two separate, yet related, paradigms:
the description paradigm and the sampling paradigm. In the description paradigm,
pay-off and probability information are explicitly provided at one point in time.
For instance, people are told that Alternative A delivers £3 with a 90% probability
and £0 with a 10% probability, and that Alternative B delivers £15 with a 20%
probability and £0 with a 80% probability.
In contrast, in the sampling paradigm, people typically learn about payoffs by
sampling payoffs one-at-a-time over a series of samples. A sequence of samples from
Alternative B, for example, could reveal £0, £0, £0, £15, and £0. By observing this
sequence, people may learn that Alternative B delivers £15 with a 20% probability.
In this sampling paradigm, people can sample each alternative as much as they
like before making a choice. Thus, in both description and sampling paradigms,
people make choices between alternatives with probabilistic pay-offs, and choices
are influenced by the information people gather. With a growth in set size, people
must decide how many alternatives to sample and — especially in the sampling
paradigm — must decide how many times to sample each alternative.
A number of studies report that choices made in the description paradigm are
often distinctively different from those made in the sampling paradigm, especially
with respect to risk (e.g., Hertwig et al., 2004; Hertwig & Erev, 2009). In particular,
when set size is small, people tend to overweight rare pay-offs in the description
paradigm, but people tend to underweight the same rare pay-offs in the sampling
paradigm. Though several different explanations have been proposed to explain
this difference (e.g., Hertwig & Erev, 2009; Hills & Hertwig, 2010), the differences
in choices are largely (though not fully) explained by the number of samples people
draw in the sampling paradigm prior to making a choice (Ungemach et al., 2009; Fox
& Hadar, 2006): people tend not to sample enough to realize the actual probabilities
of pay-off. To realize the 20% probability of £15 pay-off from Alternative B, for
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example, people have to sample at least 5 times and observe one £15 sample. With
other combinations of sampling or pay-offs, people may under- or over-estimate the
probability of the £15 pay-off.
In the risky choice environments, information overload can potentially be
induced with an increment in the number of branches. One branch corresponds
to one possible pay-off and its associated probability. In the above example, both
Alternatives A and B have two possible pay-offs (i.e., £3 and £0; and £15 and £0,
respectively) and hence have two branches.
The number of branches has been reported to influence a choice in the de-
scription paradigm: when set size is large, an alternative with fewer branches is
more often chosen, compared to when set size is small (Iyengar & Kamenica, 2010).
Iyengar and Kamenica (2010) attribute the avoidance of alternatives with many
branches to people’s tendency to avoid uncertainty. With a growth in set size, it be-
comes cognitively taxing to evaluate alternatives with many branches. Thus when
faced with a choice between alternatives with many branches, people may avoid
evaluating alternatives altogether and simply defer a choice.
In contrast, in the sampling paradigm, the influence of branch has not been
as extensively studied. Here, the number of branches in an alternative is only
revealed by sampling. As people often do not draw enough samples to realize exact
probabilities of pay-off in two-branch alternatives (Ungemach et al., 2009; Fox &
Hadar, 2006), people may also be unlikely to draw sufficient samples to recognize
the number of branches in an alternative which people sample. Furthermore, people
may draw fewer samples per alternative with a growth in set size. Previous studies
report that the number of samples per alternative tends to decrease with a growth in
set size. According to Hills et al. (2013), for example, when 32 gambles are available,
people typically draw only one or two samples per alternative before making a choice.
Although research has suggested that people draw more samples from alternative
with higher complexity in pay-offs (Lajarraga et al., 2012), we do not expect the
number of samples to scale with the number of branches to realize that an alternative
has multiple branches or the branch’s associated probabilities. Therefore, we predict
that an increment in the number of branches is more like to result in frequent choice
deferral in the description paradigm than in the sampling paradigm.
In addition in the sampling paradigm, a growth in set size has been reported
to increase people’s likelihood of sampling rare pay-offs. Chapter 3, for example,
report that when confronted with a large set, people are more likely to sample rare
but extremely good pay-offs from one of the alternatives, because people tend to
sample more alternatives in a large set than in a small set. This experience leads
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people to evaluate the alternative in a high regard and consequently to choose the
alternative. However, in previous studies people do not have the opportunity to defer
a choice, and thus their forced choice may not indicate an increased preference for
alternatives which delivered these rare pay-offs. In other words, with the opportunity
to defer a choice, people may choose deferring a choice over purchasing an alternative
that delivers a rare pay-off when that rare pay-off is observed in a large set. However,
if previous work (Hills et al., 2013; Chapter 3) does indicate an increased preference,
then sampling a rare pay-off in a large set should result in a higher willingness to
purchase the alternative presenting the rare pay-off. We hypothesize that a growth
in set size will result in more frequent choice purchase, as opposed to choice deferral,
in the sampling paradigm.
4.1.3 Information search and choice strategy
As stated above, the utility of the description and sampling paradigms is that they
allow us to quantitatively examine the “broader context of the structure of assort-
ments” and the “decisions processes people adopt” in environments that may induce
too-much-choice, as called for by Scheibehenne et al. (2010). We discussed one as-
pect of structure above — the number of attributes per alternative. Choices in the
description and sampling paradigms, however, also involve other two components:
information search and information processing.
As information search has direct influence on the quality of the information
available for processing, we predict that information search will play a critical role in
choice (see e.g., Hills & Hertwig, 2010). As presented information differs between the
description and sampling paradigms, we further predict that information search will
have differential effects on choice in the two paradigms. Specifically, we hypothesize
that more ready reliance on thin-search — spreading out and thinning information
search across available alternatives — will impact on a choice in two distinct ways
in the two paradigms.
In the description paradigm, reliance on thin-search leads to incomplete in-
formation about alternatives and therefore results in use of non-compensatory choice
strategies: people search and use only a a subset of information on probabilities and
pay-offs per alternative. Previous work reports that when consumer products are de-
scribed in terms of many attributes, people search only a subset of attributes (Cook,
1993) and choice strategies tend to be non-compensatory (Ford, Schmitt, Schecht-
man, Hults, & Doherty, 1989). Thus, we predict that the consequence of relying on
thin-search — use of non-compensatory strategies — will be most pronounced as
the number of branches per alternative increases.
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To investigate strategy use in the description paradigm, we follow previous
research on strategy selection in risky choice. In particular, (Thorngate, 1980) and
(Payne et al., 1993) provide us with a systematic way to explore various strategies.
Among them, we examine three strategies: expected pay-off, maximax and lexico-
graphic. According to the expected pay-off strategy, people choose an alternative
with the largest expected pay-off. Thus, the expected pay-off strategy is compen-
satory: it requires all the information (i.e., probability and pay-off in all branches)
to be processed to make a choice. Although other strategies have been proposed
(e.g., see Hau et al., 2008), these three strategies are selected from the best models
in explaining choices (Hau et al., 2008).
In contrast, the maximax and lexicographic strategies are non-compensatory:
the maximax strategy predicts that people choose an alternative whose best pay-
off is largest within a set. Thus the maximax strategy requires consideration of
only pay-offs and not probabilities of pay-offs. If people employ the lexicographic
strategy, they choose an alternative whose most likely pay-off is largest. Thus, the
lexicographic strategy requires consideration of probabilities of pay-offs and only
one possible pay-off per alternative. These two strategies do not require all the
information to be processed and hence are non-compensatory.
In the present context, these strategies determine likelihood that an alter-
native will exceed a given threshold for purchase. For example, with the expected
pay-off strategy, for example, a choice is deferred when all the alternatives have an
expected pay-off below a threshold for purchase. With the maximax strategy, a
choice is deferred when all the alternatives in a set have maximum pay-off of below
a threshold.
In contrast to the description paradigm, strategy use in the sampling paradigm
is less important with reliance on the thin-search. This is because fewer samples
provide less information about probabilities; in the limit, all three choice strategies
listed above make the same prediction if people take only one sample per alternative.
Instead, the increased likelihood of sampling a rare pay-off (Chapter 3) will likely
have a larger impact on a choice; the question remains, however, as to whether or
not an alternative with a rare pay-off is preferred over deferring a choice altogether.
4.1.4 Present study
In the following experiment, we tested the following hypotheses: 1) we expect choice
deferral to be more frequent when an alternative has many branches than when an
alternative has few branches, only in the description paradigm; 2) an increment
in the number of branches leads to thin-search and consequently use of a non-
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compensatory strategy in the description paradigm; 3) a growth in set-sizes results in
thin-search in the sampling paradigm; and 4) thin-search in the sampling paradigm
is associated with less frequent choice deferral. In addition, we explored relationships
between strategy use and choice deferral in the description paradigm.
4.2 Method
4.2.1 Participants
Seventy-two (63 females, 8 males, and 1 undisclosed) undergraduate students par-
ticipated in the study. Prior to collecting the data, we decided to recruit all the
88 students who are offered the chance to participate in an experiment for a course
credit. Out of 88, 16 students did not participate. Their age ranges from 18 to 33,
with a mean of 19.1.
4.2.2 Design
The experiment employed a 2 (between-participants, set-size: small or large) × 2
(between-participants, paradigm: description or sampling) × 2 (within-participant,
branch: few or many) design. Participants were randomly assigned to each of
between-participant conditions.
4.2.3 Apparatus
Alternatives were independently and randomly generated for each trial for each
participant with the following procedure. First, an expected pay-off is determined
with a random draw from the normal distribution whose mean is 1.00 and standard
deviation is 0.30. This normal distribution is truncated to ensure that no alternative
is assigned to a negative expected pay-off. The expected pay-off is randomly divided
into two (two branch condition) or four (four branch condition), with a constraint
that one of the branches is assigned to 0.00.
This constraint makes it unfeasible to use other possible strategies than the
expected pay-off, maximax, and lexicographic strategies. Minimax strategy, for
example, predicts that an alternative with the highest minimum pay-off is chosen.
With one branch always assigned to the pay-off of 0.00, the minimum pay-off is 0.00
for all alternatives, making the minimax strategy unable to discriminate alternatives.
For each alternative, an expected pay-off was divided into branches by mul-
tiplying with multinomial probabilities randomly drawn from Dirichlet distribution
whose number of concentration parameter is one fewer than the number of branches
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and whose concentration parameter is all 1.00. Then, the probability of pay-off is
independently determined with a random draw from Dirichlet distribution whose
number of concentration parameters equals to the number of branches and whose
concentration parameters is all 1.00. Then, the randomly divided numbers were
further divided by the probability of pay-off to derive the pay-off amount. The
probability and the amount of pay-off are both rounded to the nearest two deci-
mals.
In generating an alternative with four branches, for example, a random draw
from the normal distribution can be 1.20. This 1.20 is treated as an expected pay-
off from this alternative and randomly divided into four numbers: for instance,
0.62, 0.41, 0.17, and 0.00. Independently drawn random numbers from Dirichlet
distribution may be .34, .13, .08, and .45. Then, this alternative is associated with
a .34 probability of 1.82 (= 0.62/0.34), a .13 probability of 3.15 (= 0.41/0.13), a .08
probability of 2.13 (= 0.17/0.08), and a .45 probability of 0.00. Another alternative
for the same trial is independently generated with the same procedure.
4.2.4 Procedure
Participants were instructed that their bonus payments would depend on their
choices during the experiment. The experiment asked participants to make 10
choices in total, 5 of which were choice between alternatives with two branches
and the other 5 were with four branches.
Each trial displayed 2 alternatives (small set-size) or 35 alternatives (large
set-size) as an array of boxes on a screen. Participants were asked to sample from
the alternatives as many times as they wanted and then decide whether to choose
an alternative to purchase with £1.00 or to defer a choice and keep £1.00.
Every time an alternative was sampled, information about the alternative
was presented for 1,000ms. In the description paradigm, the information displayed
the probability and pay-off amount (e.g., 20%, £15.00; 80%, £0.00). In the sampling
paradigm, the information presented was a random draw with replacement from the
pay-off distribution associated with that alternative. For example, when an alterna-
tive with a 20% probability of £15.00 was sampled in the sampling paradigm, 2 in 10
on average displayed £15.00, otherwise £0.00. After sampling if participants decide
to purchase an alternative, participants were then asked to indicate the alternative
whose draw they wish to purchase.
Participants did not learn about the pay-offs from their purchases until the
end of the experiment, when one of the 10 trials was randomly selected. If par-
ticipant purchased a draw in the randomly selected trial, participant was paid the
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Figure 4.1: Proportion of choice deferral. Error bar represents standard error.
pay-off they earned from the purchase. If participant did not purchase a draw in
the randomly selected trial, participant was paid participation fee of £1.00. The
payment ranged from £0.00 to £2.39, and its mean was £0.61.
4.3 Results
4.3.1 Choice deferral
Figure 4.1 presents the proportion of deferred choices as a function of paradigm
(description or sampling), set-size (small or large) and branch (few or many). Fig-
ure 4.1 shows that the proportion of choice deferral fell with a growth in set-sizes
in both paradigms. Moreover, consistent with our hypothesis, an increment in the
number of branches increased the proportion of choice deferral in the description
paradigm. In the sampling paradigm, however, the number of branches does not
appear to impact on the proportion of choice deferral.
A mixed-effect logistic regression1 suggests a significant effect of set-size on
choice deferral: χ2(1) = 6.13, β = −0.51 (95% CI [−0.92, −0.11]), p = .01. In
addition, an interaction effect indicates that an effect of number of branches signif-
icantly depends on paradigm: χ2(1) = 11.35, β = −1.32 (95% CI [−2.07, −0.57]),
p < .001. In the description paradigm, choice is significantly more likely to be de-
1All the mixed-effect regressions we report here include maximal random factors: by-participant
intercept and slopes, and, if applicable, by-condition intercept and slopes. We assess statistical
significance by examining model fit with chi-square tests.
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Figure 4.2: Proportion of alternatives sampled. Error bar represents standard error.
ferred in the four branch condition than in the two branch condition: χ2(1) = 14.82,
β = 1.33 (95% CI [0.66, 1.99]), p < .001. In the sampling paradigm, branch has a
non-significant effect: χ2(1) = 0.14, β = −0.09 (95% CI [−0.57, 0.39]), p = .71. The
other interaction and main effects are non-significant: ps > .24.
These results show that a growth in set-sizes reduces choice deferral in both
paradigms. Also, consistent with our hypothesis (Hypothesis 1), increasing the
number of branches induces choice deferral only in the description paradigm. In the
following sections, we investigate factors driving these effects. First, we examine
whether a growth in set-sizes induces thin-search.
4.3.2 Thin-search
To investigate thin-search, we calculated the proportion of alternatives sampled and
the number of samples per alternative for each trial for each participant. In counting
the number of samples, we only considered alternatives which had sampled at least
once. The proportion and the counts are summarized in Figures 4.2 and 4.3.
Figure 4.2 shows that the proportion of alternatives sampled drops with
a growth in set-sizes. These proportions were multiplied with 0.90 to handle 1s,
added 0.05 to handle 0s and then logit-transformed. We examine the transformed
proportion with a mixed-effect linear regression. Model fit indicates that proportion
is significantly smaller in a large set than in a small set: χ2(1) = 80.53, β = −3.19
(95% CI [−3.69, −2.69]), p < .001. Interaction effects and other main effects are all
non-significant: ps > .10.
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Figure 4.3: Number of samples per alternative. Error bar represents standard error.
Similarly, Figure 4.3 shows that the number of samples drops per alternative
as set-sizes grow. In the description paradigm, the number of samples is the number
of times participant clicked on an alternative. As one click displayed information
on an alternative for 1,000ms, the number of samples in the description paradigm
corresponds to the number of seconds participant could spend on examining an
alternative.
The number of samples is examined with a mixed-effect Poisson regression,
separately for the two paradigms. In the description paradigm, the number of
samples differs between both set-size and number of branches, as indicated by the
interaction effect: χ2(1) = 4.39, β = −0.24 (95% CI [−0.45, −0.02]), p = .04. The
number of samples is significantly smaller when a set is large than when a set is
small: χ2(1) = 9.91, β = −0.26 (95% CI [−0.41, −0.10]), p < .01 for the two branch
condition; and χ2(1) = 16.18, β = −0.51 (95% CI [−0.72, −0.30]), p < .001 for
the four branch condition. Also, the number of samples is significantly larger in the
many branch condition than in the two branch condition: χ2(1) = 23.40, β = 0.42
(95% CI [0.25, 0.59]), p < .001 for a small set; and χ2(1) = 5.30, β = 0.14 (95% CI
[0.03, 0.24]), p = .02 for a large set.
Thus in the description paradigm, more time is spent on evaluating an al-
ternative with four branches than an alternative with two branches. With a growth
in set-sizes, however, less time is spent on evaluating an alternative, regardless of
the number of branches. These results imply that an individual may be able to
process less information per alternative when set-sizes are large. We examine this
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implication in the next subsection.
In the sampling paradigm, the difference in the numbers of samples between
the set-sizes does not significantly differ between branch conditions, as indicated by
the non-significant interaction effect: χ2(1) = 0.46, β = 0.07 (95% CI [−0.14, 0.29]),
p = .50. The number of samples is significantly smaller in a large set than in a
small set: χ2(1) = 4.79, β = −0.24 (95% CI [−0.34, −0.14]), p < .001. The number
of samples, however, does not differ significantly between the few and four branch
conditions: χ2(1) = 0.62, β = 0.03 (95% CI [−0.05, 0.12]), p = .43. Thus in the
sampling paradigm, a choice is based on fewer samples per alternative when set-sizes
are large, supporting the hypothesis that thin-search becomes more prevalent with
a growth in set-sizes (Hypothesis 3).
The results thus far support thin-search: less information is sampled in both
description and sampling paradigms with a growth in set-sizes. In the next analysis,
we examine how thin-search relates to choice deferral.
4.3.3 Choice deferral in the description paradigm
In the following analysis, we investigate which strategy an individual uses to decide
whether to defer a choice. As discussed above, we examine the expected pay-off,
maximax, and lexicographic strategies. According to the expected pay-off strategy,
choice deferral is explained by the largest expected pay-off among alternatives sam-
pled. Also according to the maximax and lexicographic strategies, choice deferral
is explained by the largest maximum pay-off and the largest most likely pay-off,
respectively.
We identified expected pay-off, maximum pay-off, and most likely pay-off for
each alternative sampled, and determined the largest expected pay-off, the largest
maximum pay-off, and the largest most likely pay-off for each trial for each par-
ticipant. The maximum pay-off and the most likely pay-off, however, tend to have
different amounts between the few and four branch conditions: because the expected
pay-off from an alternative is determined independently of the number of branches,
pay-off from one branch tends to decrease as the number of branches increases.
Thus to assess the maximax and lexicographic strategy independently of set-
sizes, we normalized these pay-offs within each set-size, so that their means are 0.00
and their standard deviations are 1.00. The differences in largest expected pay-offs
and largest most likely pay-offs are summarized in Figure 4.4.
The left panel in Figure 4.4 displays difference in largest expected pay-offs
when a choice was purchased compared to when it was deferred. Here, a positive
value along the vertical axis indicates that the largest expected pay-off within a
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Figure 4.4: Differences in largest pay-offs in the description paradigm when a choice
was purchased compared to when a choice was deferred. Pay-off in the right panel
is normalized. Error bar represents standard error.
trial is greater prior to choice purchase than prior to choice deferral. Difference of
0 indicates that the largest expected pay-off does not differ between prior to choice
purchase and choice deferral, and also, a negative value indicates that the largest
expected pay-off is smaller prior to choice purchase than prior to choice deferral.
In general, positive difference indicates that the expected pay-off strategy explains
choice deferral. Thus, the left panel in Figure 4.4 shows that the expected pay-off
strategy explains choice deferral in the two branch condition for both small and
large sets.
Similarly, the right panel in Figure 4.4 illustrates difference in largest most
likely pay-offs. This panel shows that the lexicographic strategy explains choice
deferral, except when an alternative has two branches in a large set.
To statistically confirm these observations, the pay-offs are entered into a
mixed-effect logistic regression to predict choice deferral. To explore different strat-
egy use across set-sizes and the number of branches, we include interaction terms
with set-size and branch in the regression.
An interaction effect indicates that the expected pay-off strategy explains
choice deferral better in the two branch than in the four branch condition: χ2(1) =
11.47, β = 1.12 (95% CI [0.47, 1.76]), p < .001. The expected pay-off strategy
significantly explains choice deferral in the few branch condition (χ2(1) = 4.62,
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β = −1.92 (95% CI [−3.76, −0.07]), p = .03) but not in the four branch condition
(χ2(1) = 3.57, β = −3.41 (95% CI [−7.50, 0.67]), p = .06). The other interaction
effects are non-significant: ps > .06.
Also, the model fit indicates that the maximax strategy explains choice de-
ferral: χ2(1) = 4.84, β = −0.34, p = .03. This effect of maximax strategy does not
depend on set size or branch condition: ps > .07.
Importantly for the thin-search prediction, the effect of the lexicographic
strategy depends on both set size and the number of branches: χ2(1) = 9.67, β =
1.98, p < .01. The lexicographic strategy explains choice deferral in the four branch
condition: χ2(1) = 6.41, β = −0.61, p = .01. This strategy, however, explains choice
deferral better in a small set than in a large set when an alternative has two branches:
χ2(1) = 6.28, β = 1.20, p = .03. While lexicographic strategy does not significantly
explain choice deferral in the two branch condition in a large set (χ2(1) = 1.71,
β = −0.39, p = .19), it does in the four branch condition (χ2(1) = 12.87, β = −1.67,
p < .01).
As only the effects of the expected pay-off and lexicographic strategies signif-
icantly differ between conditions, these results imply that people switch between the
expected pay-off and lexicographic strategies depending on the structure of choice
environments.
Thus to further examine the change in strategy use, we classified each par-
ticipant as a user of the expected pay-off strategy or lexicographic strategy for each
branch condition. This classification is based on log-likelihood of the mixed-effect
logistic regressions fitted separately for each branch condition and each set size.
Specifically, we first predicted the probability of choice deferral using the fitted
models, computed the log-likelihood of the participant’s response, and compared
the log-likelihood with the expected pay-off strategy against the log-likelihood with
the lexicographic strategy. If the log-likelihood was larger with the expected pay-off
strategy for a participant, indicating that the expected pay-off strategy is a better
predictor of choice deferral than the lexicographic strategy, we classified this partici-
pant as a user of the expected pay-off strategy. The number of participants classified
into each strategy use is displayed in Table 4.1. As branch is a within-participant
condition, each participant is classified into one of the four cells in this table.
Table 4.1 shows that the largest proportion (.53) of participants is classified
as using the expected pay-off strategy in the two branch condition but as using the
lexicographic strategy in the four branch condition. A Poisson regression confirms
that significantly more participants are classified as users of the expected pay-off
strategy than the lexicographic strategy in the few branch condition: β = 0.79 (95%
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Four Branch Condition
Expected Pay-off Lexicographic
Two Branch Condition
Expected Pay-off 5 (.16) 17 (.53)
Lexicographic 4 (.13) 6 (.19)
Table 4.1: Number (and proportion) of participants classified into each strategy use.
CI [0.07, 1.58]), p = .03. In the four branch condition, however, significantly more
participants are classified as users of the lexicographic strategy than the expected
pay-off strategy: β = −2.39 (95% CI [−1.76, −0.20]), p = .01. Other effects,
including effects of set-size, are non-significant, ps > .28.
This difference in use of the strategies explains the increased proportion of
choice deferral with an increment in the number of branches, as we saw in Figure 4.1.
Prior to choice purchase, the largest expected pay-off from an alternative with two
branches is £1.35 on average (95% CI [1.30, 1.40]) and the largest most likely pay-off
from an alternative with many branches is £1.24 on average (95% CI [1.14, 1.35]).
The overlapping confidence intervals indicate that a threshold for the expected pay-
off strategy is similar to or potentially the same as a threshold for the lexicographic
strategy.
Across all the trials, where choice is purchased and deferred, the largest
expected pay-off in the two branch condition is significantly greater than the largest
most likely pay-off in the many branch condition: χ2(1) = 4.59, β = −0.13 (95% CI
[−0.26, −0.01]), p = .03. Thus if thresholds are similar or the same for the expected
pay-off and lexicographic strategies, at least one alternative in a set is more likely to
be above a threshold for the expected pay-off strategy in the two branch condition
than for the lexicographic strategy in the four branch condition. Consequently, use
of the expected pay-off strategy in the two branch condition is more likely to result
in choice purchase, hence less likely to result in choice deferral, than use of the
lexicographic strategy in the four branch condition.
Also with a growth in set-sizes, the largest expected pay-off increases for an
alternative with few branches across all the trials: χ2(1) = 23.58, β = 0.28 (95%
CI [0.18, 0.37]), p < .001. Similarly, the largest most likely pay-off increases for an
alternative with many branches with a growth in set-sizes: χ2(1) = 23.58, β = 0.28
(95% CI [0.18, 0.37]), p < .001. These increments are due to the way alternatives are
generated: Variance in pay-offs increases as more alternatives are generated. Thus,
effects of set-sizes are due to the property of experiment and particular pay-off to
which an individual attends.
Importantly, once the effects of expected pay-off and lexicographic strategies
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Figure 4.5: Differences in maximum mean samples in the sampling paradigm. Error
bar represents standard error.
are controlled for, the effect of set-size and branch on choice deferral becomes non-
significant: χ2(1) = 3.05, β = −1.13 (95% CI [−2.41, 0.15]), p = .08; and χ2(1) =
1.49, β = 1.88 (95% CI [−1.12, 4.90]), p = .22, respectively. These results indicate
that the higher likelihood to see a larger pay-off in a large set explains the reduced
proportion of choice deferral with a growth in set-sizes. Also, an increment in the
number of branches promotes use of a non-compensatory strategy use, which results
in the increased proportion of choice deferral.
4.3.4 Choice deferral in the sampling paradigm
As in the above analysis, we consider three possible strategies in the sampling
paradigm: natural mean, maximax and lexicographic strategies. The natural mean
strategy predicts that if the largest mean samples from an alternative is less than a
threshold for choice purchase, an individual defers a choice. Similarly, the maximax
strategy posits that a largest sample is less than a threshold, choice is deferred.
Lastly according to the lexicographic strategy, if the largest most frequent sample
is less than a threshold, choice is deferred.
These three strategies make nearly identical predictions, given the relatively
small number of samples per alternative (Figure 4.3). Thus, we report only the
results with the natural mean strategy. As in the above analysis, we summarize
the differences between choice purchase and choice deferral in Figure 4.5. Positive
value in this figure indicates that the largest mean sample is greater prior to choice
purchase than prior to choice deferral, supporting predictions from the natural mean
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strategy.
These largest mean samples are examined with a mixed-effect logistic re-
gression, which includes an interaction term with set-size. Model fit indicates that
choice deferral is significantly predicted by largest mean samples: χ2(1) = 85.67,
β = −1.44 (95% CI [−2.05, −0.81]), p < .001. This effect does not significantly
depend on set-size or the number of branches: ps > .11. Thus, observing a large
sample leads to choice purchase.
Replicating previous research (Noguchi & Hills, under review), the largest
mean sample is greater in a large set than in a small set: χ2(1) = 18.97, β = 1.79
(95% CI [1.12, 2.46]), p < .001. This is because an individual is more likely to
encounter a large but rare sample as he or she draws samples from more alternatives.
As a large sample is more likely to be observed in a large set, the proportion of choice
deferral decreases with a growth in set-sizes.
Once the effect of natural mean strategy is controlled for, the effect of set-
size on choice deferral becomes non-significant: χ2(1) = 1.40, β = −0.58 (95% CI
[−1.54, 0.37]), p = .24. Thus, a growth in set-sizes leads to thin-search in the
sampling paradigm, which in turn explains less frequent choice deferral in a large
set. The results are consistent with Hypothesis 4.
4.4 Discussion
The too-much-choice effect suggests that a growth in set size reduces choice quality,
decreases satisfaction, and increases frequency of choice deferral. These effects were
initially attributed to large set size, but empirical evidence suggest that the picture
is more subtle. In particular, in the present work we found that choice deferral is
mediated by the interaction of information presentation, information complexity,
and information search. In what follows, we briefly describe these interactions and
their potential implications for future research.
First, our results demonstrate that in both description and sampling paradigms,
when confronted with a large set of alternatives, people sample more alternatives,
but appear to acquire less information per alternative. Thus, people respond to large
sets by using thin-search. This finding is consistent with previous findings on task
complexity and contingent processing. When confronted with many apartments to
choose from, for example, people tend to quickly eliminate certain apartments from
consideration, and more closely examine the remaining apartments (Payne, 1976;
Lussier & Olshavsky, 1979). We observed a similar kind of elimination, but in our
experiments people eliminate alternatives from consideration without investigating
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them at all. Such stopping rule of information search in different domains is of broad
general interest (e.g., Seale & Rapoport, 1997; Browne & Pitts, 2004) and a clear
direction for future research. However, in this work we were specifically interested
in the implications of thin-search on choice deferral.
Second, we found that choice deferral is less frequent in a large set for both
description and sampling paradigms. In part, this is consistent with prior work sug-
gesting that people are more likely to find an alternative they prefer in a large set
than in a small set, if they have sufficiently well-defined preferences (Chernev, 2003;
Scheibehenne et al., 2010). We note that this explanation is to some degree unsatis-
factory, because if people defer a choice one can always argue that preferences were
not established well enough. If people do not defer a choice, one can simply argue
the opposite. Given that people routinely exhibit choice strategies that sometimes
favor likely (lexicographic) and sometimes favor maximum outcomes (maximax),
as well as many other variations, it is difficult to conclude (except in retrospect)
that people had well-defined preferences before they completed our study. Instead,
we focused on environmental factors influencing strategy use, which explain choice
deferral.
We find that a non-compensatory strategy is likely to be used in the descrip-
tion paradigm, especially when an alternative is associated with many branches.
This non-compensatory strategy use may appear in conflict with previous findings.
Glo¨ckner and Herbold (2011), for example, analyzed eye-movement process data and
reported support for compensatory strategy use: people consider all the information
presented. In Glo¨ckner and Herbold (2011)’s study, however, alternatives had only
two branches. Our results indicate that use of a compensatory strategy is most
prevalent when the number of branches is few. With an increment in the number of
branches, use of a non-compensatory strategy becomes more prevalent. This finding
is consistent with prior work (e.g., Ford et al., 1989), where a non-compensatory
strategy is often more readily used with an increment in the number of attributes
to describe alternatives.
In the sampling paradigm, thin-search increases the likelihood of encounter-
ing rare pay-offs, which often results in choice purchase. Similar to choices in the
description paradigm, choices based on thin-search can also be considered to follow
a non-compensatory strategy. Of course, as has frequently been observed in the
sampling paradigm, information search is rarely sufficient to provide people with
accurate probability information (Hertwig et al., 2004; Ungemach et al., 2009). One
of the principle contributions of the present work is to show that thin-search leads
to an increase in preference for alternatives with rare pay-offs when set sizes is large.
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With thin-search, people could have felt uncertain about possible pay-offs
from alternatives, disliked this uncertainty, and avoided purchasing an alternative
(e.g., Iyengar & Kamenica, 2010). Our results, however, show that despite the
uncertainty, people often decide to purchase an alternative. Thus, frequent choice
for alternatives with rare large pay-offs in a large set, reported in previous work
(e.g., Hills et al., 2013; Chapter 3), is not a result of forced choice — people appear
to develop preferences for alternatives with rare pay-offs sufficient to purchase an
alternative. The present study, however, did not measure choice satisfaction, and
it could be possible that choice satisfaction is lower when an alternative with rare
large pay-offs is purchased, compared to when an alternative with more frequent
but small pay-offs is purchased. Examination of this possibility is left for future
research.
Our results, however, do not show psychological factors behind thin-search.
When faced with large sets, for example, people may attempt to reduce cognitive
effects associated with sampling by reducing the number of samples per alternative.
Alternatively, people may feel exhausted after making one choice in a large set, and
subsequently when faced with a large set, people may be left with little cognitive
resource to evaluate alternatives as rigorously as they could have otherwise.
One place where thin-search appeared to increase frequency of choice de-
ferral is in the description paradigm with increased branches per alternative. We
suggest this increase is potentially due to people having a similar threshold for
choice purchase for both compensatory and non-compensatory strategies. To illus-
trate, suppose people are choosing whether to purchase an assorted jam box. At a
given price, a box can have many small containers of jam or fewer larger containers
of jam. When a box contains many jams, people using a non-compensatory strategy
may inspect only a few jams and infer that no jam which they prefer is in sufficient
quantity to warrant purchase. This limited attention may lead people to regard the
box to be overpriced and defer a purchase. In contrast when a box contains few jams,
people are more likely to employ a compensatory strategy, observe greater amounts
of preferred jam when it is present, and proceed to purchase a box. This example
highlights that subjective utility of an alternative may be sensitive to structures of
choice environment. This unstable nature of utility is further demonstrated in the
following chapters.
The number of attributes, however, is not likely to be the only factor driving
non-compensatory strategy use: Previous studies report that the cost of information
search is also related to non-compensatory strategy use. Bro¨der (2000) showed that
search costs make it more likely that people will search only a subset of attributes
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and consequently use a non-compensatory strategy.
To summarize, the present work examined two of the possible factors of
choice deferral: set size and the number of branches. Our results show that set size
and the number of branches impact on information search and choice strategies, but
that the exact impact differs between the description and the sampling paradigms.
In both paradigms, set size is related to thin-search — search over more alternatives
but for less information per alternative. In the description paradigm, increasing
the number of branches is associated with use of a non-compensatory strategy,
which often leads to choice deferral. In contrast, thin-search often leads to choice
purchase in the sampling paradigm. These findings demonstrate the importance
of interactions between the choice environments, information search, and choice
strategies, in understanding choice deferral. Thus, the present work provides a
potential answer to the concern raised by Scheibehenne et al. (2010) and suggest
that choice deferral as observed in previous work (e.g., Iyengar & Lepper, 2000) is
a function of interactions between multiple factors.
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Chapter 5
In the attraction, compromise,
and similarity effects,
alternatives are repeatedly
compared in pairs on single
dimensions
5.1 Background
In the domain of choice between multiple alternatives, the attraction, compromise,
and similarity effects demonstrate some puzzling behaviors. Together these effects
demonstrate that individuals do not choose by selecting the alternative with the
highest value or utility. Instead, individuals choose as if the value or utility of an
alternative is temporarily affected by the other alternatives in the choice set they
face. This is puzzling because how much an individual enjoys the car she or he buys,
for example, should be independent of the cars he or she does not buy. These context
effects are often interpreted as indicating that a choice is reached by comparing
available alternatives. This study investigated how alternatives are compared, using
eye movement data collected while people make a series of three-alternative choices.
To illustrate the attraction, compromise, and similarity effects, suppose an
individual is choosing among different cars. Available cars are described in terms of
the two attributes, quality and economy, where Car A is better on the quality di-
mension but Car B is better on the economy dimension (Figure 5.1). The attraction
effect is produced by adding Car D to the choice of Cars A and B. Car D is inferior
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Figure 5.1: Illustration of various alternatives. The probability of A being chosen
over B can be affected by the presence of D, C or S.
Comparison Model
Attribute-wise Multi-alternative decision field theory
Leaky competing accumulator model
Alternative-wise Comparison-grouping model
Attribute-and-alternative-wise Decision by sampling
2N-ary choice tree model
Multi-alternative linear ballistic accumulator model
Table 5.1: List of models discussed
to Car A in both quality and economy dimensions and should thus be discarded
but, after adding this decoy, Car A becomes more likely chosen and Car B becomes
less likely chosen (Huber et al., 1982). Adding Car C to a choice between Cars A
and B produces the compromise effect. Car C has extremely good quality but poor
economy. Importantly, Car C makes Car A a compromise between the other cars,
and with Car Cs presence, Car A becomes more likely to be chosen than Car B
(Simonson, 1989). The similarity effect is produced by adding Car S instead. Car S
is similar to Car B, and Car Ss introduction results in the higher probability of Car
A being chosen than Car B (Tversky, 1972).
For the non-chosen alternative to influence a choice as described above, an
individual has to be comparing alternatives in making a choice (e.g., Simonson,
Bettman, Kramer, & Payne, 2013). Here we explore the nature of these comparisons,
and consider models involving attribute-wise comparison, alternative-wise compar-
ison, and attribute-and-alternative-wise comparison (see Table 5.1 for a list of the
models).
According to attribute-wise comparison models, one attribute dimension is
attended at one moment and all the available alternatives are simultaneously eval-
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uated. In the above car example, an individual may attend, for instance, on the
quality dimension of available cars at one moment, and evaluate how advantageous
each of the three cars is. Then at the next moment, the individual may attend
the economy dimension and evaluate all three cars. This attribute-wise compari-
son is implemented in multi-alternative decision field theory (Roe et al., 2001) and
the leaky competing accumulator model (Usher & McClelland, 2001) to explain the
three context effects.
In contrast, alternative-wise comparison models assume that all the attributes
are integrated before comparison: one pair of alternatives is attended, attribute di-
mensions are integrated within each alternative, and then the pair of alternatives
are compared on their integrated values. In the above example, an individual may
integrate the quality and economy dimensions for, for instance, Car A, and also
integrate these dimensions, separately, for Car B. Then, the individual compares
the integrated value for Car A with Car B. At the next moment, the individual
may select a new pair of alternatives, Cars A and S, and repeat the integrate-then-
compare process. This integration of information across attributes is commonly
assumed in models of two-alternative choice, including models where risk and re-
ward information are integrated into a single expected-value-like measure such as
cumulative prospect theory (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992) and the transfer of atten-
tion exchange model (Birnbaum, 2008). In the domain of multi-alternative choice,
the comparison-grouping model (Tsuzuki & Guo, 2004) implements a mixture of
attribute-wise and alternative-wise comparisons to explain the context effects.
Lastly in the attribute-and-alternative-wise comparison, one attribute di-
mension and also one pair of alternatives are attended at one moment, and two
alternatives are compared against each other on the attended attribute dimension.
For instance, an individual may attend on the quality dimension and compare Cars
A and B at one moment. Then, at the next moment, the individual may focus on
the economy dimension and compare Cars A and D. This comparison is assumed
in the decision by sampling model (Stewart et al., 2006), which has been applied
to context effects in risky and intertemporal choice (Stewart, Reimers, & Harris, in
press) and could potentially be extended to account for the three context effects.
The attribute-and-alternative-wise comparison has also been employed in the 2N-ary
choice tree model (Wollschla¨ger & Diederich, 2012), and the multi-attribute linear
ballistic accumulator model (Trueblood, Brown, & Heathcote, in press).
This study examined predictions made by the three types of comparison
model. In particular, we tested predictions concerning transitions of attention during
choice and effect of random fluctuations in the attention on choice.
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(a) Attribute-wise Comparison:
A Decision Field Theory Simulation
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(b) Alternative-wise Comparison:
A Comparison Grouping Model Simulation
Figure 5.2: Simulated choice probability. The darkness of the line corresponds to the
likelihood of the attention frequency given the equal weighting, and vertical dotted
line represents most likely attention split. The left panel illustrates that when Car
D or S is included in a choice set, more sampling of the quality dimension predicts
higher probability of Car A to be chosen. The right panel shows that the probability
of choosing Car A decreases with the frequency of comparisons between Cars B and
D, C, or S.
5.1.1 The pattern of attention transition
In attribute-wise comparison, all of the available alternatives are simultaneously
compared on a single attribute dimension. Therefore, an individual is likely to
fix attention to one attribute dimension and shift their attention back and forth
between alternatives to make comparisons. Thus we should see transitions of at-
tention between alternatives within a single attribute dimension more frequently
than, or at least equally frequently to, transitions within a single alternative be-
tween attribute dimensions. This same pattern of transitions is predicted by the
attribute-and-alternative-wise comparison.
In contrast in the alternative-wise comparison models, all the attributes are
used simultaneously in each comparison. Therefore, an individual is likely to fix
attention to one alternative, shift their attention within the alternative to integrate
attribute values, and then make a comparison. Thus we should see transitions of
attention between attributes within a single alternative more frequently than, or at
least equally frequently to, between alternatives.
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5.1.2 The influence of stochastic fluctuations in attention on choice
When attribute dimensions are weighted equally so that each attribute dimension is
equally likely to be attended at any moment, there will still be trial-to-trial variations
in the number of times each attribute dimension is attended. This is due to the
stochastic nature of the allocation of attention, and the relative frequencies of the
observed split in attention are given by the binomial distribution. For example, with
two equally weighted dimensions and with 10 allocations, the number of times each
dimension is attended would follow the binomial distribution. So we would see a
5/5 split 24.6% of the time but, just by random chance, we would see the unequal
splits (0/10, 1/9, 2/8, 3/7, or 4/6) 75.4% of the time.
Thus, for a particular trial, one attribute dimension will often be attended
more frequently than another, even when attribute dimensions are weighted equally.
These trial-by-trial fluctuations will increase the probability of selecting the alter-
natives high on the more attended dimension. To illustrate this prediction, we
simulated the multi-alternative decision field theory. In this simulation, a choice is
reached after 1,000 comparisons and dimensions are weighted equally. We explored
how the choice probabilities change with the number of times the quality dimen-
sion is attended. The results are summarized in the left panel in Figure 5.2 (see
Appendix A.1 for the details). This figure illustrates that, for example, when 490
comparisons are made on the economy dimension and 510 comparisons are on the
quality dimension, probability of choosing Car A is .69 with the presence of Car
D in the choice set. Generally when Car D or S is included in a choice set, more
sampling of the quality dimension predicts higher probability of Car A to be chosen.
We also considered attention fluctuating over pairs of alternatives in the
alternative-wise comparison models. One pair of alternatives will more frequently
be compared against each other even with an equal weighting of all the pairs. This
stochastic bias towards one pair of alternatives results in these alternatives being
more likely to be chosen. For example if an individual more frequently compares
Cars B and C, the individual is more likely to choose Car B or C and less likely
to choose Car A. To illustrate this prediction, we simulated a modified version of
the comparison grouping model. This modified version assumes that all the pairs
of alternatives are equally weighted and that an alternative is chosen after 1,000
alternative-wise comparisons (see Appendix A.2 for the details). We manipulated
the number of comparisons made between Cars B and D, C, or S, and summarized
the results in the right panel of Figure 5.2. The figure shows that the probability of
choosing Car A decreases with the frequency of comparisons between Cars B and
D, C, or S.
73
Finally, in the attribute-and-alternative-wise comparison models, bias to-
wards one pair of alternatives affects choice. But here, attention to an alternative
pair interacts with attention towards an attribute dimension: In the car example,
an individual is more likely to choose Car A over B if the individual more frequently
compares Cars A and B on the economy dimension. In contrast, frequent compar-
ison of Cars A and B on the quality dimension should lead to the choice of Car
B.
In summary, the three types of model predict different patterns of attention
transition and make competing claims on how a stochastic attention bias explains
choice. These claims were examined using eye-movement data in the following ex-
periment.
5.2 Method
Following Simmons, Nelson, and Simonsohn (2012)s recommendation, we report
how we determined our sample size, all data exclusions (if any), all manipulations,
and all measures in the study.
5.2.1 Participants
One hundred undergraduate students were recruited through the participant panel
at the University of Warwick and were paid £5.00 for participating. We decided
in advance of collecting the data to test exactly 100 participants. Our previous
work indicated that this would give us reasonable statistical power to replicate
the attraction, compromise, and similarity effects. Seven participants could not
complete the experiment due to failure in tracking their eyes (e.g., lazy eyes), leaving
93 (34 males and 59 females) participants. Their ages ranged from 17 to 49 (median
= 21.0).
5.2.2 Procedure
Participants made 40 choices. At the beginning of each choice, participants were
given information about the two attributes involved. After displaying the fixation
point until participant fixated it for at least 500 ms, the experiment program pre-
sented three choice alternatives: one at the lower left corner of the screen, another
at the top middle area, and the other at the lower right corner of the screen. This
presentation ensures that the three alternatives are equally distant from each other
on the display. An example screen shot is given in Figure 5.3. Participants made a
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Imagine you are going to buy a car.
The safety rating will appear on the upper
line, and the fuel efficiency (in miles per
gallon) will be seen on the lower line.
The safety is rated on a scale from 0 to 5,
where 0 is poor and 5 means excellent.
Please press SPACEBAR to proceed.
(a) Choice Description
Safety
5.0
Efficiency
31.05mpg
Safety
4.0
Efficiency
49.65mpg
Safety
4.9
Efficiency
32.91mpg
(b) Choice Set
Figure 5.3: Example screen-shots. This example depicts a choice between cars in
an attraction choice. Font size is enlarged for this illustration.
DA
DB
A
B
(a) Attraction Choices
CA
A
CB
B
(b) Compromise Choices
SA
A
SB
B
(c) Similarity Choices
Figure 5.4: Locations of the alternatives used in the experiment.
choice by pressing one of the left, up, or right arrow keys.
The 40 choices comprised 10 attraction, 10 compromise, 10 similarity, and
10 catch choices. The catch choices always had one dominant alternative on both
attribute dimensions. We used participants responses to the catch choices to assess
whether they were engaged in the task. Each of the other 30 choices appeared in
one of two versions, one favoring Alternative A and another favoring B. The two
versions are summarized in Figure 5.4.
The left panel in Figure 5.4 displays the alternatives for the two versions of
the attraction choices. One version involved Alternatives A, B and DA (the decoy
to Alternative A), and the other involved Alternatives A, B, and DB (the decoy
to Alternative B). The middle panel displays the alternatives for the compromise
choices. One version involved Alternatives A, B, and CA (making Alternative A the
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compromise), and the other involved Alternatives A, B, and CB (making Alternative
B the compromise). The right panel displays alternatives for the similarity choices:
one version involved Alternatives A, B, and SA (adding an alternative similar to
Alternative B), and the other involved Alternatives A, B, and SB (adding an al-
ternative similar to Alternative A). The allocation of versions was counterbalanced
between participants.
Each of 40 choices involved a different cover story (e.g., cars, laptops, and
TV sets), and the same cover story was used for the two version of choices. Thus,
all the participant made a choice between cars in an attraction choice, regardless of
the version to which they were assigned. The order of the choices was randomized
and the four types of choices were interleaved. The locations of alternatives and
attributes on the screen were randomized for each choice.
Throughout the experiment, participants eye-movements were recorded at
500 Hz using an EyeLink 1000 (SR Research). The eye-tracker was placed right
under the 19 inch monitor, and the distance between participants eye and the eye-
tracker was kept between 50cm and 55cm. Also, the eye- tracker was calibrated just
before the experiment and also after every 10 choices during the experiment.
5.3 Results
Out of 93 participants, 44 participants did not choose the dominant alternative in
one or more of the catch choices. These less-engaged participants may have been
unable to differentiate the attraction and similarity choices, where the detection of
dominance is crucial. Thus, the analysis below includes engagement as a factor,
noting where it matters.
5.3.1 The attraction, compromise, and similarity effects were repli-
cated
We computed the proportion of times each alternative was chosen for each choice
type for each participant. The choice proportions from the engaged group of par-
ticipants are plotted in Figure 5.5. The filled circles with the solid line represent
the version of choices which favors Alternative A, and the empty squares with the
dashed line represent the one which favors Alternative B.
The left panel in Figure 5.5 shows a replication of the attraction effect: Al-
ternative A is most often selected from the DA version while Alternative B is most
frequently chosen from the DB version. The middle panel shows a replication of
the compromise effect: The compromise alternatives are most often to be chosen
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Figure 5.5: Mean choice proportions of the engaged participants. Error bars are
standard error of the mean. In the attraction choices, DA is inferior to A in both
attributes, and DB is inferior to B. In the compromise choices, CA makes A a
compromise between the other alternatives, and CB makes B a compromise. In the
similarity choices, SA is similar to B and SB is similar to A. The subscript of labels
indicate which alternative (A or B) is favored by the context.
in both CA and CB versions. The right panel shows a replication of the similarity
effect: Alternative A has a higher proportion of choice in the SA version compared
to the SB version and Alternative B has a higher proportion, albeit only slightly, in
the SB version compared to the SA version.
We explored the significance of these effects using a mixed-effect model. The
proportions for Alternatives A and B are logit-transformed after multiplying with 0.9
to handle ones and adding 0.05 to handle zeros. Then the transformed proportions
are entered into a linear mixed-effect linear model. The model had fixed effects
for alternative (A or B), version (whether the version favors Alternative A or B),
choice-type (attraction, compromise, or similarity), and participant group (engaged
or less-engaged). The model also had by-participant slopes and intercepts as random
factors.
The model fit indicates that the effect of the three-way interaction depends
on participant engagement: the four-way interaction is significant, χ2(2) = 17.92,
p < .001. When the same mode is fit only to the engaged group of participants,
the three-way interaction effect indicates that the effect of choice alternative on
the choice proportion depends on the choice type and the version: χ2(2) = 28.84,
p < .001. Thus, we fit the same mixed-effect model to the attraction, compromise
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and similarity choices separately for the group of engaged participants.
For the attraction choices, the interaction effect is significant, χ2(1) = 44.47,
p < .001, indicating that the choice proportions for Alternatives A and B are dif-
ferent between the DA and DB versions. The interaction effects are also significant
for the versions. The interaction effects are also significant for the compromise
choices, compromise choices, χ2(1) = 19.90, p < .001, and for the similarity choices,
χ2(1) = 4.11, p = .043. These interaction effects indicate that the attraction, com-
promise and, similarity effects are replicated in this study.
For the group of the less-engaged participants, the three-way interaction is
also significant: χ2(2) = 51.81, p < .001. The attraction and compromise effects
are confirmed: χ2(1) = 34.23, p < .001 and χ2(1) = 27.37, p < .001. However, the
similarity effect does not reach significance: χ2(1) = 0.11, p = .738.
5.3.2 Eye Movements
For the fixation data, we defined non-overlapping regions of interest to identify to
which alternative and attribute dimension the participant fixated his or her eye on.
Due to noise in the detecting fixation locations, fixations were not registered for
some of the displayed attributes in 153 out of the total of 2790 (= 30 choices ×
93 participants) trials. These trials are removed from the analysis. Then, each
choice was recoded to match the labels in Figure 5.1. So for the DA version of the
attraction choices, DA was relabeled D. For the DB version, DB was relabeled D
and labels for A and B were swapped. In addition, the attribute dimensions were
switched when relabeling the alternatives in the DB version. Similar relabeling was
done for the compromise and similarity choices.
5.3.3 Stages of decision making
Previous studies which analyze eye-movement often assume three stages of decision
making: initial screening, evaluation and comparison, and validation prior to mak-
ing a choice (e.g., Glaholt & Reingold, 2011; Russo & Leclerc, 1994). Glo¨ckner
and Herbold (2011) review evidence that the duration of fixations increases with
processing difficulty, and so differences in fixation duration over time may indicate
different processing stages.
To examine the stages of decision making, we segmented the sequence of
fixations into three blocks. Each block has the equal number of fixations, but when
the number of fixations is not dividable by three, we added the reminder to the
last block. Then the mean fixation duration is computed for each block for each
78
1 2 3
Block
240
270
300
Fi
xa
tio
n
D
ur
at
io
n
(m
s)
(a) Attraction Choices
1 2 3
Block
(b) Compromise Choices
1 2 3
Block
(c) Similarity Choices
Figure 5.6: Fixation duration as a function of time. Error bars are standard error
of the mean.
participant and displayed in Figure 5.6. This figure illustrates that the fixation
tends to be longer in the first block.
The fixation durations were examined with a mixed-effect model. Fixed
effects are fixated alternative (A, B, or the third alternative), fixated attribute di-
mension, block (1, 2, or 3), and choice-type (attraction, compromise, or similarity).
Random effects are by-participant intercept and slope for block. The interaction ef-
fects indicates that the fixation duration does not differ between the alternatives or
the attribute dimensions (ps > .066), but that the difference between blocks depends
on the choice-type (χ2(4) = 13.48, p = .009). Thus, we fit the mixed-effect model
separately for each choice-type. Although the strength of the effect may differ be-
tween the choice-types, the effect of block is significant for all the three choice-types
(χ2(2) = 49.34, p < .001 for the attraction choices; χ2(2) = 44.92, p < .001 for the
compromise choices; χ2(2) = 37.37, p < .001 for the similarity choices), indicating
that the fixation duration is significantly longer in the first block.
The longer fixation in the first block may indicate a qualitatively different
stage of decision making. Therefore, we examined effects of the block in the following
analysis, although the results hold if the block is not included in the analysis.
5.3.4 The pattern of attention transitions
According to the attribute-wise and attribute-and-alternative-wise comparison mod-
els, transitions of attention between alternatives on a single attribute should be more
frequent than, or at least equally frequent to, transitions between attributes within a
single alternative. In contrast, according to the alternative-wise comparison models,
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Figure 5.7: Difference in transitions. Error bar are standard error of the mean.
transitions of attention within a single alternative should be more frequent than, or
at least equally frequent to, transitions between alternatives.
The difference between the number of transitions between alternatives and
within an alternative is displayed in Figure 5.7. The between-alternatives transi-
tions include only those on a single attribute dimension, excluding the between-
alternatives, between-attributes transitions. Thus, the between-alternative transi-
tions are underestimated, which should favor the prediction from the alternative-
wise comparison. However, between-alternatives transitions are more frequently
observed than within-alternative transitions, consistent with the attribute-wise and
attribute-and-alternative-wise comparison models.
These transitions are examined with a mixed-effect model, whose fixed effects
are participant group (engaged or less-engaged), choice-type (attraction, compro-
mise, or similarity), and block (1, 2, or 3), and the random effects are by-participant
slopes and intercepts. The three-way and two-way interaction effects indicate that
the effect of transition-type does not differ significantly between the participant
groups or the blocks: ps > .064. The main effect of choice-type is significant:
χ2(1) = 6.87, p = .032. When the mixed-effect model was fit to each choice-type,
the estimated intercept indicates the scores are significantly different from zero:
β = 0.48 (95% CI [0.29, 0.68]) for the attraction choices; β = 0.33 (95% CI [0.12,
0.53]) for the compromise choices; β = 0.52 (95% CI [0.31, 0.73]) for the similarity
choices. These results suggest that the effect differs quantitatively but not qualita-
tively across the choice-types.
Thus, the attention transitions more frequently between alternatives on the
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same attribute dimension than within an alternative. This pattern of attention
transition supports the attribute-wise and attribute-and-alternative-wise compari-
son models and rejects the alternative-wise comparison models.
5.3.5 The influence of stochastic fluctuations in attention on choice
Before examining the influence of attention bias on choice — the subject of the
simulations above — we need to consider the gaze-cascade effect (Shimojo, Simion,
Shimojo, & Scheier, 2003). In the gaze cascade effect a developing preference for
an alternative causes more frequent eye-movements to that alternative and more
frequent eye-movements to an alternative causes preference for that alternative to
develop, in a positive feedback loop. This gaze-cascade effect is considered inde-
pendent of the comparison process and could artificially favor one prediction over
another. Thus, we quantified the gaze-cascade effect and used it as a control vari-
able.
Specifically, we counted the number of transitions towards an alternative and
the number away from the alternative. According to Bird, Lauwereyns, and Craw-
ford (2012), transitions towards an alternative increase the probability of selecting
that alternative, and transitions away from an alternative decrease the probability
of selecting that alternative. Importantly, once the number of transitions towards
and away from an alternative is controlled for, there is no overall effect of the total
number of fixations in predicting a choice.
As the number of transitions towards an alternative is highly correlated with
the number of transitions away from the alternative, we took the difference as the
gaze-cascade score. By definition, the number of transitions towards an alternative
must be one less than, equal to, or one more than the number of transitions away
from that alternative, and so the gaze-cascade score for an alternative was always−1,
0, or +1. When tested alone in a mixed-effect logistic regression with by-participant
intercept and slope as random factors, the gaze-cascade score for Alternative A
significantly predicts the choice of Alternative A: β = 0.52 (95% CI [0.45, 0.59]),
χ2(1) = 144.27, p < .001. The gaze-cascade score for each alternative was entered
as both fixed and by-participant random factors to all the models to predict choices
we used below.
Attribute-wise comparison
In the attribute-wise comparison models, a stochastic bias in attention towards one
attribute dimension over the other should predict a choice of the alternative on
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which that attribute is highest, as in the simulation described above. To examine
this prediction, we counted differences in the numbers of fixations and also summed
the duration of fixations between the attribute dimensions within each trial. We
first examined whether fixation counts and durations varied over the time course of
a trial before testing whether fixation counts and durations were related to choices
as the attribute-wise comparison models predict.
To examine whether these fixation counts and duration differ between the
blocks, we used a mixed-effect model. Fixed factors are block (1, 2, or 3), partici-
pant group (engaged or less-engaged), and choice-type (attraction, compromise, or
similarity), and random factors are by-participant slopes and intercepts. While we
tested the counts and durations in the separate models, the total fixation duration
is correlated with the fixation counts, as the average duration of each fixation does
not differ significantly between alternatives or attributes (see the analysis in Section
“Stages of decision making”). As a result, the model with fixation duration yielded
essentially the same results as the model with the fixation counts. The model fits
suggest that the counts and the duration do not differ significantly between blocks,
participant groups or choice-types (ps > .066). Thus, we summed the counts and
durations across the blocks to explore their relationship to choice.
The fixation counts and durations were then entered into mixed-effect lo-
gistic regressions to predict the choice of Alternative A. The fixed effects include
participant group (engaged or less-engaged) and choice type (attraction, compro-
mise, or similarity), and the random effects are by-participant slopes and intercept.
The three-way and two-way interaction effects indicate that the effect of attention
bias over attribute dimensions, in both counts and durations, does not depend on
the participant group or the choice-type: ps > .682. The main effect suggests that
attention bias is not a significant predictor of choice: β = 0.00 (95% CI [-0.01,
0.02]), χ2(1) = 0.05, p = .821 for the counts and β = 0.00 (95% CI [0.00, 0.00]),
χ2(1) = 2.02, p = .155 for the duration. Thus, the prediction from the attribute-wise
comparison models is not supported.
Alternative-wise comparison
In the alternative-wise comparison models, a bias in attention towards one pair of
alternatives negatively correlates with probability of the remaining alternative being
chosen, as in the simulation described above. To examine this prediction, we counted
the number of transitions between each pair of alternatives within each trial. First
we describe how, over the time course of a trial, some transitions come to be more
frequent than others. Then we test whether the transition frequencies on a trial can
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Figure 5.8: Number of transitions prior to making a choice. Error bars are standard
errors of the mean.
be used to predict the choice on that trial in the way alternative-wise comparison
models predict.
The transitions are displayed in Figure 5.8 which shows that the differences
between the transitions emerge over a trial. Transitions were transformed by adding
1 and logging before being entered into a mixed-effect linear regression in which the
effects of block were examined. Fixed factors are block (1, 2, or 3), participant group
(engaged or less-engaged), choice-type (attraction, compromise, or similarity), and
transition (between A and B, between B and the third alternative, or between A
and the third alternative), and the random factor was by-participant intercepts.
Random factors do not include by-participant slopes, to keep the model complexity
manageable. The four-way and three-way interaction effects indicate that the inter-
action effects do not depend on participant group (ps > .308), but that block has
different effect depending on choice-type and transition (χ2(8) = 385.89, p < .001).
Thus, the mixed-effect model is fit to each choice-type separately.
The model fits suggest that the effect of block depends on transition for all
the choice-types (the attraction choices: χ2(4) = 135.90, p < .001; the compromise
choices: χ2(4) = 101.16, p < .001; the similarity choices: χ2(4) = 170.04, p < .001).
When the mixed-effect models were fit separately to each block, the model fits
indicate that in the attraction and compromise choices, the transitions differ from
each other non-significantly in Block 1 (ps > .147), but significantly in Blocks 2 and
3 (the attraction choices: χ2(2) = 48.04, p < .001 and χ2(2) = 111.68, p < .001,
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Figure 5.9: Number of transitions prior to making a choice. Error bars are standard
errors of the mean.
respectively; the compromise choices: χ2(2) = 35.60, p < .001 and χ2(2) = 87.38,
p < .001) In the similarity choices, the transitions differ in all the blocks (Block 1:
χ2(2) = 9.08, p = .011; Block 2: χ2(2) = 65.98, p < .001; Block 3: χ2(2) = 100.71,
p < .001).
Although the significance of the differences in the transitions differs between
blocks, the direction of the differences is consistent across the blocks. In short, we
see that, as the choice unfolds, differences in the frequencies of each transition type
emerge. Before the attribute values have been read, there can be no bias to make
some transitions more frequently than others. So gradually emerging differences in
the transitions are entirely expected. The consistent directions of the differences
imply that the process of decision making is not qualitatively different between the
blocks.
The second state of our analysis is to see whether transition frequencies can
be used to predict choices as the alternative-wise comparison models predict. We
summed the transitions across the blocks and displayed the summed transitions
in Figure 5.9. The transitions are largely consistent with the predictions for the
alternative-wise comparison models for all three choice types. For example, the
transition between Alternatives A and B is more frequent before A or B is chosen,
and also the transition between Alternatives A and the third alternative is more
frequent before A or the third alternative is chosen.
These transitions were entered into a mixed-effect logistic regression to pre-
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dict the choice of Alternative A. The fixed effects include participant group and
choice type, and the random effects are by- participant slopes and intercept. The
interaction effects indicate that the effect of transitions does not significantly depend
on the participant group (ps > .567), but that the effect depends on the choice-type:
χ2(6) = 82.53, p < .001.
Consistent with the prediction, the transition between Alternatives B and D
is a significant, negative predictor of choice A in the attraction choices: β = −0.18
(95% CI [-0.27, -0.09]), χ2(1) = 16.11, p < .001. Also the transition between B
and S is a significant negative predictor in the similarity choices: β = −0.39 (95%
CI [-0.48, -0.31]), χ2(1) = 92.13, p < .001. However, the effect of the transition
between B and C is not significant in the compromise choices: β = −0.02 (95% CI
[-0.10, 0.06]), χ2(1) = 0.24, p = .626.
In addition, some of the transitions, which involve Alternative A, significantly
predict the choice of A. In the attraction choices, the transition between Alternatives
A and D predicts the choice of A: β = 0.27 (95% CI [0.19, 0.35]), χ2(1) = 49.37,
p < .001. This effect further implicates the alternative-wise comparison in the
attraction choices, as the comparison between A and D always favors A.
Also in the compromise choices, the transition between Alternatives A and
B and also between A and C predict the choice of A: β = 0.09 (95% CI [0.02, 0.25]),
χ2(1) = 6.63, p = .010; and β = 0.13 (95% CI [0.06, 0.20]), χ2(1) = 12.11, p < .001.
In the similarity choices, the transition between Alternatives A and S predicts the
choice of A: β = 0.12 (95% CI [0.04, 0.20]), χ2(1) = 7.78, p = .005.
The other significant predictor is not readily explained by the alternative-
wise comparison. In the attraction choice, the transition between A and B negatively
predict the choice of A: β = −0.08 (95% CI [-0.15, -0.01]), χ2(1) = 4.69, p = .030.
Thus, the effects of the transitions on choice are generally consistent with
the predictions from the alternative-wise comparison, though some additional effects
are not readily explained.
Attribute-and-alternative-wise comparison
According to the attribute-and-alternative-wise comparison, an attention bias to-
wards one pair of alternatives predicts the choice of the alternative better on the
attended attribute dimension, as described above. As the transitions are correlated
between the attribute dimensions, we summed the numbers of fixation transitions
favorable for each alternative, so that the larger count indicates more comparisons
favorable to an alternative. For example, in an attraction choice, the transitions fa-
vorable for Alternative A is the sum of the transitions between Alternative A and B
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Figure 5.10: Number of transitions prior to making a choice. Error bars are standard
errors of the mean.
on the quality dimension and between A and D on both quality and economy dimen-
sions. Our analysis here follows the same procedure as the analysis for attribute-wise
comparisons and for alternative-wise comparisons above: First we explore how the
counts of favorable transitions unfold over the time course of a trial and then we
explore whether these counts predict choice as the attribute-and-alternative-wise
comparison models predict.
The favorable transitions are summarized in Figure 5.10. In the attraction
choices, the transitions favorable to Alternative A increase with block, because the
transition between Alternatives A and D, which favors A, becomes more frequent
with block (see Figure 5.8). Likewise in the compromise choices, as the transition
between Alternatives A and B and between Alternatives A and C becomes more
frequent, the transitions favorable to A increase. Also in the similarity choices, as
the transition between Alternatives B and S becomes more frequent, the transitions
favorable to B and S increase.
These transitions are transformed by adding 1 and logging, and then entered
into a mixed-effect linear regression. Fixed effects are block (1, 2, or 3), participant
group (engaged or less-engaged), choice-type (attraction, compromise, or similarity),
and favored alternative (A, B, or the third alternative). By-subject intercepts are
included in the random effects. The interaction and main effects indicate that the
transitions do not differ significantly between participant groups (ps > .430), but
that the effect of block differs between the choice-types and alternatives (χ2(8) =
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167.29, p < .001). Thus, we fit the mixed-effect model to each choice-type separately.
In all three choice-types, the interaction and main effects indicate that the
count does not differ between the participant groups (ps > .097), but that the effect
of favored alternative depends on the block (the attraction choices: χ2(4) = 107.95,
p < .001; the compromise choices: χ2(4) = 37.30, p < .001; the similarity choices:
χ2(4) = 55.36, p < .001).
Again, although the significance of the difference differs between the blocks,
the directions of the differences are consistent across the blocks. Thus, we summed
the transitions across the blocks and displayed the transitions as a function of the
chosen alternative in Figure 5.11.
Consistent with the prediction from the attribute-and-alternative wise com-
parison, the transition is generally higher for the alternative to be chosen. Before
Alternative A is chosen (the empty circles), for example, the transition favoring A
(the left column in each plot) is higher than the other transitions across the three
choice-types.
These transitions were then entered into a mixed-effect logistic regression
to predict the choice of Alternative A. The fixed effects include participant group
and choice-type, and the random effects are by- participant slopes and intercept.
The interaction effects indicate that the effect of transitions does not depend on
the participant group (ps > .28), and that the effect depends on the choice-type:
χ2(6) = 39.25, p < .001.
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Consistent with the prediction, the transition, which indicates more frequent
comparison favorable to Alternative A, is a significant predictor of choice A in the
attraction, compromise, similarity choices: respectively, β = 0.17 (95% CI [0.11,
0.24]), χ2(1) = 26.76, p < .001; β = 0.17 (95% CI [0.07, 0.26]), χ2(1) = 11.77,
p < .001; and β = 0.24 (95% CI [0.14, 0.34]), χ2(1) = 20.69, p < .001.
In addition, the transition, which indicates more frequent comparison favor-
able to other alternatives than A, is a significant, negative predictor of choice A
in the attraction and similarity choices. In the attraction choices, the transition
favorable to Alternative B shows β = −0.19 (95% CI [-0.29, -0.10]), χ2(1) = 15.89,
p < .001. In the similarity choices, the transition favorable to Alternative B shows
β = −0.28 (95% CI [-0.40, -0.17]), χ2(1) = 25.18, p < .001; and that favorable to S
shows β = −0.17 (95% CI [-0.27, -0.08]), χ2(1) = 12.51, p < .001.
Thus, the results consistently support the prediction from the attribute-and-
alternative-wise comparison.
5.4 Discussion
The present study replicated the attraction, compromise, and similarity effects in a
within- participants design using 40 different consumer choice scenarios. This is the
second study, following Berkowitsch et al. (in press), to simultaneously replicate the
three effects in consumer choice. This is also the first study to record eye movements
in participants showing these effects.
This study investigated the psychological processes of multi-alternative choice,
focusing on how alternatives are compared against each other. We examined tran-
sitions of attention while a choice was being made. Specifically, the pattern of eye
movements was examined to differentiate between three types of comparison model:
attribute-wise, alternative-wise, and attribute-and-alternative-wise.
Transitions between alternatives within an attribute dimension were more
frequent that transitions within alternatives between attributes, consistent with
attribute-wise and attribute and alternative-wise models. The attribute-wise com-
parison models predict that bias towards a dimension should increase the probability
that the alternative highest on that dimension should be chosen, but there was no
significant effect of attribute-dimension bias. The alternative-wise comparison mod-
els predict that bias towards a pair of alternatives should decrease the probability
that the third alternative is chosen, and this effect of alternative-pair bias was found.
Finally, the attribute-and-alternative-wise comparison models alone predict an in-
teraction between the alternative-pair and the attribute dimension attended. For a
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given pair and dimension, the alternative higher on the attribute dimension attended
should be favored over the alternative lower on the attribute dimension attended.
This interaction was observed. Overall, the eye movement data are most consistent
with the attribute-and-alternative-wise comparison models, in which comparisons
are between pairs of alternatives on single dimensions.
The finding of more transitions between alternatives within an attribute di-
mension could be influenced by physical locations of the alternatives within the dis-
play. In our experiment, the distance between the alternatives is deliberately very
similar to the distance between two attribute values within an alternative. However,
if between-alternative distances were minimized compared to within-alternative dis-
tances, attention might transition more frequently between alternatives, appearing
as if the alternative- wise comparison is supported. Previous research however, has
also favored the attribute-wise comparison over the alternative-wise comparison:
When an individual is allowed to choose which information to examine, the indi-
vidual more often decides to reveal information on one attribute dimension across
available alternatives (Payne, 1976). Also, our results confirm previous findings,
where transition is more frequent between alternatives on a single attribute dimen-
sion than within an alternative (Russo & Dosher, 1983).
While attribute-wise comparison models are supported by the attention-
transition evidence, these models are not consistent with the null effect of attention
bias on choice. The attribute-wise comparison models predict relationship between
a choice and attention bias towards one attribute dimension over the other, but this
prediction is not supported in our result. This result has implications for compu-
tational models beyond the class of comparison-based models described above. For
instance, the associative accumulation model (Bhatia, 2013) explains the context
effects with attention bias towards one attribute dimension over the other. Also,
the range-normalization model (Soltani, De Martino, & Camerer, 2012) predicts
that the attention bias should lead to different choices. These explanations are not
consistent with the present results.
These relationships between transition and choices extend previous findings
on eye-movement and choice. Krajbich and Rangel (2011) for instance, proposed
a drift-diffusion model which incorporated fixations, by assuming that the drift
rate was higher for fixated alternatives. This model relates a priori ratings of the
attractiveness of alternatives and the fixation times on each alternative during a
choice to the final choice of alternative. That is, to predict choice this model requires
the pattern of fixations and also attractiveness judgments for each alternative. In
contrast, our study focused on predicting choices from the pattern of attention
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transitions alone.
A second major finding is the gaze cascade effect (Shimojo et al., 2003;
Simion & Shimojo, 2007). The gaze cascade effect is a developing bias to direct
an eye-fixation toward the alternative ultimately chosen. As a result, choice can
be predicted from transitions (Bird et al., 2012). While it is not clear how well
this gaze cascade effect correlates with preference development (e.g., Glaholt &
Reingold, 2009, 2011), our results confirm the positive relationship between the gaze
cascade (measured from transitions) and choice. Also, the results show that even
after controlling for this gaze cascade effect, the pattern of transition still predicts
choices and reveals details of the comparison process in choice making.
In our analysis we were careful to explore how eye movements changed over
the time course of a choice, because changes might indicate different stages of pro-
cessing (e.g., Glo¨ckner & Herbold, 2011). Although we did find a surprising tendency
for early fixations to be longer, we did not find any qualitative shift in the pattern
of eye movements. Instead, each of the biases we find emerged gradually within a
trial. This is not surprising because, given that the biases are defined only by the
relation of the attribute values to one another and not by some more obvious cue
like physical location on the screen, these biases cannot emerge until the attribute
values have been read and compared. Our data are most consistent with a single
continuous cognitive process operating over the whole time course of a choice, unless
attention is independent to eye-movements. Eye-movements are, however, tightly
associated with attention (Kustov & Robinson, 1996), and its tight associations
are also assumed in previous studies (e.g., Glo¨ckner & Herbold, 2011; Krajbich &
Rangel, 2011).
The effects of attention bias on a choice are consistent with the attribute-
and-alternative-wise comparison models. Here a choice is reached through a series
of comparisons of pairs of attributes on a single dimension, as in the decision by
sampling model (Stewart, 2009; Stewart et al., in press, 2006; Stewart & Simpson,
2008), the 2N-ary choice tree model (Wollschla¨ger & Diederich, 2012), and the
multi-attribute linear ballistic accumulator model (Trueblood et al., in press).
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Chapter 6
Multi-alternative Decision by
Sampling
6.1 Background
As discussed in Chapter 5, the attraction, compromise, and similarity effects have
been explained by various computational models. The majority of the models im-
plement dynamic preference development over time, but differ from each other in
two factors: how the model treats multiple attribute dimensions and how many
alternatives are evaluated at one time. For instance, in decision field theory (Roe
et al., 2001), the leaky competing accumulator model (Usher & McClelland, 2001)
and the associative accumulation model (Bhatia, 2013), an individual attends one
attribute dimensions at one time and simultaneously evaluates all the alternatives.
In contrast, in the comparison grouping model (Tsuzuki & Guo, 2004) assumes that
the attribute dimensions are integrated, but that an individual evaluates only two
of the alternatives at a time.
Contrary to these processes implemented in the existing models, empirical
evidence on choice process indicates that, at any moment, an individual attends
to one attribute dimension and evaluates two alternatives (Payne, 1976; Russo &
Leclerc, 1994; Russo & Dosher, 1983, Chapter 5). Based on the processes implicated
by these empirical findings, we propose a new model of multi-alternative decision
making: multi-alternative decision by sampling (MDbS). This new model imple-
ments three components of decision-making: 1) an alternative is evaluated through
a series of pair-wise comparisons on single attribute values, 2) similar alternatives
are compared more often, and 3) relatively small differences in attribute values are
ignored.
91
We first review empirical findings to support each process and discuss how
these processes explain the attraction, compromise, and similarity effects. Then the
three processes are formulated in a computational model and, through simulations,
we demonstrate that the MDdS model can produce the three context effects and
other associated findings. The performance of the MDbS model is compared against
decision field theory, and the last section addresses how the MDbS model relates to
other existing models of decision making.
6.2 Qualitative Account of the Context Effects
In this section, we discuss empirical findings to support each of the three compo-
nents and address how these components explain the attraction, compromise, and
similarity effects. The attraction effect is explained by the first component, the com-
promise effect is explained by the first and second components, and the similarity
effect is explained by the three components. First, we discuss the first component:
pair-wise, single-attribute comparisons.
6.2.1 Pair-wise, single-attribute comparison explains the attraction
effect
Pair-wise comparison has been reported in studies of eye-movement during choice.
For example, when making a choice between more than two alternatives, an indi-
vidual moves his or her eye back and forth between two of the alternatives most
frequently (Russo & Leclerc, 1994). This finding indicates that a pair of alterna-
tives is compared at one time. Also, Chapter 5 demonstrates that alternatives are
compared on a single attribute dimension at a time.
To formulate these pair-wise, single-attribute comparison in a new model,
we employ the framework of the decision by sampling (Stewart et al., 2006). Under
this framework, an individual reaches a choice through a series of comparisons of
pairs of attribute values on single dimensions (see Stewart & Simpson, 2008). These
comparisons are between sample of attribute values in working memory. While some
of the sample will come from long-term memories of attribute values, some of the
working memory sample will come from the context given by the current choice set.
In our application to multi-alternative choice, we assume that an individual
is unfamiliar with the attribute dimensions, and that this individual can only have
samples from the current choice set. If an individual is familiar with the attribute
dimensions, however, some of the working memory samples can come from long-
term memory, and, as we discuss in the model simulation, the samples from long-
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Figure 6.1: Attraction choice set.
Comparison Attribute Favored Car
A 
 B Safety Rating B
A 
 B Fuel Efficiency A
B 
 D Safety Rating B
B 
 D Fuel Efficiency D
D 
 A Safety Rating A
D 
 A Fuel Efficiency A
Table 6.1: List of comparisons for the at-
traction choice set.
term memory will dilute the attraction, compromise, and similarity effects. Exactly
this dilution has been reported for the attraction (Kim & Hasher, 2005) and the
compromise effects (Sheng, Parker, & Nakamoto, 2005).
Thus, in the MDbS model, when deciding on a car to purchase, for example,
an individual may compare Car A against Car B on fuel efficiency at one moment.
In the next moment, the individual may compare Car A against Car D on the safety
rating. The individual keeps track of the number of favorable comparisons for each
car and ultimately chooses one car when sufficient comparisons are accumulated.
This accumulation process stochastically approximate rank-position of alternatives
(see Stewart et al., 2006).
This pair-wise, single-attribute comparison process explains the attraction
effect. The choice set for the attraction effect is displayed in Figure 6.1, and the six
possible comparisons of alternatives are listed in Table 6.1. Out of the six possible
comparisons, three comparison favor Car A, while two comparisons favor Car B
and one comparison favor Car D. Thus, Car A is most frequently favored, and this
results in Car A having the largest choice probability.
6.2.2 Similarity bias explains the compromise effect
When comparing alternatives, an individual shifts their attention back and forth
between two alternatives which share an attribute value (Russo & Rosen, 1975).
Extending this finding, and to examine whether attention more frequently goes back
and forth between a pair of similar alternatives than a pair of dissimilar alternatives,
we re-analyzed the eye-movement data from Chapter 5.
Figure 6.2 displays the number of transitions between alternatives made be-
fore making a choice. These counts are examined with a Bayesian mixed-effect
Poisson regression. The fixed factors are choice set (attraction, compromise, or sim-
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Figure 6.2: Counts of eye-fixation transition between alternatives. Grey circles,
jittered randomly along the horizontal axis, represent by-participant means, and
black circles indicate grand means. The error bars show the 95% highest density
interval of the mean.
ilarity) and transition (between A and B, between B and T, and between A and T).
We label the other alternative T, where T equals D in the attraction choice sets, C
in the compromise choice sets, and S in the similarity choice sets. The random fac-
tors are by-participant slopes and intercepts. For all the fixed and random factors,
we used a non-informative prior1 and drew 105 samples from the posterior using
the no-u-turn sampler (Hoffman & Gelman, 2014). We discarded the first half and
pooled the remaining samples from four chains without thinning.
Estimated coefficients in Poisson regressions indicate estimated difference
in ratio, and the interaction coefficients indicate that the ratio of A
B to B
T
counts differs across the attraction and similarity choice sets: posterior probabil-
ity distribution supports the difference with a probability pposterior > .999. The
A
B to A
T ratio also differs between the attraction and compromise choice sets:
pposterior > .999. Thus, we kept the interaction term in the model and examined the
posterior estimates. The 95% highest density intervals in Figure 6.2 show that given
the data, we are 95% confident that the population mean falls within the interval.
Below, we report where the intervals do not overlap and the difference is greater
than 1.10 in ratio at the posterior median.
In the attraction choice set, the mean transition count between A and D
is 1.13 times greater than between A and B and also 1.50 times greater than that
between B and D. In addition, the mean count between A and B is 1.32 times greater
than that between B and D. In the compromise choice set, the mean transition count
1The prior for a fixed factor is N (0, 1000) and the prior for a random factor is U(0, 1000).
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Figure 6.3: Compromise choice set.
Comparison Attribute Favored Car
A 
 B Safety Rating B
A 
 B Fuel Efficiency A
B 
 C Safety Rating B
B 
 C Fuel Efficiency C
C 
 A Safety Rating A
C 
 A Fuel Efficiency C
Table 6.2: List of comparisons for the
compromise choice set.
between A and B is 1.40 times greater than that between B and C. Also, the mean
count between C and A are 1.29 times greater than that between B and C. Lastly
in the similarity choice set, the mean count between B and S is 1.67 times greater
than that between A and B and also 1.53 times greater than that between S and A.
These results can be summarized by stating that the attention goes back and
forth more frequently between similar alternatives. This similarity-biased compari-
son, together with the pair-wise, single-attribute comparison, explains the compro-
mise effect. The six possible comparisons in the compromise choice set are listed in
Table 6.2. The rows in bold font in this table represent the comparisons of similar
alternatives. Both comparisons in which Car A is favored are frequent, but only one
of the two for Car B and one of the two fro Car C is frequent. Thus Car A will be
favored.
6.2.3 Just meaningful difference explains the similarity effect
When making a comparison, an individual may not register a relatively small differ-
ence. We borrow the notion of the just noticeable difference from studies on sensory
discrimination. When the difference between two sensory stimuli (e.g., loudness and
brightness) is too small, the stimuli are often not recognized as different. To see a
stimulus as different from another, the ratio of their magnitudes is required to be
above a certain value, called the Weber function.
When applied to decision making, the just noticeable difference is often called
just meaningful difference. In support for the just meaningful difference, Tversky
and Kahneman (1981) report that an individual is willing to make an extra trip
to save $5 on a $15 purchase but unwilling to make the same trip to save $5 on a
$125 purchase. This finding suggests that the discount is judged not on an absolute
difference but on an ratio. Although the reduced monetary amount is $5 in both
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Figure 6.4: Similarity choice set.
Comparison Attribute Favored Car
A 
 B Safety Rating B
A 
 B Fuel Efficiency A
B 
 S Safety Rating B
B 
 S Fuel Efficiency S
S 
 A Safety Rating S
S 
 A Fuel Efficiency A
Table 6.3: List of comparisons for the
similarity choice set.
cases, the $5 discount is 33% reduction from the price of $15 but is only 4% reduction
from the price of $125. The 4% reduction may not be a meaningful enough difference
to influence a decision.
The just meaningful difference is also reported in the studies of price percep-
tion, which report that a relatively small change in prices, expressed in percentages,
does not have a significant impact on consumer choices (Kalwani & Yim, 1992).
Also, studies on employees’ judgments of increases in salary report that the in-
crement expressed in percentage is a better predictor of employees’ judgments on
meaningfulness of the increment (Heneman III & Ellis, 1982; Futrell & Varadara-
jan, 1985) and also employees’ subsequent spending and saving decisions (Rambo &
Pinto, 1989).
The just meaningful difference, together with the pair-wise, single-attribute
comparison and similarity bias, can explain the similarity effect. The possible com-
parisons within the similarity choice set are listed in Table 6.3. The shaded rows
indicate comparisons discounted because the differences are small. Now, Cars B and
S are so similar to each other that the difference is unlikely to be meaningful. As
a result, the comparison between B and S is discounted. Outside this discounted
comparison, Car A is most frequently favored, resulting in the highest probability
that Car A is chosen among the three cars.
6.2.4 Differences from the decision by sampling model
Thus far, we have argued that the MDbS model accounts for the attraction, com-
promise and similarity effects, with only the additional component: comparisons are
more likely between similar pairs (component 2 above). The other two components
were both core components in the original decision by sampling model (e.g., see
Stewart & Simpson, 2008).
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6.3 Quantitative Specification
Now that we have qualitatively described the model, the mathematical formulation
will be presented so it can be applied to the data. The MDbS model keeps track of
the frequency of comparisons favoring each alternative, and predicts the choice of
the first alternative whose frequency count reaches the decision threshold, λ. The
three cars in a choice set are labeled as Cars A, B, and T, where Car T represents
Car D, C, or S. Comparison of Car A against Car B in working memory is denoted as
A ⇀ B, and the probability of this comparison is p(A ⇀ B). Also, Ai 6≡ Bi denotes
registration of difference between Car A and Car B on attribute dimension i. Thus,
p(Ai 6≡ Bi) represents the probability of recognizing the difference as meaningful.
6.3.1 Pair-wise, single-attribute comparison
The probability that the frequency count for Car A increases at a given moment is
defined as follows:
p(ΨA++) = p(A ⇀ B)
∑
i
p(Attend i) p(Ai 6≡ Bi) 1Ai≥Bi
+ p(A ⇀ T )
∑
i
p(Attend i) p(Ai 6≡ Ti) 1Ai≥Ti .
(6.1)
Here, i indexes attribute dimensions: Ai is the value of Car A at Attribute i. Also,
1condition is an indicator function, whose value is 1 if the condition is met otherwise
0.
Thus, the probability of incrementing the number of favorable comparisons
for Car A is a product of three factors: the probability of comparison, the probability
of attending to one dimension, and the probability of registering the difference as
meaningful. Previous research indicates that the probability of attending to an
attribute dimension is not likely to be different across the choice sets (e.g., Bonaccio
& Reeve, 2006). Thus we assume that p(Attend i) is uniform across dimensions: 1
divided by the number of dimensions.
6.3.2 Comparison probability
The similarity between alternatives is computed with an interdimensional similarity
function (Nosofsky, 1986; Shepard, 1987). Thus the similarity between Cars A and
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B is computed as follows:
ηA,B= exp
−α (∑
i
∆Ai,Bi
)1/γ
Here, parameters α and γ control how the similarity is perceived: α controls overall
discriminability in the attribute space, where the larger value of α indicates the
better discriminability, and γ determines the shape of the similarity function (for a
discussion, see Ja¨kel, Scho¨lkopf, & Wichmann, 2008).
This symmetrical similarity is a function of the psychological difference be-
tween A and B on dimension i, denoted as ∆Ai, Bi . Following Weber’s law, the
difference is computed as a ratio:
∆Ai,Bi =
(
max(Ai, Bi)
min(Ai, Bi)
)γ
(6.2)
Then, the probability of comparing Car A against Car B is defined as:
p(A ⇀ B) =
ηA,B
ηA,B + ηB,A + ηB,T + ηT,B + ηA,T + ηT,A
,
where the denominator normalises by dividing by the sum of all directional pair-wise
similarities.
6.3.3 Just meaningful difference
Using the psychological difference defined in Equation 6.2, the probability of recog-
nizing the difference between Ai and Bi as meaningful is computed with the logistic
function:
p(Ai 6≡ Bi) = 1
1 + exp(β0 + β1 ∆Ai,Bi)
,
where parameters β0 and β1 determines how large the difference should be to be
recognised as meaningful.
6.3.4 Choice probability
The choice probability for Car A is equal to the probability that ΨA reaches threshold
λ before ΨB or ΨT . As some comparisons do not result in an increment to either
ΨA, ΨB, or ΨT , we normalize p(ΨA++) to derive p
∗(ΨA++), the probability of an
98
increment to ΨA, given there is an increment:
p∗(ΨA++) =
p(ΨA++)
p(ΨA++) + p(ΨB++) + p(ΨT++).
Then, the choice probability is computed as follows:
p(Choose A) = p∗(ΨA++)
λ−1∑
ψB=0
λ−1∑
ψT=0
M([λ− 1, ψB, ψT ] | p∗, λ− 1 + ψB + ψT ),
where
p∗ = [p∗(ΨA++), p∗(ΨB++), p∗(ΨT++)].
Here, ψB indicates the value of ΨB when ΨA reaches the threshold, and M is the
multinomial probability mass function: M([ψA, ψB, ψT ] | [p∗(ΨA++), p∗(ΨB++), p∗(ΨT++)], N)
is the probability of Car A accumulating ψA favorable comparisons, Car B accumu-
lating ψB comparisons and Car T accumulating ψT favorable comparisons, given the
normalized probabilities, p∗(ΨA++), p∗(ΨB++) and p∗(ΨT++), and the total number
of comparisons, N . Previously, the decision by sampling model used the binomial
probability mass function (Stewart et al., 2006) to explain choice between two al-
ternatives, but to explain multi-alternative choice, we use the multinomial function.
As the choice is made when ΨA reaches λ, the above computation ensures
that the last comparison favors Car A. The probability of choosing Car B or T is
computed in a similar manner.
6.4 Model Prediction
This section demonstrates the context effects with the above specified computational
model. We first estimate parameter values using the multi-alternative choice data
from Chapter 5, which replicated the attraction, compromise, and similarity effects.
Specifically, we pooled the choice response data from all the participants who cor-
rectly selected the dominant alternative in each catch trial, and sampled parameters
from the posterior distribution using the adaptive Metropolis sampler (Rosenthal,
2011). The prior distribution for all the parameters is a non-informative, improper
distribution: the normal distribution with mean 0 and infinite variance.
We drew 106 posterior parameter values, discarded the first half, and thinned
at an equal interval to retain 104 parameter values. At the median, parameter values
are: α = 0.056, β0 = 15.01, β1 = −14.65 γ = 0.36, and λ = 3.
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Using these parameter values, the context effects were simulated on a hy-
pothetical choice set. The choice set to simulate the attraction effect is illustrated
in Figure 6.5a. These attribute values ensure indifference when only Cars A and
B are available. Car A is 1.5 times better than B in the safety rating, and B is
1.5 times better than A in the fuel efficiency. Thus, probability of recognizing the
difference as meaningful is the same for both dimensions. Also, please note that,
given Equation 6.2, our model is invariant to unit changes. The following prediction
results are identical if, for example, we use kilometers per liter for fuel efficiency.
In the following, we estimated the three context effects and also various
empirical findings associated with these effects. As described above, the parameter
values are constrained only on the choice responses on the choice sets from Chapter
5 which did not include the hypothetical choice set. Thus, the parameter values
are not constrained to produce particular comparison probability or probability to
recognize a difference as meaningful.
6.4.1 The three context effects
Attraction effect
The comparison and choice probability were predicted on the choice set illustrated
in Figure 6.5a. We summed p(A ⇀ B) and p(B ⇀ A) to get the comparison
probability p(A 
 B) in Figure 6.5b. This figure shows that, with Car D present,
Cars A and D are most frequently compared against each other. The error bars here
show that given the choice response data from Chapter 5, we are 95% confident that
the comparison probability in this particular choice set falls into the interval. As
the frequent comparison between Cars A and D favors Car A, Car A becomes most
likely chosen, as displayed in Figure 6.5d.
The attraction effect is reported to be weaker when the decoy is closer to Car
A (Soltani et al., 2012). To simulate this finding, we moved Car D from the point
marked as E in Figure 6.6a toward where Car A is, and computed the probability
of choosing Cars A and B. As Car D comes closer to Car B, the two alternatives
become similar to each other. This similarity increases the probability of A
B com-
parison (Figure 6.6b), but reduces the probability that the difference is registered
as meaningful (Figure 6.6c). When the difference between Cars A and D is not reg-
istered, preference for Car A becomes less likely to increase, resulting in the smaller
difference in the probability that Car A is chosen compared to the probability that
Car B is chosen (Figure 6.6d), just as Soltani et al. (2012) found empirically.
Previous research also reports that the strength of the attraction effect can
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Figure 6.5: MDbS prediction of the attraction effect. Square and circle markers
show prediction with the posterior median parameters, and error bar represents
95% highest density interval.
depends on the location of the decoy (Huber et al., 1982; Wedell, 1991). To simulate
the varying strength, choice probability is computed with three types of decoys: Cars
D, F and R (Figure 6.7a). Figure 6.7c summarizes the probabilities of choosing Cars
A and B.
The model predicts the strongest effect with Car D. Car D is inferior to Car
A in both attribute dimensions, and thus every comparison between Cars A and D
favors A. In contrast, Cars R and F is inferior to A only in one dimension, and hence
only half of comparison between A and the decoy (Car R or F) favors A, resulting
in the weaker effect.
Also compared to Car F, Car R is further away from Car B. As a result, Car
R is less frequently compared against Car B than Car F is, and hence, Car R is more
frequently compared against Car A than Car F is (Figure 6.7b). As the comparisons
between Cars A and R favor Car A, the difference in comparison probability leads
to the difference in the probabilities of choosing Car A.
The difference between the strengths of the attraction effect with Cars R and
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Figure 6.6: MDbS prediction of the attraction effect with various locations of Car
D, from E to A (endpoint exclusive). The shaded area indicates 95% highest density
intervals.
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Figure 6.7: MDbS prediction of the attraction effect with various decoys. Error bar
represents 95% highest density interval.
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Figure 6.8: MDbS prediction of the compromise effect. Square marker shows pre-
diction with the posterior median parameters, and error bar represents 95% highest
density interval.
F is reported significant in Huber et al. (1982) but non-significant in Wedell (1991),
which implies that the difference may be small. Also, the differences between the
strengths with Cars R and D, and Cars D and F are non-significant in both Huber
et al. (1982) and Wedell (1991). Our prediction results show the overlapping error
bars.
Compromise effect
The prediction results for the compromise effect are displayed in Figure 6.8. As Car
B is more similar to Car A than to Car C, the comparison between Cars A and B
is more frequent than between Cars B and C. Similarly, the comparison between
Cars C and A is more frequent than between Cars B and C (Figure 6.8b). As half
of these frequent comparison favors Car A, Car A becomes more likely chosen with
the presence of Car C (Figure 6.8d).
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Figure 6.9: MDbS prediction of the similarity effect. Square marker shows prediction
with the posterior median parameters, and error bar represents 95% highest density
interval.
Similarity effect
The prediction results for the similarity effect are summarized in Figure 6.9. As
discussed above, Cars B and S are most often compared against each other (Fig-
ure 6.9b), but the differences between B and S are less likely recognized as meaningful
(Figure 6.9c), resulting in the larger probability of A being chosen (Figure 6.9d).
6.4.2 Choice response time
Here, we computed the number of comparisons taken in each choice set (see Ap-
pendix B.1 for the computation details). Thus we estimate the numbers of tran-
sitions using a model fit based only on choice data. The results are summarized
in Figure 6.10. The solid line represents the model prediction with the posterior
median parameter values. The model predicts, for instance, that there is a 7.81%
probability that one alternative is chosen after exactly 10 comparisons in the attrac-
tion choice set.
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Figure 6.10: Predicted number of comparisons before choosing A, B, or T.
For comparison, Figure 6.10 also displays the histogram showing the number
of eye-fixation transition between alternatives from Chapter 5, where participants
made a choice in 10 different attraction, compromise and similarity choice sets.
Although the histogram does not contain the eye-fixation data on the choice set
where a choice is predicted, the distribution of the transitions are fairly well fit by
the predicted number of comparisons.
The model itself and also parameter values are not designed or trained to
produce this fit to the eye-fixation counts, but Figure 6.10 illustrates that the MDbS
model captures the pattern of the numbers of the transitions to make a choice.
6.4.3 Effect of choice familiarity
As discussed above, the familiarity with the choice category reduces the attraction
effect (Kim & Hasher, 2005) and also the compromise effect (Sheng et al., 2005).
The effect of choice familiarity is explained in the MDbS model by allowing samples
from long-term memory distributions of attribute values to enter working memory,
in addition to the samples from the current choice set.
The cars from long-term memory in the prediction are randomly drawn from
the uniform distribution, whose range is shown as the shaded area in Figure 6.11a.
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Figure 6.11: Simulated effects of choice familiarity. The square markers in Panels
(b), (c), and (d) represents median predictions with the posterior median parame-
ters. Error bars are 95% highest density interval.
These recalled cars are compared against alternatives in the choice set and remain
in memory until a choice is made. Thus, to allow for comparison to Alternative M
in memory, Equation 6.1 becomes:
p(ΨA++) = p(A ⇀ B)
∑
i
p(Attend i) p(Ai 6≡ Bi) 1Ai≥Bi
+ p(A ⇀ T )
∑
i
p(Attend i) p(Ai 6≡ Ti) 1Ai≥Ti
+ p(A ⇀ M)
∑
i
p(Attend i) p(Ai 6≡Mi) 1Ai≥Mi .
Because the choice probability depends on the recalled cars and recalled cars
are randomly drawn from the distribution, the same parameter values can lead
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to different prediction on the effect of choice familiarity. Therefore, we simulated
a choice 102 times with each of 104 parameters for each number of cars drawn
from long-term memory. The highest density interval for these 106 predictions
was computed for each number of cars from long-term memory and summarized in
Figure 6.11. When the choice is familiar and a car is recalled, the choice probability
becomes less dependent on relative advantage of the cars within the choice set. As a
result, the attraction, compromise and similarity effects diminish with the number
of cars recalled from long-term memory (Figures 6.11b, 6.11c, and 6.11d).
The above prediction results hold as long as the distribution of alternatives
does not favor Car A over Car B or Car B over Car A. Also, as long as the median
point of the distribution is at the middle point between Cars A and B, the results
appears identical with other distributions (e.g., Gaussian with zero covariance).
In addition, the prediction can depend on exact samples drawn from long-
term memory. The simulation does not make an assumption on what sample is more
or less likely to be drawn, but we assume that sampled encountered immediate past
are more likely to be drawn. This assumption is further discussed when we simulate
the attribute range effect below.
6.4.4 Effect of display duration
The attraction, compromise, and similarity effects are also reported to be stronger
with the display duration. In the experiments reported in Pettibone (2012), three
alternatives disappear from the computer screen after two, four, six or eight seconds,
and participant is asked to make a choice. When the alternatives are displayed only
for two or four seconds, the attraction and compromise effects are not observed
or are weaker, compared to when the alternatives are displayed for eight seconds.
The same effect of display duration on the similarity effect was recently reported by
Trueblood et al. (in press).
In simulating this effect of display duration, we assumed that alternatives
are compared against each other only when the alternatives are displayed: rather
than race to threshold, cars are compared for a fixed time after which the higher is
selected. Thus we implement the external stopping rule as in decision field theory
(Roe et al., 2001) (see Appendix B.2 for the computation details).
The prediction results are summarized in Figure 6.12. This figure plots the
strength of the attraction, compromise, and similarity effects as a function of the
number of comparisons. When no comparison is made, one alternative is randomly
chosen and hence the choice probability for Cars A and B does not differ. As the
number of comparisons increases, Car A becomes more likely chosen than Car B,
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Figure 6.12: Simulated effects of display duration. The shaded area represents 95%
highest density interval.
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Figure 6.13: Perceptual focus effect documents the choice of Car A.
indicating the emergence of the context effects. Also in line with Pettibone (2012),
the difference in the choice probability between Cars A and B is generally larger in
the attraction effect than in the compromise effect at each number of comparisons.
6.4.5 Other Context Effects
The perceptual focus effect
The perceptual focus effect has been reported with the choice set in Figure 6.13a.
In this choice set, four cars share the same value on the fuel efficiency, making Car
A distinctive on the fuel efficiency. Hamilton, Hong, and Chernev (2007) found that
Car A is more frequently chosen over Car B in the presence of Cars E, H, and J.
This frequent choice of Car A is ascribed to the distinctiveness of Car A’s attribute
values, which facilitates an individual to focus on Car A.
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Figure 6.14: Attribute balance effect documents the choice of Car A.
This perceptual focus effect is explained by the same mechanisms as in the
similarity and attraction effects by the MDbS model. Although Car B dominates Car
J in the safety rating and is most frequently compared against J, Car J is so similar
to Car B that the difference is less likely recognized as meaningful. Meanwhile, Cars
G and H are inferior to Car A in both attributes, and thus Car A is more frequently
favored through the comparisons. As a result, Car A is more likely chosen than Car
B (Figure 6.13b).
Attribute balance effect
The attribute balance effect is reported when two attribute dimensions are on the
same scale range and unit: e.g., available cars are rated on the scale from 0 to 5 for
both efficiency and safety. Under this condition, an individual tends to choose a car
which has the same scores for both attributes (Chernev, 2004, 2005). An example
choice set is shown in Figure 6.14a.
When the attributes are on the same scale range and unit, the dimensions
are more comparable. As a result, an individual may engage in pair-wise comparison
across dimensions: e.g., the efficiency rating of Car A may be compared against the
safety rating of Car B. When the dimensions are collapsed, the balanced alterna-
tive becomes the compromise alternative in the choice sets used by Chernev (2004,
2005). Then, the attribute-balance effect emerges with the same mechanism as the
compromise effect: Car A is most frequently compared against another Car, and as
a result, Car A most frequently wins a comparison.
Thus to simulate this attribute balance effect, we assumed that the compar-
ison frequency depends on within-dimension and across-dimension similarity. Thus,
the comparison frequency between Cars A and B, for example, is proportional to
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the following:
exp
−α
∑
i
∑
j
∆Ai,Bj
1/γ
 .
Also, the four cars are compared across the attribute dimensions. For example,
efficiency rating of Car A can be compared against safety rating of Car B. The pre-
diction results are summarized in Figure 6.14b. This figure shows that the predicted
choice probability is the highest for Car A, if the attribute dimensions are collapsed.
Consistent with the assumption of the collapsed dimensions, Chernev (2004)
reports that when an individual is primed to examine alternatives attribute by
attribute and also not to collapse the dimensions, their choices do not show the
attribute-balance effect. In addition, when the attribute dimensions are not col-
lapseable (e.g., different units), the attribute-balance effect is not observed (Chernev,
2004).
Attribute range effect
The attribute range effect (Mellers & Cooke, 1994; Cooke & Mellers, 1998) docu-
ments that how attractive an individual finds one attribute value depends on what
values this individual previously saw in other choice sets. After seeing the fuel
efficiency of 68.8mpg in one choice set, for example, an individual finds the fuel
efficiency of 51.6mpg in another choice set less attractive. After seeing the fuel effi-
ciency of 34.4mpg, however, an individual finds 51.6mpg more attractive. A similar
effect is also reported in a risky choice (Ungemach et al., 2011).
This attribute range effect is explained through a comparison against alter-
natives in working memory in the MDbS model. After an individual saw the fuel
efficiency of 34.4mpg in one choice set, this fuel efficiency is likely to remain on his or
her working memory and to be compared against a fuel efficiency in the next choice
set. If this individual recalls 34.4mpg, the memory comparison favors 51.6mpg,
resulting in higher attractiveness of 51.5mpg.
To simulate this effect, we computed the probability of choosing Cars A and
B assuming that × or + in Figure 6.15a are in working memory. Cars marked as ×
enhance the advantage of Car A on the fuel efficiency, resulting in the higher choice
probability for Car A than Car B (Figure 6.15b). When Cars marked as + are in the
working memory, instead, the advantage of Car B on the safety rating is enhanced,
resulting in the higher choice probability for Car B than Car A (Figure 6.15b).
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Figure 6.15: Attribute range effect.
Context effects in risky and intertemporal choice
When an individual is familiar with the attribute dimensions, the distributions of
attribute values in this individual’s long-term memory is likely to reflect the envi-
ronmental distributions. With this assumption, the decision by sampling is able to
explain the shapes of utility/value, probability weighting, and temporal discounting
functions (Stewart et al., 2006), and also key phenomena in risky choice (e.g., the
common ratio effect) (Stewart & Simpson, 2008; Stewart, 2009). Recently, Stewart
et al. (in press) demonstrate that the shapes of utility/value and probability weight-
ing functions can be manipulated by changing the environmental distribution of
gains, losses, probabilities, and delays, supporting the predictions from the decision
by sampling model.
6.5 Model Comparison
This section compares the performance of the MDbS model against that of multi-
alternative decision field theory (MDFT; Roe et al., 2001) in predicting the at-
traction, compromise and similarity effects. MDFT is among the most extensively
studied models of multi-alternative choice. Berkowitsch et al. (in press), for ex-
ample, compare MDFT against probit models and demonstrate the advantage of
MDFT. Also, Trueblood et al. (in press) compare MDFT against multi-attribute
linear ballistic accumulator model.
The MDFT model is an extension of decision field theory (Busemeyer &
Townsend, 1993) to explain the three context effects under the single frame work.
As in the MDbS model, the MDFT implements dynamic preference development,
where a choice is reached through a series of evaluations and comparisons. Unlike the
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MDbS model, however, an alternative is evaluated in relation to the mean attribute
values of the other alternatives, and the developing preferences inhibit each other,
where the strength of the inhibition depends on the distance between alternatives.
The relative evaluation and distance-based inhibition is the key component of MDFT
to explain the context effects (at the posterior median, the parameter values are
φ1 = 2.02, φ2 = 1.01, ξ = 15.39, σ
2 = 0.02, and a threshold is 1.89).
The MDFT model has been examined by assuming that a choice is reached
after a fixed amount of time (an external stopping rule) (e.g., Trueblood et al., in
press) or after preference is stabilized (a convergence stopping rule) (e.g., Berkow-
itsch et al., in press), rather than by assuming that a choice is reached after prefer-
ence for one alternative reaches a threshold (an internal stopping rule). In Chapter
5, the timing of choice was not controlled: participants were allowed to spend as
much time as necessary to make a choice. Therefore, the experiment design reflects
the use of the convergence stopping rule or the internal stopping rule.
The convergence stopping rule, however, is not applicable to the models
without inhibition, including the MDbS model. For the purpose of the model com-
parison, we consider it fair to use the same stopping rule for both MDbS and MDFT
models, and thus compared the models with the internal stopping rule.
The MDFT model with the internal stopping rule, however, does not have
an analytic solution to choice probability, and the choice probability has been de-
rived by simulating choices (e.g, Hotaling, Busemeyer, & Li, 2010). When choice
probability is derived by simulations, the same parameter value can lead to slightly
different predictions. To reduce this uncertainty, we simulated 20,000 choices to
derive prediction and manually seeded the random number generator, so that the
same parameter values lead to the reasonably accurate, identical predictions.
Lastly unlike the MDbS model, the MDFT model is scale-variant: when the
attribute values are on the different scale, one attribute dimension could dispro-
portionally drive preference development. This scale-variance make it impossible
to apply the same parameter values across the different choice sets with different
units. Thus, it is necessary to normalize the attribute values for the MDFT model.
Following the personal communication with Prof. Jerome R. Busemeyer (2013), we
normalized the values to range from 0 to 1, using the maximum and the minimum
value on each attribute dimensions across choice sets in the entire experiment (see
Appendix B.3 for the more details).
Then we sampled posterior parameter values for the MDFT model using
the same method as we used for the MDbS model as described earlier: We pooled
the choice response data from Chapter 5, and used a non-informative, improper
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Figure 6.16: MDbS posterior predictives for p(Choose A)−p(Choose B). The square
markers show the prediction with the posterior median parameters (α = 0.056,
β0 = 15.01, β1 = −14.65 γ = 0.36, and λ = 3), and the error bars show the 95%
highest density interval. The cross represents overall mean.
distribution as the prior. This prior distribution, however, covers only the area
where preference can be stable: i.e., the eiganvalue of the inhibition matrix is equal
to or less than one in magnitude (Roe et al., 2001). Outside this stable area, the
prior distribution is set to 0. Also due to the computational expense, we sampled
the 105 parameter values, instead of 106, discarded the first half, and thinned at an
equal interval to retain 104 samples.
6.5.1 Posterior predictive distributions
Figures 6.16 and 6.17 show the model predictions on the choice sets we used to draw
the posterior parameter values. Each marker represents a choice product (e.g., cars,
laptops, and TV sets). Chapter 5 had two versions for each choice product: one
where the context favors A, and the other where the context favors B. Alternatives
in the latter version are recoded so that the context favors A, and the predictions
for the two versions are mean-averaged.
While the MDbS model predicts the overall attraction effect reasonably well
(Figure 6.16a), the model underpredicts the overall strength of the compromise effect
(Figure 6.16b) and does not provide an accurate variability in the strength of the
similarity effect between choice products (Figure 6.16c). This observation confirms
that the compromise and similarity effects are on a fine balance in the MDbS com-
ponents. When the similarity between alternatives has a stronger influence on the
comparison probability, the compromise effect becomes stronger but the similarity
effect becomes weaker. Also when the just-meaningful-different threshold is higher,
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Figure 6.17: MDFT posterior predictives for p(Choose A) − p(Choose B). The
square markers show the prediction with the posterior median parameters (φ1 =
2.02, φ2 = 1.01, ξ = 15.39, σ
2 = 0.02, and a threshold is 1.89), and the error bars
show the 95% highest density interval. The cross represents overall mean.
the compromise effect becomes weaker but the similarity effect becomes stronger.
For the MDbS model, this balance resulted in the underprediction of the strength
of the compromise effect.
The same, more subtle balance leads the MDFT model to underpredict the
strength of the similarity effect (Figure 6.17c). Also while the MDFT model captures
the attraction, compromise and similarity effects on average, the model is not able
to predict the variability in the strength of context effects between choice problems,
primarily because of the normalization (Figure 6.17).
6.5.2 Predictive accuracy
Here, we compare performance of the MDbS and MDFT models. In comparing com-
putational cognitive models, previous research has often used Baysian information
criteria (BIC; Schwarz, 1978) or the odds of the model likelihoods. BIC approxi-
mates the model likelihood, when the number of observation in data is large, and
when the distribution of the prediction errors follows an exponential family (e.g.,
Gaussian, binomial and multinomial). While our application of the MDbS and
MDFT models assumes the multinomially distributed error, it is unrealistic to use
BIC here, as the model likelihood is not available when the prior distribution is
improper (Gelman et al., 2013). More generally, the value of the model likelihood
depends on the exact specification of the prior. For example, the model likelihood,
computed with the prior distribution for one parameter being the uniform distribu-
tion between −100 and 100, can be lowered by the factor of 10, when the prior for the
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Figure 6.18: Predictive accuracy of the models.
parameter is the uniform between −1000 and 1000. Moreover, the model likelihood
depends on the model parameterization: the MDbS model can have larger or smaller
model likelihood by employing the slightly altered function for the just-meaningful-
differences while keeping the model predictions identical. These properties led us to
conclude that the model likelihood may not be particularly useful in comparing dis-
tinctively different models, such as the MDbS and MDFT models (see also Gelman
& Shalizi, 2013).
Instead, we compared the models in their predictive accuracy and assessed
the out-of-sample prediction error. While a natural way to assess this error is cross-
validation, the cross-validation can be computationally very expensive. Thus for
practical reasons, several approximation methods have been proposed (for review,
see Gelman, Hwang, & Vehtari, in press), and we used one of the most accurate
method, Widely Applicable Information Criteria (WAIC; Watanabe, 2010). In its
computational specification, WAIC penalizes the predictive accuracy with the flex-
ibility of the prediction. Thus the model is penalized when the posterior predictive
distribution is off the observed choice proportion and/or has a large variance (see
Appendix B.4 for the computational detail).
WAIC for the MDbS and MDFT models are displayed in Figure 6.18. The
larger value of WAIC indicates the better performance. As we have the same number
of observations for the attraction, compromise, and similarity choice sets, WAIC is
comparable across the three choice sets. Across the choice sets, both models show
the same pattern of predictive accuracy: both MDbS and MDFT models make
more accurate prediction for the attraction choice set than for the compromise or
similarity choice set. This reduced accuracy in the compromise and similarity choice
sets quantitatively confirms that the difficult balance the models are making in
predicting the strength of the compromise and similarity effects.
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The advantage of the MDbS model in predicting the attraction effect out-
weights the smaller advantage of the MDFT in predicting the compromise and sim-
ilarity effects. As a result, the MDbS model (WAIC = −1411.28) outperforms the
MDFT model (WAIC = −1413.10) for overall accuracy. Thus, while both the MDbS
model and the MDFT predicts the attraction effect better than the compromise and
similarity effects, the MDbS model provides a better prediction of the attraction ef-
fect. This advantage results in the overall better predictive accuracy of the MDbS
model.
6.6 Relations to Other Models
We proposed a new model of decision-making: the MDbS model. This new model
has the three components: 1) an alternative is evaluated through a series of pair-
wise comparisons on a single attribute value, 2) similar alternatives are compared
more often, and 3) relatively small differences in attribute values are ignored. We
have demonstrated that these components explain the attraction, compromise, and
similarity effects. These components of the MDbS model, however, have been im-
plemented in existing models of decision making. In this section, we address how
the MDbS model relates to other models.
Recently, Simonson et al. (2013) proposed that choices are based on the
comparisons which are task-acceptable and easy to make. According to Simonson
et al. (2013), the task-acceptability depends on whether the comparison results are
informative in judging which alternative is better. For example, when choosing
between Cars A and B, a comparison between Cars A and C is not acceptable.
This is because a comparison between Cars A and C does not justify a choice of
Car A over B or Car B over A. Therefore, alternatives are compared only within a
choice set, and inevitably, this account does not readily explain the effects of choice
familiarity and the attribute-range effect. The other component of Simonson et al.
(2013)’s proposal, the ease of comparison, depends on a number of factors, including
computational ease and saliency of alternatives. With this regard, we propose that
similarity between alternatives also determines probability of comparisons.
However, Simonson et al. (2013) does not specify how alternatives are eval-
uated in the comparisons. In the MDbS model, the comparison is insensitive to the
magnitude of the differences, as long as the difference is judged meaningful. The
magnitude-insensitive comparison is implemented in the model proposed by de Clip-
pel and Eliaz (2012). In de Clippel and Eliaz (2012), each alternative is ranked on
each attribute dimension, and an individual chooses the alternative whose minimum
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ranking is highest. Thus, the procedure to rank alternatives is unbiased: unlike the
MDbS model, the rank is not influenced by similarity between alternatives.
Influence of similarity on decision making has also been employed in models
of risky choice (e.g. Rubinstein, 1989; Leland, 1994; Buschena & Zilberman, 1999).
For example, Buschena and Atwood (2011) argue that an individual employs dif-
ferent decision strategies depending on the similarity between alternatives. While
in the MDbS model similar alternatives are compared in the same manner as dis-
similar alternatives, the similarity between alternatives determines the probability
of comparison and also the probability of recognizing the difference as meaningful.
These influence of similarity on choice processes might appear as if an individual is
engaged in different choice processes depending on the similarity.
Also among the models of risky choice, priority heuristic (Brandstatter et al.,
2006) implements the just meaningful difference. This heuristic predicts that an indi-
vidual chooses the alternative if the alternative excels another by 10%. Brandstatter
et al. (2006) argue that this 10% threshold is fixed. In contrast, the threshold for
the just meaningful difference is probabilistic in the MDbS model. The probabilistic
threshold has been implemented in models to explain how a change in prices influ-
ences consumer behavior (e.g., Han, Gupta, & Lehmann, 2001) and also to explain
choices of transportation (e.g., Cantillo, Heydecker, & Ortu´zar, 2006; Cantillo &
Ortu´zar, 2006).
The MDbS model is perhaps most similar to the exemplar-based random
walk (EBRW) model of categorization (Nosofsky & Palmeri, 1997). According the
EBRW model, an individual categorizes a target object through a series of pair-wise
comparisons. In each comparison, an object is recalled from memory, and as in the
MDbS model, the target object is more likely compared against a similar object,
and the comparison results are accumulated over time. Also, similar to the MDbS
model, when this accumulation reaches a threshold, the individual makes a choice in
the EBRW model. Unlike the MDbS model however, the choice in the EBRW model
is on what category the target object belongs to, and the individual accumulates
counts for categories a compared object favors. In the MDbS model, the individual
accumulates counts for alternatives a comparison favors.
The three components of the MDbS model have been employed in various
models. Our contribution to the exiting literature is to show that combination of
the components explains the context effects.
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6.7 Limitations
The multi-alternative decision by sampling model, we propose here, concerns a
choice in a static choice set, which excludes a non-static choice set. In a non-
static choice set, an alternative becomes unavailable or available at an arbitrary
time point. When an alternative is announced unavailable, this announcement of-
ten changes the preference order (Worchel, Lee, & Adewole, 1975; see Verhallen &
Robben, 1995, for review). Boland, Brucks, and Nielsen (2012), for example, asked
participants to choose the most and second most preferred alternatives in a choice
set. When the most preferred alternative is announced unavailable, the second most
preferred alternative does not become the most preferred among the available alter-
native. Instead, another alternative, which is similar to the unavailable alternative,
becomes the most preferred among the available alternatives. This effect of alterna-
tive unavailability is also called the phantom decoy effect (Highhouse, 1996). When
an alternative becomes unavailable, a choice process appears to change (e.g., Walter
& Festinger, 1964). While the nature of this process change is an interesting topic,
our intention in this article is focused on a choice in a static choice set.
6.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, we developed the decision by sampling account of the attraction,
compromise, similarity, and other context effects. The preference for an alternative
is developed through a series of pair-wise comparisons on single attribute dimension.
In the comparisons, similar alternatives are more often compared, but a relatively
small difference is considered to be not meaningful. We have demonstrated that
these three components explain a range of empirical findings concerning the context
effects.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
This thesis investigated how an individual evaluates an alternative and how he or
she makes a choice. Choices have been extensively studied and modeled with two
classes of models: static and dynamic models. Traditionally, the class of static mod-
els has been developed to understand risky choice. In risky choice, an alternative
is associated with probabilistic pay-offs, and models of risky choice have attracted
much attention in psychology, and in experimental and behavioral economics. As I
discussed in the introduction, these models have typically been examined using care-
fully selected sets of choice alternatives (e.g., Allais’s paradox to compare prospect
theory against expected utility theory).
A model performance however, can depend on which alternatives are being
considered. A model, which outperforms another model in one set of alternatives,
may underperform in another set of alternatives. To evaluate models with a wide
range of alternatives, Chapter 2 developed a non-parametric method for estimat-
ing the utility map and comparing the models. The estimated maps are compared
against three of the most well-known static models: expected utility theory, cumu-
lative prospect theory, and the transfer of attention exchange model. The results
show that cumulative prospect theory and the transfer of attention exchange model
fits better to choices than expected utility theory, indicating an advantages of cu-
mulative prospect theory and transfer of attention exchange model over expected
utility theory.
However, the results in Chapter 2 also show that utility predicted from the
models deviates from the estimated map in some regions of the probability triangle.
The deviation implies that a new model, if it better captures patterns of estimated
map, could outperform the existing models. Utility, however, may be unstable, as
the results from the following chapters indicate.
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Chapter 3 examined effects of set-sizes and information presentation formats
in risky choice. Previous research on risky choice, including the study reported
in Chapter 2, has been predominantly based on studies of choices between two
alternatives, with the findings often generalized to environments with more than
two alternatives. One prominent claim of this research is that choices differ with
respect to risk when alternatives are described — the description paradigm — as
opposed to experienced — the experience paradigm: Individuals appear to make
choices as if they over-weight small probabilities in the description paradigm, but
under-weight the same probabilities in the experience paradigm.
Chapter 3 demonstrated that the under-weighting in the experience paradigm
is sensitive to set-sizes in the gain domain. Two experiments show that with a
growth in set-sizes, choices systematically favor risky alternatives in the experi-
ence paradigm, appearing as if small probabilities are over-weighted. This risk-
amplification is due to the statistical structure of pay-offs, where in a large set, at
least one risky alternative is more likely to deliver a pay-off at a much higher fre-
quency than its underlying probability. Chapter 3 simulated several static models to
further demonstrate that the difference between the frequency of pay-off and its true
probability drives the risk-amplification, regardless of choice and search strategies
employed.
Effects of set-sizes on risky choice are further explored in Chapter 4. In
particular, Chapter 4 examined information overload. A large set was previously
reported to overload an individual’s cognition — information overload — often re-
sulting in choice deferral. More recent studies, however, indicate that information
overload is more tightly associated with the number of attributes to describe al-
ternatives than with set-sizes. Thus, Chapter 4 assessed impacts of the number
of possible pay-offs on choice deferral: participants were endowed with money and
then given the opportunity to search through varying numbers of alternatives and
to either purchase a pay-off from an alternative or to defer a choice and keep the
money. The alternatives were presented in the description or experience paradigm.
The results in Chapter 4 show that in both description and experience
paradigms, individuals are more likely to purchase an alternative when the set size is
larger. Also in the description paradigm, choice is more frequently deferred when an
alternative is associated with many possible pay-offs than with few possible pay-offs.
The results indicate that a growth in set-sizes leads to thin-search — search for less
information per alternative — and that an increment in the number of attributes
promotes non-compensatory strategy use. Thin-search often results in a systematic
bias in evaluation of alternatives. This bias explains choice deferral.
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These results from Chapters 3 and 4 indicate that utility may depend on
information presentation formats and also the number of possible pay-offs. In the
experience paradigm, evaluation of an alternative is often influenced by the statis-
tical structure of pay-offs, and with a growth in set-sizes, this influence eventually
overrides subtle differences between static models. Also, the results from Chapter 4
indicate that one model may explain choices the best when an alternative is associ-
ated with few possible pay-offs, but that the same model may be outperformed by
another model when the number of possible pay-offs is increased.
These results imply an alternative way to consider static models. As dis-
cussed in the introduction, static models are often developed with an aim to produce
single model that explains as many choice phenomena (e.g., violation of coalescing)
as possible. The results presented in Chapter 4, however, indicate that an indi-
vidual may adapt a different strategy depending on the structures of alternatives.
Thus, the results imply that existing static models may be too specific in explain-
ing choices in one context, and exiting models may lack generalizability to explain
choices across contexts and structures of alternatives.
The instability of utility, however, has been captured by dynamic models,
and with this regard, dynamic models might be able to provide a better explana-
tion of choices than static models. Unlike static models, a dynamic model assumes
that an individual iteratively and stochastically develops preferences for alterna-
tives. This stochastic nature of preference development can capture the instability
of utility. While dynamic models can be compared on their accuracy to predict
choices, dynamic models can also be evaluated on assumed processes of preference
development. The assumptions on choice processes are tested in Chapter 5.
In particular, Chapter 5 examined eye-movements recorded during a series
of three alternative choice. In three alternative choice, the attraction, compromise,
and similarity effects demonstrate instability of utility: the utility of an alterna-
tive appears dependent on the other alternatives in a set. Thus, these effects are
considered to suggest that utility is realized through the comparison of alterna-
tives. Chapter 5 investigated exactly how alternatives are compared against each
other. The results indicate that a series of comparisons is made in each choice,
with a pair of alternatives compared on a single attribute dimension in each com-
parison. Then, Chapter 5 concluded that psychological models of choice should be
based on the single-attribute pair-wise comparisons, as these comparisons are not
assumed in two of the dynamic models reviewed in the introduction: decision field
theory (Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993; Roe et al., 2001) and comparison grouping
model (Tsuzuki & Guo, 2004).
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Following the conclusion from Chapter 5, Chapter 6 proposes the multi-
alternative decision by sampling model. This new dynamic model explains the at-
traction, compromise, and similarity effects with three components: an alternative is
evaluated through a series of pair-wise comparisons on single attribute values, simi-
lar alternatives are compared more often, and relatively small differences in attribute
values are ignored. The first two components are supported by eye-movement data
in Chapter 5, and the third component is based on well-established empirical find-
ings. Thus, the proposed model is tightly grounded on choice processes implicated
by the eye-movement data and previous empirical findings.
The model evaluation reported in Chapter 6 indicates that the proposed
model explains the attraction, compromise, and similarity effects equally well to
or slightly better than decision field theory. This result demonstrates again that
dynamic models, including the proposed model, are more difficult to differentiate
in their ability to explain choices than in their assumptions on choice processes.
The proposed model, however, can reproduce empirical findings related to choice
processes and also predicts various other context effects, demonstrating that the
proposed model accurately reflects choice processes.
Taken together, the studies reported in this thesis imply an advantage of
dynamic models over static models, as a core assumption of static models — presence
of stable utility — is not supported. As reviewed in Chapter 1, static models explain
choices with the utility maximization principle. With this principle, various static
models have been proposed to provide a descriptive account of utility, assuming
that utility is stable across various contexts determined by information presentation
formats and relationships between alternatives within a set. As a result, static
models typically do not account for instability of utility. In contrast, dynamic
models could incorporate instability of utility, and in Chapter 6, the new, dynamic
model was demonstrated with its ability to produce various empirical findings.
The two classes of models, however, were not directly compared against each
other in this thesis: Static models are discussed in Chapters 2, 3, and 4, and dynamic
models are discussed in Chapters 5 and 6. While Chapter 5 successfully employed
eye-movement data to evaluate choice processes assumed by dynamic models, eye-
movement data were not used to test assumptions of static models. Thus, the
studies reported here evaluated static and dynamic models with different methods,
and hence, this thesis does not provide a direct, empirical support for an advantage
of dynamic models. Thus, the advantage of dynamic models is speculative as it is.
The studies reported here, however, indicate that models, either static or
dynamic, can be difficult to differentiate in their ability to explain choices (see also
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Birnbaum, 2011), and that it is often required to evaluate models with additional
data to test their assumptions.
Possible advantage of dynamic models over static models, however, does
not invalidate static models altogether. Static models have been used to understand
rationality of choices (Oaksford & Chater, 2009), and thus, static models can provide
a guidance for rational choices. Also, while dynamic models can explain instability of
utility due to various contexts, dynamic models may not be able to explain instability
of utility due to other psychological factors, such as emotion, fatigue, and stress.
To summarize, this thesis evaluated various models on their ability to explain
choices and their assumptions of choice processes, and based on empirical findings
on choice processes, the new model was proposed. I would like to conclude this
thesis with a hope that the studies reported here will be leveraged in future research
to further advance scientific understanding of choices.
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Appendix A
Details of Simulation in Chapter
5
A.1 Multi-alternative decision field theory
In this appendix, we describe the computation to derive the results in the left panel
in Figure 5.2. The parameter values and the alternative values are taken from
Hotaling et al. (2010).
In simulating multi-alternative decision field theory, we label three alterna-
tives as A, B, and T , where T indicates D, C or S depending on the choice set.
These alternatives are described with two attributes, E (economy) and Q (quality).
The value of Alternative A on the economy dimension is denoted as EA and that
on the quality dimension is QA. The values used in the simulation is summarized
in Table A.1. Preference for the three alternatives is iteratively developed through
the computation described in Chapter 1, but following Hotaling et al. (2010), the
influence of Alternative i on j, sij , is computed as:
sij = 0.99 (δij − 0.05 exp(−0.022D2ij)).
Here, δij is 1 if i equals j, otherwise δij is 0. The other parameters are set as follows:
ξ = 12, and σ2 = 1.
Third Alternative (T) EA EB ET QA QB QT
D 1.0 3.0 0.5 3.0 1.0 2.5
C 2.0 3.0 1.0 2.0 1.0 3.0
S 1.0 3.0 2.9 3.0 1.0 1.1
Table A.1: Values used in the simulation
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Third Alternative (T) EA EB ET QA QB QT
D 2.0 8.0 1.5 8.0 2.0 7.5
C 5.0 8.0 2.0 5.0 2.0 8.0
S 2.0 8.0 7.5 8.0 2.0 2.5
Table A.2: Values used in the simulation
The iterative update starts with zero preference for all the alternatives, and
after 1,000 iterations, the alternative with the highest preference is chosen. For each
specified frequency of attending to economy and quality, a choice is simulated 106
times to derive the probability of choosing each alternative.
A.2 Modified version of the comparison grouping model
In this appendix, we describe the computation to derive the results in the right
panel in Figure 5.2.
The three alternatives are labeled as A, B, and T , where T indicates D, C or
S depending on the choice set. These alternatives are described with two attributes,
E (economy) and Q (quality). The value of Alternative A on the economy dimension
is denoted as EA and that on the quality dimension is QA. The parameter values
and the values for the alternatives are taken from Tsuzuki and Guo (2004): the
parameter values are λ = 0.04, τ = 0.60, µ = 31, ν = 3.35, and ψ = 0.905; and the
values for the alternatives are displayed in Table A.2.
The iteration is initiated with preference for attribute dimensions being 0.50
each, and preference for alternatives starts with 0, rather than a random sample
from the uniform distribution between 0.25 and 0.75 as in the original model. Also,
unlike the original model, preference for two attribute dimensions and only two
alternatives is updated at one iteration.
After 1000 iterations, the alternative with the highest preference is chosen.
For simplicity, frequency of attending a pair of Alternatives A and B is the same
as attending a pair of Alternatives A and T. For each frequency of attending a
pair of Alternatives B and T, a choice is simulated 106 times to derive the choice
probability.
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Appendix B
Details of Computation in
Chapter 6
B.1 Choice response time in the attraction, compro-
mise and similarity choice set
We computed how likely one alternative is chosen after the Nthe comparison as
follows:
p(Choose after the Nth comparison) = p(Choose A after the Nth comparison)
+ p(Choose B after the Nth comparison)
+ p(Choose T after the Nth comparison),
where
p(Choose A after the Nth comparison)
= p(ΨA++ at the Nth comparison)
p(λ− 1 = ΨA and λ− 1 ≥ ΨB and λ− 1 ≥ ΨT after N − 1 comparisons)
= p(ΨA++)
min(λ−1, N−λ)∑
ψB=0
min(λ−1, N−λ−ψB)∑
ψT=0
p
(
ΨA = λ− 1,ΨB = ψA,ΨT = ψA
after N − 1 comparisons
)
.
137
The last term is computed with multinomial probability mass function:
p(ΨA = ψA,ΨB = ψB,ΨT = ψT after N comparisons)
=M([ψA, ψB, ψT , N − ψA − ψB − ψT ] |
[p(ΨA++), p(ΨB++), p(ΨT++), 1− p(ΨA++)− p(ΨB++)− p(ΨT++)], N)
(B.1)
B.2 Computation details for simulating the effect of dis-
play duration
p(Choose A after N comparisons)
= p(ΨA > ΨB,ΨA > ΨT after N comparisons)
+
1
2
p(ΨA = ΨB,ΨA > ΨT after N comparisons)
+
1
2
p(ΨA > ΨB,ΨA = ΨT after N comparisons)
+
1
3
p(ΨA = ΨB = ΨT after N comparisons)
=
N∑
ψA=1
min(ψA−1,N−ψA)∑
ψB=0
min(ψA−1,N−ψA−ψB)∑
ψT=0
p
(
ΨA = ψA,ΨB = ψB,ΨT = ψT
after N comparisons
)
+
1
2
bN/2c∑
ψA=1
min(ψA−1,N−ψA−ψA)∑
ψT=0
p(ΨA = ψA,ΨB = ψA,ΨT = ψT after N comparisons)
+
1
2
bN/2c∑
ψA=1
min(ψA−1,N−ψA−ψA)∑
ψB=0
p(ΨA = ψA,ΨB = ψB,ΨT = ψA after N comparisons)
+
1
3
bN/3c∑
ψA=0
p(ΨA = ψA,ΨB = ψA,ΨT = ψA after N comparisons).
Then the probability is computed with Equation B.1, and also, p(Choose B after N
comparisons) is computed in the similar manner.
B.3 Attribute value normalization for the MDFT model
Figure B.1 displays locations of all the alternatives used in Noguchi and Stewart
(2014). The attribute values are normalized, so that Alternative C has value 0 and
Alternative C′ has value 1 on the dimension represented by the horizontal axis,.
138
C’
S
A
S’
C
B
D
D’
Figure B.1: Locations of alternatives used in Noguchi and Stewart (2014).
After this normalization, Alternative A has the value of [0.33, 0.67] and Alternative
B has the value of [0.67, 0.33] for all the choice sets.
B.4 Widely applicable information criteria
First, a vector of parameter values are labeled θ, and the ith choice response in the
data from Noguchi and Stewart (2014) is yi, where i = 1, . . . , n. Then, the widely
applicable information criteria (WAIC) is defined as follows:
WAIC =
n∑
i=1
ln
∫
p(yi|θ) p(θ|data) dθ −
n∑
i=1
var(ln p(yi|θ,data))
To compute this, we used parameter values drawn from the posterior distribution.
The parameter values in the jth draw is denoted as θ(j), where j = 1, . . . , s. Then,
ŴAIC =
n∑
i=1
ln
1
s
s∑
j=1
p(yi|θ(j))
− n∑
i=1
 1
s− 1
s∑
j=1
(
ln p(yi|θ(j))− 1
s
s∑
k=1
ln p(yi|θ(k))
)2 .
For the notation simplicity, WAIC in the main text refers to ŴAIC in the above.
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